scholarly journals The dynamics of change in decision making under risk

Psihologija ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Milicevic ◽  
Dubravka Pavlicic ◽  
Aleksandar Kostic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Empirical Evaluation ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
Outcome Probability ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

The goal of this study was to investigate the dynamics of decision making under risk. In three experiments this dynamics have been explored with respect to probability of outcome and with respect to frame, i.e. the way the outcomes of the alternatives have been specified. The process of decision making was explored within a framework of expected utility and Prospect theory. The outcomes of alternatives as well as their probabilities were quantitatively specified (so that the expected value of a risk alternative was equal to the value of a non-risk alternative). The results of experiments indicate that the attitude towards risk (risk-proneness vs. risk-averseness) depends on the outcome probability and the way the outcomes were specified (i.e. positive/negative frame). It was also demonstrated that content strongly affects the choices made in decision making. This outcome is somewhat unexpected and requires additional empirical evaluation.

scholarly journals Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Post ◽  
Martijn J van den Assem ◽  
Guido Baltussen ◽  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
Game Show ◽  
Dependent Choice

We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show “Deal or No Deal” and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. (JEL D81)

scholarly journals Law & Economics as a Theory of Decision Making in Legal Contexts – Decision Theoretical Foundations, Their Misinterpretations and Excessive Claims of Economic Analysis of Law

2012 ◽  
pp. 34-50
Author(s):  
Magdalena Małecka
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Economic Analysis Of Law ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Legal Contexts ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
The Way

The article treats law & economics as a proposal of a theory of decision making in legal settings. It is emphasized that the distinction between two approaches in economic analysis of law: the neoclassical and the behavioral one, is made with reference to two different theories of decision making applied in the realm of each approach. The neoclassical approach is based on the theory of expected utility, whereas the behavioral one – on prospect theory. According to the scholars on both sides, application of decision theory might be helpful in influencing behavior by legal norms in a more sophisticated way. The claim of the article is that law & economics scholars misinterpret the assumptions and propositions of the theories and/or formulate excessive claims, if they argue that decision theoretical findings provide knowledge about the way in which people’s decisions are influenced by law.

scholarly journals Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Person ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.

The Paradox of Minimax Regret

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 918-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Beck
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Risk Model ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Decision Making Under Uncertainty ◽  
Minimax Regret ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
Participation Decision ◽  
Making A Difference ◽  
Made In

The introduction of decision making under uncertainty by Ferejohn and Fiorina is an interesting addition to the literature on rational theories of citizen participation. Decision making under uncertainty assumes, however, that the actor has no knowledge of the probabilities of the various outcomes; this is obviously no more true than the assumption of perfect information about these probabilities made in the decision making under risk model. Voters have some, but not perfect, information about the probabilities of at least some of the different possible outcomes.Specifically, let us look at the two-party case. In Ferejohn's notation, (p3 + p4) is the probability of an individual's vote making a difference. We might expect a rational citizen to know that this probability is at most minuscule, even if he cannot calculate its exact value.

scholarly journals ECONOMICS OF RANDOMNESS: BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
Alexander Krasilnikov
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Uncertainty Analysis ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Probabilistic Methods ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
History Of

The paper discusses evolution of the concept of risk in economics. History of probabilistic methods and approaches to risk and uncertainty analysis is considered. Expected utility theory, behavioral approaches, heuristic models and methods of neuroeconomics are analyzed. Author investigates stability of neoclassical program related to risk analysis and suggests further directions of development.

Measuring Utility, Destabilizing EUT

2018 ◽  
pp. 261-280
Author(s):  
Ivan Moscati
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Behavioral Models ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
Utility Measurement ◽  
Elicitation Methods ◽  
Series Of Experiments

Chapter 16 shows how the validity of expected utility theory (EUT) was increasingly called into question between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s and discusses how a series of experiments performed from 1974 to 1985 undermined the earlier confidence that EUT makes it possible to measure utility. Beginning in the mid-1960s, in a series of experiments seminal to the field later called behavioral economics, Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky, and others showed that decision patterns violating EUT are systematic. The new experimenters who engaged with the EUT-based measurement of utility from the mid-1970s, namely Uday Karmarkar, Richard de Neufville, Paul Schoemaker, and coauthors, showed that different elicitation methods to measure utility, which according to EUT should produce the same outcome, generate different measures. These findings contributed to destabilizing EUT, undermined the confidence in EUT-based utility measurement, and helped foster a blossoming of novel behavioral models of decision-making under risk.

From Chicago to Paris

2018 ◽  
pp. 177-192
Author(s):  
Ivan Moscati
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Economic Model ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
The Face

Chapter 11 studies the second phase of the debate on expected utility theory (EUT), which commenced in May 1950, when Paul Samuelson, Leonard J. Savage, Jacob Marschak, Milton Friedman, and William Baumol initiated an intense exchange of letters. These economists argued about the exact assumptions underlying EUT, quarreled over whether these assumptions are compelling requisites for rational behavior under risk, and debated the nature of the cardinal utility function u featured in EUT. This correspondence modified the views of all five economists and transformed Samuelson into a supporter of EUT. In a prominent conference in Paris in May 1952, Friedman, Savage, Marschak, and Samuelson advocated EUT in the face of attacks from Maurice Allais and other opponents of the theory. The Paris conference and the publication of an Econometrica symposium on EUT in October 1952 marked the emergence of EUT as the mainstream economic model of decision-making under risk.

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