scholarly journals Epistemic contextualism

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Zivan Lazovic
Keyword(s):  
Main Topic ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Inferential Contextualism ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The aim of this article is to provide an introduction to the main topic of this issue of Theoria. First, the author presents the key thesis of epistemic contextualism, outlines its development in contemporary epistemology and briefly characterizes its two versions, namely conversational and inferential contextualism. Second, the author focuses on some contextualist solutions to three major epistemological problems: the problem of scepticism, lottery, and Gettier's problem. The author agrees with Stewart Cohen that Gettier?s problem does not belong to this group and explains why both its formulation and a solution require a traditional, invariantist approach.

scholarly journals Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Behavioural Experiments ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioural claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioural claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people's tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My evidence consists in results from several behavioural experiments. I conclude that contextualism is an idle hypothesis and I propose some general methodological lessons.

scholarly journals Lewis’s contextual solution to the Lottery paradox and the Gettier problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Marija Rekovic
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Skeptical Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The main topic of this paper is conversational contextualism, one of the most dominant versions of epistemic contextualism, endorsed by David Lewis. Proponents of conversational contextualism, including Lewis, argue that the key advantage of this view lies in its unique way of analyzing and solving the most prominent epistemological problems. Among those problems are the skeptical paradox, the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The first part of the paper is concerned with the general features of conversational contextualism. In the second part of the paper the author highlights the main hypotheses of conversational contextualism, proposed by Lewis, as an attempt to solve the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The last part of the paper analyzes the pros and cons of the Lewisian solutions to the aforementioned problems. The key part in that analysis is the Cohen?s criticism of those solutions.

scholarly journals ‘KNOWLEDGE’ ASCRIPTIONS, SOCIAL ROLES AND SEMANTICS

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin McKenna
Keyword(s):  
Social Roles ◽  
Social Role ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The State ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Concept Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

AbstractThe idea that the concept ‘knowledge’ has a distinctive function or social role is increasingly influential within contemporary epistemology. Perhaps the best-known account of the function of ‘knowledge’ is that developed in Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature (1990, Oxford University Press), on which (roughly) ‘knowledge’ has the function of identifying good informants. Craig's account of the function of ‘knowledge’ has been appealed to in support of a variety of views, and in this paper I'm concerned with the claim that it supports a sort of epistemic contextualism, which is (roughly) the view that the semantic contents and truth-conditions of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – instances of ‘S knows that p’ – depend on and vary with the context of ascription (see, for instance, John Greco's ‘What's wrong with contextualism’, Philosophical Quarterly [2008]). Prima facie, this claim should strike us as surprising. A number of concepts and linguistic items (words, sentences) serve functions that have little or nothing to do with semantics. However, I argue that, on the best interpretation of talk of the function of a concept such as ‘knowledge’, the function of ‘knowledge’ is relevant to semantics. Along the way I also suggest how to improve on what I call the ‘usual argument’ that Craig's account of the function of ‘knowledge’ supports epistemic contextualism.

scholarly journals How (not) to be a fallibilist: Lottery paradox and two types of epistemic contextualism

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-120
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
The World ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Inferential Contextualism ◽  
Knowledge Claims ◽  
Michael Williams ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

There is one common thing among lotteries from all over the world: there is small number of winning tickets and considerably bigger number of losing tickets. Therefore, the probability that a ticket wins a lottery is quite low, usually so low that we think that it is almost sure the ticket loses. But, we would never say that we know that a ticket will lose, until we see results of the lottery in, for example, some newspapers. And the probability of newspapers making a mistake does not seem to affect our knowledge claims. But why is that, since newspapers could make a mistake more often than a ticket wins? This question presents trouble for fallibilism, which claim that S could know that p, even when the probability that p is less than 1. Contextualist theories give their typical brand of solution: we have a change of context between the two cases, and in one case standard for knowledge claims are higher than the standard in the other case. Because of that, one can know that S lost the lottery when she reads it in newspapers. In this paper, I will present analysis of the lottery paradox, and two types of epistemic contexutalism: simple conversational contextualism and inferential contextualism. I will also present two of the most popular solution based on simple conversational contextualism, made by Lewis and Cohen. Finally, I will introduce some problems for such solutions, and show that the problems could solved if we apply strategy and explanation of inferential contextualism, type of contextualism proposed by Michael Williams.

scholarly journals Williams’ inferential contextualism

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Jelena Pavlicic
Keyword(s):  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Conversational Context ◽  
Contextual Sensitivity ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Inferential Contextualism ◽  
The Given ◽  
Michael Williams

This paper is concerned with version of epistemic contextualism known as inferential contextualism which cheif proponent is Michael Williams. The general contextualist strategy attempts to interpret the cognitive claims as expressing statements which meaning is sensitive to the context in which they are uttered, which implies that the truth-value of these claims may differ from context to context. Versions of epistemic contextualism that explain context sensitivity of cognitive claims by referring to conversational factors of the participants in the given conversational context are usually called simple conversational contextualism. Williams accepts the basic contextualists assumptions, but, in contrast to simple conversational contextualists, insists that explanation of contextual sensitivity of cognitive statements is to be found in differences (which are mainly the differences in the methodological assumptions and inferential patterns) between the thematic areas which are the subject of knowledge in different contexts. We will try to show that Williams? contextualism, despite some difficulties, does have certain advantages over the simple conversational contextualism.

Ekottarika-?gama Discourse Without Parallels

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 125-134
Author(s):  
Anālayo Bhikkhu
Keyword(s):  
Main Topic ◽  
Pure Land ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Oral Transmission

With the present paper I study and translate a discourse in the Ekottarika-?gama preserved in Chinese of which no parallel in other discourse collections is known. This situation relates to the wider issue of what significance to accord to the absence of parallels from the viewpoint of the early Buddhist oral transmission. The main topic of the discourse itself is perception of impermanence, which is of central importance in the early Buddhist scheme of the path for cultivating liberating insight. A description of the results of such practice in this Ekottarika-?gama discourse has a somewhat ambivalent formulation that suggests a possible relation to the notion of rebirth in the Pure Abodes, suddh?v?sa. This notion, attested in a P?li discourse, in turn might have provided a precedent for the aspiration, prominent in later Buddhist traditions, to be reborn in the Pure Land.

When Is True Belief Knowledge?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Significant Aspect ◽  
Coming To Know ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
What Matters

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. This book finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite “get.” This may seem a modest point but, as the book shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

The 2018/19 beet campaign – Suiker Unie

2019 ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Antens
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Weather Conditions ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Process Disturbances

As in the rest of Europe beet cultivation and the related beet quality was the main topic at Suiker Unie this campaign due to the very dry weather conditions. With a rather low beet yield as a result it was a short campaign of only 120 days in the Netherlands and 100 days at the Anklam factory in Germany. Despite the unusual beet quality and its related impact on the process, all factories had rather stable beet slicing rates. The beet cultivation and harvest, main investments and process disturbances of the 2018/19 campaign at the three factories Anklam (D), Dinteloord (NL) and Vierverlaten (NL) are discussed.

Is all knowledge prepositional?

2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 7-19
Author(s):  
Miroslava Andjelkovic
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

This paper deals with a criticism of Ryle's claim that the so called Intellectualist legend leads to an infinite regress. Critics have attempted to show that Ryle's argument cannot even get off the ground since its two basic premises cannot be true at the same time. In the paper I argue that this objection is based on a misinterpretation of Ryle's argumentation, which is complex and consists of two arguments, not of a single one as it is claimed. One of Ryle's argument attacks the thesis that an intelligent act is an indirect result of propositional knowledge, while the other, which I call the Asymmetry argument, claims that not every manifestation of knowledge that is accompanied with the manifestation of knowing how. In the paper I argue that both Ryle's arguments are valid and resistant to recent critique so it can be said that Ryle's distinction between knowledge that and knowing how is still an important distinction within contemporary epistemology.

Good Reasoning and Evidence-Based Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.D. Trout
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Reasoning Strategies ◽  
Good Reasoning ◽  
Naturalistic Theory ◽  
Normative Standards ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

In early epistemology, philosophers set standards on how to reason and on what counts as knowledge. These normative standards still form a core of work in contemporary epistemology, but much objectively excellent reasoning still doesn’t meet these epistemological standards, and sometimes these standards lead reasoning astray. Improving decisions about health and happiness may require developing even better reasoning strategies than are now available through contemporary epistemology. One naturalistic theory of good reasoning—Strategic Reliabilism—holds that excellent reasoning efficiently allocates cognitive resources to robustly reliable reasoning strategies, all applied to significant problems. This contrasts with the traditional normative theories in epistemology that drew their inspiration from intuitions.

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