scholarly journals Just war theory in Njegos’s works

2021 ◽  
pp. 361-375
Author(s):  
Dragan Stanar

Modern just war theory represents more of a tradition of thoughts on ethical issues of war than a theory per se. However, philosophical attitudes on war coming from authors from non-western cultures, including Serbian culture, are often left outside of this tradition. Author aims to demonstrate that there are clear ideas on ethical attributes of war and warring in Njegos?s work. By analyzing Njegos?s views expressed in his most significant works, through the prism of criteria of the classical elements of the modern just war theory (Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello), author demonstrates the existence of Serbian tradition of thought on ethics of war and warring. In this way, modern just war theory is supplemented and enriched with the Serbian historical perspective on justness of war and in war. Simultaneously, author highlights the challenges and perils of interpretation of philosophical ideas without considering the historical context, specific political-culturological circumstances and personality of the idea author. This is of a particular contemporary relevance, as misinterpretations of Njegos?s ideas on war and justice in war are often used to further fuel national antagonisms and destabilize the region.

2019 ◽  
pp. 263-283
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe

This chapter assesses war and intervention. Just war theorists share two beliefs: that wars can, at least in theory, sometimes be just, and that the fighting of war is governed by moral rules. Just war theory is usually divided into jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Jus ad bellum (justice prior to war) sets the conditions under which it is just to declare war. Jus in bello (justice during the war) sets the ‘rules of engagement’, governing the conduct of combatants during a conflict. Jus post bellum (justice after war) deals with topics like war reparations and punishment of aggression and had, until recently, received comparatively little attention in the just war literature. Meanwhile, pacifism and realism offer alternative approaches to the ethics of war.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Kalmanovitz

Recent scholarship in just war theory has challenged the principle of symmetrical application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This revisionist work, which is increasingly dominating the field of contemporary war ethics, rejects the idea that the rules of conduct of war (jus in bello) should be agnostic about the justice of the decision to go to war (jus ad bellum). Just wars are perceived to be inherently at odds with the principle of symmetrical application of IHL, which appears to create a hard choice between justice and legality. I show that this challenge to IHL is misplaced. It derives from a widespread view among just war theorists according to which only one side in a just war can be justified in using force. By looking closely at the nature of adjudication of just causes of war, I show that there can be cases of war in which both sides are justified in using force, and cases in which, though not objectively justified, both sides may be excused for fighting. On the basis of this understanding of jus ad bellum, I argue that the principle of symmetrical application of IHL in fact best reflects the uncertainty and complexity that should characterize the practical doctrine of jus ad bellum.


Numen ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torkel Brekke

AbstractThe European just war tradition makes a distinction between matters of just resort to war (jus ad bellum) and matters of just means in war (jus in bello). If one compares the just war tradition with ethical systems of other cultures, one is struck by the European concern about jus ad bellum and the lack of interest in the same in other traditions. I compare the ethics of war in two important literary traditions of classical Hinduism with the European just war tradition. Our problem: Why were Europeans so interested in matters of jus ad bellum (in particular the principle of right authority) and why did Hindu writers take so little interest in the same questions? I suggest the following answer. In medieval and early modern Europe there was great interest in jus ad bellum because Europeans had a concept of war that made two important distinctions. The European concept of war distinguished, firstly, war against external enemies from violence against internal enemies and, secondly, public from private violence. Some important studies of the ethics of war have asserted that these two distinctions are universal. I argue, on the contrary, that these two distinctions are unique to Europe. Hindu writers had a fundamentally different concept of war. They did not make the same distinctions. I argue that this conceptual difference explains why Europeans were so concerned about jus ad bellum while Indians were not.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ιωάννης Σταμούλος

Το διδακτορικό αρθρώνεται σε τρία μέρη. Στο πρώτο, αναλύσαμε την έννοια του πολέμου ως προς τον ορισμό, τις μορφές, και τα αίτια. Στο δεύτερο μέρος της διατριβής, καταγράψαμε τις απόψεις ειδημόνων και φιλοσόφων σχετικά με τον πόλεμο. Επικεντρωθήκαμε ιδιαίτερα στις αντιλήψεις τους που συνέβαλαν εξελικτικά στη διαμόρφωση της Θεωρίας περί Δικαίου Πολέμου (Just War Theory), η οποία περιλαμβάνει τα κριτήρια που καθιστούν έναν πόλεμο δίκαιο (Jus ad Bellum), κι εκείνα που αφορούν στη δεοντολογική διεξαγωγή του (Jus in Bello). Στο τρίτο μέρος, αναλύσαμε και συγκρίναμε τέσσερις διαφορετικές εποχές, κι από τη μεταξύ τους σύγκριση επιχειρήσαμε μ’ ένα ιστορικό-φιλοσοφικό πρίσμα να καταλήξουμε σε μια θέση, η οποία εκτιμάται ότι, κατά το μάλλον ή ήττον, θα έχει βάση, επειδή επιβεβαιώνεται διαχρονικά και διατοπικά. Προσπαθήσαμε να εντοπίσουμε τις σταθερές που διέπουν την ανθρώπινη δράση, ώστε να διαβλέψουμε την εξέλιξη των γεγονότων ή, τουλάχιστον, να έχουμε ένα μέτρο αξιολόγησης του παρόντος. Εργαλείο της έρευνας έγινε ο φιλοσοφικός λόγος, και αποσκοπούμε στην αναβίωση των κλασικών φιλοσοφικών κειμένων, για να αντλήσουμε από την πλούσια φιλοσοφική παρακαταθήκη του παρελθόντος σκέψεις που θα μας επιτρέψουν να κατανοήσουμε και να ερμηνεύσουμε τα ανθρώπινα δρώμενα διαχρονικά. Στο διδακτορικό προστίθεται ένα παράρτημα με πολεμικές μαρτυρίες, από τις οποίες επιχειρήσαμε να αναδείξουμε την ανθρώπινη ψυχοσύνθεση και συμπεριφορά στο πεδίο της μάχης. Το δεύτερο παράρτημα περιελάμβανε τις απόψεις για τον πόλεμο προσώπων από το χώρο της τέχνης, τα οποία με τις ευαισθησίες τους δίνουν έναν ιδιαίτερο τόνο στο κείμενο.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Najamudin Najamudin

Tradisi perang berbasis keadilan dapat ditemukan dalam sejarah pemikiran politik Islam pada masa awal khalifah Islam. Dalam kajian ini, penulis menggunakan dua pisau analisis yaitu interpretasi tekstual terhadap Alquran dan Hadis, dan interpretasi sejarah perang suci dalam tradisi Islam. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menggali prinsip-prinsip dasar jihad, dan membandingkannya dengan teori perang berbasis keadilan untuk menemukan sisi persamaan dan perbedaanya, serta membangun argumentasi apakah jihad bisa dikategorikan sebagai bentuk perang yang memenuhi rasa keadilan masyarakat yang tertindas. Studi kasus dalam kajian ini adalah konsepsi jihad Imam Samudra dalam buku kontroversialnya “Aku Melawan Teroris”. Dengan menggunakan analisa Jus Ad Bellum dan Jus In Bello, ditemukan bahwa apabila jihad dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang sakral dan suci, maka kesucian jihad tidak bisa dikotori dengan tindakan terorisme. Dalam perspektif teologi dan hukum Islam, penelitian ini membuktikan penyalahgunaan ayat-ayat jihad oleh Imam Samudra untuk menjastifikasi tindakan terorisme yang dilakukannya di Bali.


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 111-122
Author(s):  
Dragan Stanar

This paper aims to explain the effect of the post-truth on revisionism in Just War Theory. Revisionism in JWT is based on the claim that Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello cannot be separated and that only combatants who fight on the just side are morally justified in killing. Presupposition of this argument is that combatants can and ought to know the moral status of their side. This paper will demonstrate that it is impossible to demand combatants to know whether their side is just by investigating the implications of post-truth in modern conflicts. By demonstrating the practical impossibility of combatants to know whether their side is just, author will show that the assumption of inculpable ignorance in war must remain the essence of JWT. Posttruth phenomenon only fortifies the necessity of separating Jus ad Bellum from Jus in Bello and upholding the principle of moral equality of combatants in contemporary wars.


2021 ◽  
pp. 175508822110347
Author(s):  
Lonneke Peperkamp

Peace plays a central role in the ethics of war and peace, but this proves to be an enormous challenge. In a recent article, Elisabeth Forster and Isaac Taylor grapple with this important topic. They argue that certain concepts in just war theory—aggression, legitimacy, and peace—are essentially contested and susceptible to manipulation. Because the rules are interpreted and applied by the very states that wage war, it is as if the fox is asked to guard the chicken coop—a recipe for disaster. To avoid manipulation of the theory and make the goal of peace attainable, they defend “minimalism” in the ethics of war and peace. This paper responds to and builds on their article. After nuancing the analysis, I will argue (a) that their minimalism does not solve the problem since the proposed alternative concept is equally prone to misuse, and (b) that their minimalism is mistargeted. What I propose is to specify and ground the rules of war without raising the standard too high, to disentangle jus ad bellum and jus post bellum and see peace as guiding principle for jus post bellum, and to interpret that in a minimalist way.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 403-430
Author(s):  
Lonneke Peperkamp

Many argue that the problems encountered in and after today’s armed conflicts demonstrate the need for norms to govern the aftermath of war. Therefore, jus post bellum is welcomed as a ‘new’ branch of just war theory, complementing the theory’s two traditional branches—jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus post bellum is meant to function as moral compass, offering the needed guidance in the aftermath of war. While many agree on the importance of a third branch, an important question is often overlooked: After war, how should we distribute post war duties? This question deserves more attention, because uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact merely empty rhetoric. Two specific questions need answering. First: Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: How to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors? This article directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after war, using David Miller’s and H.L.A. Hart’s theories on responsibility, with an eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete situations. Only with such a system in place is there a realistic prospect that jus post bellum functions as a useful tool in the creation of a just and stable peace.


Author(s):  
Rick Searle

We are at the cusp of a revolution in the development of autonomous weapons, yet current arguments both for and against such weapons are insufficient to the task at hand. In the context of Just war theory, arguments for and against the use of autonomous weapons focus on Jus in bello and in doing so miss addressing the implications of these weapons for the two other aspects of that theory- Jus ad bellum and Jus post bellum. This paper argues that fully autonomous weapons would likely undermine adherence to the Jus ad bellum and Jus post bellum prescriptions of Just war theory, but remote controlled weapons, if designed with ethical concerns in mind, might improve adherence to all of the theory's prescriptions compared to war as currently waged from a distance, as well as help to undo the occlusion of violence which has been a fundamental characteristic of all forms of modern war.


Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre

This chapter offers an account of the role and place of jus post bellum within just war theory and highlights avenues of inquiry on the aftermath of war that have been largely ignored. The author discusses recent arguments to the effect that jus ad bellum and jus in bello exhaust just war theory and that jus post bellum, far from being a key member of the family, in fact does much better as an outsider. The author claims, on the contrary, that there is ample space for jus post bellum within just war theory; in partial agreement with those arguments, however, the author agrees that a full account of the ethics of war’s aftermath must also draw on other fields of normative inquiry and fleshes out in greater details connections and disconnections between jus post bellum on the one hand and the other two jura on the other.


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