Social Aspects of the Planning State

1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-22
Author(s):  
Lewis L. Lorwin

We are witnessing today in both Europe and America the breakdown of what may be called the nineteenth-century equilibrium, and at the same time the effort to work out a new equilibrium as a basis of life for the twentieth century. The New Deal is the American phase of this movement. We can understand it better if we view it with the search-light of the movements in other countries, and if we make clear to ourselves what is driving them, how they are being driven, and what problems are in their path.The key to recent social developments seems to me to lie in the resurgence of the middle classes. This is a development of the last decade or so, and is largely the result of the failure of the two other major social groups—the capitalists and the workers—to give Western society, especially Western European society, leadership and direction. On the one hand, the capitalistic groups, while concentrating industrial and financial resources, showed a sad incapacity to establish a leadership based on social needs and moral values.

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Didier

ArgumentWhen the New Deal administration attained power in the United States, it was confronted with two different problems that could be linked to one another. On the one hand, there was a huge problem of unemployment, affecting everybody including the white-collar workers. And, on the other hand, the administration suffered from a very serious lack of data to illuminate its politics. One idea that came out of this situation was to use the abundant unemployed white-collar workers as enumerators of statistical studies. This paper describes this experiment, shows how it paradoxically affected the professionalization of statistics, and explains why it did not affect expert democracy despite its Deweysian participationist aspect.


2002 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-177
Author(s):  
John Brueggemann

Social policy that emerged from the New Deal era continues to shape race relations and politics today. Since the 1930s, scholars have debated the net effect of the New Deal on racial inequality. On the one hand, the social policies of the 1930s are viewed as a great step toward a racially inclusive society (Myrdal 1944; Wolters 1975; Sitkoff 1978, 1985; Ezell 1975; Patterson 1986; Weiss 1983). In contrast to previous eras and political regimes,Roosevelt's New Deal reflected a qualitatively different sense of government's responsibility toward its citizens, including African Americans. Alternatively, New Deal era social policy is considered a crucial component in the structure of American racial stratification (Lewis 1982; Rose 1993; Quadagno 1994; Valocchi 1994; Brown 1999).The legislative record of the New Deal was consistently racialized and discriminatory.Welfare policy, in particular, actively excluded and subjugated blacks. These contrasting portrayals reflect the ambiguity of the New Deal legacy of race relations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 336-356
Author(s):  
Peter Fritzsche

This chapter studies how the transformations which occurred in less than “one hundred days” in Germany evoked the original template for the one hundred days: Napoleon Bonaparte's return from Elba and the reestablishment of the empire until his abdication in the wake of Waterloo in 1815. Each of the hundred days—Napoleon's, Franklin D. Roosevelt's, and Adolf Hitler's—recharged history. The one hundred days consolidating the New Deal and the Nazi seizure of power gave new shape to the future in the extraordinary year of 1933. Ultimately, the great achievement of the Third Reich was getting Germans to see themselves as the Nazis did: as an imperiled people who had created for themselves a new lease on collective life. Not everyone agreed with the Nazis on every point, but most adjusted to National Socialism by interpreting it in their own way, adhering to old ideas by pursuing them in new forms. As a result, more and more Germans had accepted the Third Reich. This reassembly closed off any consideration of returning to the democratic governments of the Weimar Republic; it was neither recognized as a possibility nor desired.


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-310
Author(s):  
Mary C. Trackett

Of all criticisms of the New Deal, the one most frequently emphasized is the lack of coördination. Headlessness in policy-framing and sprawling aimlessness in policy execution are twin charges which the Administration has been forced to admit. The recent report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management is an indication that the Administration intends to leave to posterity a good record on this score; but both practitioners and students of government are well aware that no reorganization can be so complete, so perfect in its functional allotment of duties to departments, that the problem of horizontal integration will not still need to be faced and solved. This reminder is less an apologia than an indication of the frame of reference of the present note; those who have been administering the government for the past four years have never been unaware of the need for concerted action among the executive departments, and many attempts have been made to achieve it. A device often employed for the purpose has been the interdepartmental committee.


Author(s):  
Ken I. Kersch

This chapter maps the contemporary right's nascent obsession with the Progressive era as a developmental phenomenon—as a stage in the trajectory of a political-intellectual movement advancing through time. To that end, it ventures three main claims. First, the recent conservative focus on Progressivism represents a shift on the right of understandings of the historical location or source of contemporary constitutional problems, an understanding informed by the sequence of constitutional conservatism's development through time: whereas (old) “originalist” legal conservatives adopted Progressive thinking in focusing their attention on countermajoritarian “activist judges” and criticized the New Deal for its weightless, substance-free pragmatism, recent conservatives have forged a more global critique of contemporary constitutional practice that moves beyond judges to the entire modern structure and theory of American government, finding its weighty and substantive blueprint in the Progressive era, and its extension and institutionalization in the New Deal. Second, this more foundational and comprehensive constitutional critique was forged outside legal academia in political science, particularly by Straussian political theorists. And third, the overarching character of this critique centered on the Progressive era serves a movement-building function by offering a set of understandings that can win the assent of the movement's diverse factions, including social conservatives and religious traditionalists, on the one hand, and economic conservatives and libertarians on the other.


1998 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sidney M. Milkis

Interpreting the 1970s is a difficult business. On the one hand, reformers struggled earnestly and effectively to codify the exalted vision of a good society that was celebrated during the 1960s. And yet in doing so, they appeared to routinize rather than resolve the virulent conflicts of the previous decade. Scholars tend to agree that the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s marked a transformation of political life no less important than the Progressive Era and the New Deal. Unlike these earlier reform periods, however, the 1960s and 1970s did not embrace national administrative power as an agent of social and economic justice. Instead, reformers of the 1960s and 1970s championed “participatory democracy” and viewed the very concept of national governmental authority with deep suspicion. Indeed, Hugh Heclo characterizes the reform legacy of the 1960s and 1970s as one of intractable fractiousness, as a “postmodern” assault on the modern state forged on the anvil of reforms carried out during the Progressive and New Deal eras. “In the end, it appears that a great deal of postmodern policymaking is not really concerned with ‘making policy’ in the sense of finding a settled course of public action that people can live with,” he writes. “It is aimed at crusading for a cause by confronting power with power.”


1982 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wilson D. Miscamble

No American presidency in this century has inspired quite so much controversy as the turbulent administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even now, on the one-hundreth anniversary of his birth, and nearly fifty years after the coming of the New Deal, the contentious debates sparked during his four terms as chief executive are no less the subject of argument among historians than they were among the adversaries of the day. One issue in point is the question of antitrust, particularly the principles and practices of Thurman Arnold, who headed the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department during the later stages of the New Deal. While this essay will hardly resolve the contumacious debates over the policies of either Arnold or Roosevelt, Dr. Miscamble nonetheless offers some surprising, but persuasive, evidence about the internal workings of the administration, the antitrust philosophy of Roosevelt, and the remarkable practices of Arnold, the law professor turned antimonopolist.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 287
Author(s):  
Bruno Henz Biaseto

The American Conservative movement saw a huge rise following Reagan’s ascent to the residency. The Reagan Coalition managed to make the Republican Party the dominating force for almost thirty years, empowering certain social groups that supported its rise since its beginning, during the New Deal era. Following deep economic and social changes seen in the early 21st century, Barack Obama managed to craft a new political coalition, one that managed to end the Republican dominance. As the Democrats were able to craft a new coalition, the answer came in the rise of an authoritarian/populist right embodied by Donald Trump and the Tea Party. The goal of this essay is to understand this political process through the lens of American scholars, focusing on their analysis of how the rise and fall of the Reagan Revolution shaped the troubled political scenario seen in America today.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Bell

This chapter examines how the changing concept of liberalism within the Democratic party ultimately contributed to the erosion of consensus; it contends that the challenge to consensus from the left was as significant as the one from the right in changing the character of American politics. Liberals increasingly chafed throughout the second half of the 1950s at the Democratic party’s limited agenda of maintaining rather than expanding the New Deal legacy, managing prosperity, and containing communism.In their view, this embodied a centrist strategy aimed simply to hold the diverse elements of the Democratic coalition together rather than address a changing America and its needs.As the 1960s dawned, these progressive Democrats reconfigured liberalism around questions of social rights and identity politics that could not be accommodated within the confines of consensus. In parallel with similar developments within the GOP, Democratic factionalism did much to undermine the ideology of the liberal consensus.


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