Judicial Review and Politics in Australia

1957 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 386-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. C. Vile

In a recent issue of this Review John P. Roche developed an explanation of the motivation behind the exercise of self-restraint by the United States judiciary. He related the scope available for the exercise of judicial power to the working of the American party system, i.e., to the extent to which the Court found itself faced by “cohesive majorities.” Almost in passing he drew a comparison between the British and the American position. “No cohesive majority, such as normally exists in Britain,” he said, “would permit a politically irresponsible judiciary to usurp decision-making functions, but, for complex social and institutional reasons, there are few issues in the United States on which cohesive majorities exist.” The purpose of this essay is to test that thesis, and the concept of cohesive majorities, in the setting of Australian politics and judicial review.

1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-50
Author(s):  
C. Edwin Gilmour

A central theme of contemporary literature on American political parties—a theme with a broad consensus that is uncommon in the discipline—is that the party system of the United States is in transition due to significant changes within the past two decades that distinguish the operation of today's party system from what it was before 1960. However, consensus is lacking as to the implications of these changes for the future status of the American party system. This paper has four broad objectives: 1. to review briefly the phenomenon of party re-alignment in American history as a useful perspective on the present party era; 2. to identify and discuss significant alterations in the party system since 1960 ; 3. to note various scenarios in the literature concerning the future of the parly system in ‘the United States and 4. to hazard a personal assessment of the scenarios as to their plausibility and probability.


2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lino A. Graglia

Constitutional law in the United States is, for most practical purposes, the product of ‘judicial review’, the power of judges to disallow policy choices made by other officials or institutions of government, ostensibly because those choices are prohibited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and unprecedented power, America's dubious contribution to the science of government, has made American judges the most powerful in the world, not only legislators but super-legislators, legislators with virtually the last word. Because lawmaking power divorced from popular will is tyranny, most states have attempted to reconcile the lawmaking power of judges with representative self-government by subjecting all or some judges to some form of popular election. In all but four such states, judges, encouraged and supported by their fellow lawyers in the organized bar—would-be judges and beneficiaries of judicial power—have responded by adopting codes of judicial ethics that limit what candidates for election to judicial office are permitted to say. The effect is to undermine elections as a control on judicial power by limiting criticism of judicial activism, the misuse of judicial power.


1939 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-211
Author(s):  
F. A. Hermas

Political parties have been subjected to more vigorous criticism than any other institution of modern democracy. It is charged that their divisions split a country artificially. It is further contended that the line-up into the two camps of government and opposition makes it impossible for a country to avail itself of all its political talent, since those belonging to the opposition party are, temporarily at least, unavailable for constructive work, and are instead making every effort to obstruct the government in power. In the United States the point has frequently been made that the two major parties are no longer justified because neither of them contains anything which it could consider characteristic of itself. “The party term Republican isn't definitive any more. It isn't even descriptive. No more so is the party term Democrat. They are labels on empty bottles, signs on untenanted houses, cloaks that cover but do not conceal the skeletons beneath them.” More recently a similar charge has been made by Dr. Mortimer Adler, a writer who brilliantly combines his analysis of the present with a knowledge of the past. He directs attention to the fact that parties, instead of responding to issues, tend to create them. According to Dr. Adler, parties would be justified if they served only the purpose for which they have been created and then dissolved; of course, in reality, they perpetuate their existence. On somewhat similar lines the famous biographer of the modern party organization, Ostrogorski, proceeded from theoretical criticism to practical suggestions. His plan was to replace existing parties by “leagues,” which were to respond to one issue only, and be dissolved as soon as that issue should be settled.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-241
Author(s):  
Peter Fotheringham

THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM, LONG CONSIDERED TO BE DOMINATED by two decentralized, non-programmatic and non-governing parties, is once again at the heart of empirical and normative arguments about the adequacy of government in the United States. Political developments since 1948 have revitalized the longstanding debate about the causal links between the constitutional and social bases of American politics, the definitive features of the party system and the attributes and outcomes of the governmental process.


Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett

This chapter applies the concepts of interpretation and construction to the contentious issue of judicial review and examines the originalist evidence that overwhelmingly supports the judicial power to nullify unconstitutional laws. According to Article III of the Constitution: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The Constitution does not say explicitly that the “Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as may be established by Congress, shall have power to nullify a Law enacted by Congress and signed by the President if the Law is unconstitutional.” The absence of a clearly expressed grant of power has moved some critics of judicial review to question its legitimacy. The chapter also considers the concepts of judicial nullification and judicial supremacy as they relate to judicial review.


1996 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 371-383
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Amy

Few laws have had a more direct impact on American political parties than the requirement that elections be conducted in single-member districts, with the winner being the candidate with the plurality of the vote. This common electoral arrangement has played a significant role in determining the structure of the United States party system and in shaping the behavior of our parties. It is also an arrangement that has largely been taken for granted by most citizens and political scientists.


Author(s):  
Steven Hurst

The United States, Iran and the Bomb provides the first comprehensive analysis of the US-Iranian nuclear relationship from its origins through to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Starting with the Nixon administration in the 1970s, it analyses the policies of successive US administrations toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Emphasizing the centrality of domestic politics to decision-making on both sides, it offers both an explanation of the evolution of the relationship and a critique of successive US administrations' efforts to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, with neither coercive measures nor inducements effectively applied. The book further argues that factional politics inside Iran played a crucial role in Iranian nuclear decision-making and that American policy tended to reinforce the position of Iranian hardliners and undermine that of those who were prepared to compromise on the nuclear issue. In the final chapter it demonstrates how President Obama's alterations to American strategy, accompanied by shifts in Iranian domestic politics, finally brought about the signing of the JCPOA in 2015.


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 256-265
Author(s):  
Konstantin V. Simonov ◽  
Stanislav P. Mitrakhovich

The article examines the possibility of transfer to bipartisan system in Russia. The authors assess the benefits of the two-party system that include first of all the ensuring of actual political competition and authority alternativeness with simultaneous separation of minute non-system forces that may contribute to the country destabilization. The authors analyze the accompanying risks and show that the concept of the two-party system as the catalyst of elite schism is mostly exaggerated. The authors pay separate attention to the experience of bipartisan system implementation in other countries, including the United States. They offer detailed analysis of the generated concept of the bipartisanship crisis and show that this point of view doesn’t quite agree with the current political practice. The authors also examine the foreign experience of the single-party system. They show that the success of the said system is mostly insubstantial, besides many of such systems have altered into more complex structures, while commentators very often use not the actual information but the established myths about this or that country. The authors also offer practical advice regarding the potential technologies of transition to the bipartisan system in Russia.


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