Hobbes's Confusing “Clarity”—The Case of “Liberty”

1960 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 428-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Roland Pennock
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Psychological Explanation ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social ◽  
Analytical System ◽  
Acceptable Theory

The Leviathan has been described as “original, persuasive, solid, coherent.” General commentaries on Hobbes usually single out his logic for special praise; more detailed critiques generally unearth a mass of confusions and inconsistencies. Confusions and inconsistencies there certainly are; more, I believe, than one would expect to find in the work of a man of such undeniable logical powers. Speculation upon the psychological explanation of this fact is intriguing, but no part of the purpose of the present article. It is part of my purpose, however, to contend that Hobbes's passion for clarity and certainty may have played a part in leading him to adopt perverse definitions, to which even he did not consistently adhere and which constituted a major source of confusion. Conversely, I disagree with those who say his analytical system is sound and only his empirical assumptions about human nature are open to serious criticism.More specifically, one may profitably inquire whether there is some central concept that serves as a focal point for many of these difficulties. For example, it is often suggested, with merit, that Hobbes's perversion, or inversion, of the traditional meaning of “jus naturale” plays such a role. Without making any exclusive claim or denying the insights that may be gained by concentrating attention upon other focal points, my hypothesis is that understanding of Hobbes may be deepened by an examination of his use of the word “liberty.” I shall deal first with his definitions of the term, and then in turn with his applications of it to natural right and natural law, to sovereignty by acquisition, and finally to the social contract. I shall argue that his method, as illustrated by his definitions, leads him occasionally into confusion or inconsistency, and more frequently tends to confuse the reader and so to enable Hobbes to make an unsound conclusion appear sound, by means of specious reasoning. In particular, I shall contend that Hobbes's treatment of liberty (1) leads him into self-contradiction regarding the extent of natural liberty, (2) enables him to argue persuasively but speciously in support of the obligation to obey a sovereign who has attained his position by violence, and (3) prevents him from developing an acceptable theory of political obligation.

Foundations II

2021 ◽  
pp. 193-215
Author(s):  
Mogens Lærke
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical Evolution

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.

Thomas Hobbes's Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics

2008 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Dungey
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
English Civil War ◽  
The Social

AbstractThomas Hobbes sought a reconstruction of philosophy, ethics, and politics that would end, once and for all, the bitter disputes that led to the English Civil War. This reconstruction begins with the first principles of matter and motion and extends to a unique account of consent and political obligation. Hobbes intended to produce a unified philosophical system linking his materialist account of human nature to his moral and political theory. However, his materialism gives rise to a set of perceptions, imagination, and desires that contribute to the chaos of the state of nature. The sort of person that emerges from Hobbes's materialist anthropology is unlikely to be able to make the necessary agreements about common meaning and language that constitute the ground of the social contract. Therefore, Hobbes's materialism frustrates the very purpose for which it is conceived.

Leviathan Bound; or the Re-education of Thomas Hobbes

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quentin Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social

AbstractThomas Hobbes is often credited as the “founder of modern liberalism” for grounding his political theory in individualism, natural right, and the social contract. The irony, of course, is that upon this foundation he built an imposing edifice of absolutism. What has escaped most observers, however, is the extent to which Hobbes' absolutism is mitigated by his own principles, qualifications, and doctrines. Hence, “saving Hobbes from himself,” is not simply a matter of correcting his errors, but requires drawing out the implications of his first principles and identifying the additional supports he provides for an essentially liberal order. In this way it is possible to “bind” Leviathan through a process of internal domestication, as opposed to looking backward to Aristotle or forward to Locke. The result is a “reformed” Hobbes who can be readily acknowledged as “the true ancestor of constitutional liberal democracy.”

Hypothetical Consent and Political Legitimacy

1998 ◽  
pp. 232-238
Author(s):  
Cynthia Stark
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Hypothetical Consent

A commonly accepted criticism of the social contract approach to justifying political authority targets the notion of hypothetical consent. Hypothetical contracts, it is argued, are not binding; therefore hypothetical consent cannot justify political authority. I argue that although hypothetical consent may not be capable of creating political obligation, it has the power to legitimate political arrangements.

Heller's Self-Defense

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Sangero
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Person Following ◽  
The Social ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right

This article reflects on District of Columbia v. Heller and proposes a new footing and limit to the right to bear arms: a person's inalienable right to selfdefense. Self-defense is a natural right embedded in personhood and is antecedent to the social contract that sets up a state. This right consequently remains with the person following the establishment of the state and allows her to use proportional force necessary for resisting aggression. The right to bear arms derives from the constitutional right to self-defense, which merits protection under both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. This instrumental nexus calls for a dynamic determination of the scope of the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, along Heller's lines. The scope of the right to bear arms should be defined by an ordinary citizen's necessity to use arms in defending herself proportionally against criminals. This criterion will allow courts to deliver both predictable and balanced decisions that align with originalism.

Contractarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Common Good ◽  
John Locke ◽  
General Will ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Social Compact ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice

The idea that political relations originate in contract or agreement has been applied in several ways. In Plato’s Republic Glaucon suggests that justice is but a pact among rational egoists. Thomas Hobbes developed this idea to analyse the nature of political power.Given the predominantly self-centred nature of humankind, government is necessary for society. Government’s role is to stabilize social cooperation. By exercising enforcement powers, government provides each with the assurance that everyone else will abide by cooperative rules, thereby making it rational for all to cooperate. To fulfil this stabilizing role, Hobbes argued that it is rational for each individual to agree to authorize one person to exercise absolute political power. Neo-Hobbesians eschew absolutism and apply the theory of rational choice to argue that rules of justice, perhaps even all morality, can be construed in terms of a rational bargain among self-interested individuals. John Locke, working from different premises than Hobbes, appealed to a social compact to argue for a constitutional government with limited powers. All men are born with a natural right to equal freedom, and a natural duty to God to preserve themselves and the rest of mankind. No government is just unless it could be commonly agreed to form a position of equal freedom, where agreement is subject to the moral constraints of natural law. Absolutism is unjust according to this criterion. Rousseau developed egalitarian features of Locke’s view to contend for a democratic constitution.The Social Contract embodies the General Will of society, not the unconstrained private wills of its members. The General Will wills the common good, the good of society and all of its members. Only by bringing our individual wills into accord with the General Will can we achieve civic and moral freedom. In this century, John Rawls has recast natural rights theories of the social contract to argue for a liberal egalitarian conception of justice. From a position of equality, where each person abstracts from knowledge of their historical situations, it is rational for all to agree on principles of justice that guarantee equal basic freedoms and resources adequate for each person’s independence. T.M. Scanlon, meanwhile, has outlined a right-based contractualist account of morality. An act is right if it accords with principles that could not be reasonably rejected by persons who are motivated by a desire to justify their actions according to principles that no one else can reasonably reject.

Contract, Gender, and the Emergence of the Civil-Military Distinction

2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 416-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Parsons
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Military

AbstractThis paper examines the social contract theories of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke, highlighting the failure of their contractarian defenses of the military and military service. In order to ground the duties of military service, each theorist presumes a chivalric gender order wherein men as men are expected to be willing to sacrifice themselves as violent instruments for the sake of their families and communities. While Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf use the contract method to defend absolute, or near absolute, political authority wherein subject's primary political obligation is to serve the sovereign in war upon command, Locke uses the contract method to create a liberal political order that preserves the natural rights of subjects. Nevertheless, Locke maintains the commitment to self-sacrificial military service. In Locke, then, the military is peeled away from liberal civil society and we see the first statement of the civil-military distinction that persists today.

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