Hypothetical Consent and Political Legitimacy

1998 ◽  
pp. 232-238
Author(s):  
Cynthia Stark
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Hypothetical Consent

A commonly accepted criticism of the social contract approach to justifying political authority targets the notion of hypothetical consent. Hypothetical contracts, it is argued, are not binding; therefore hypothetical consent cannot justify political authority. I argue that although hypothetical consent may not be capable of creating political obligation, it has the power to legitimate political arrangements.

Contract, Gender, and the Emergence of the Civil-Military Distinction

2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 416-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Parsons
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Military

AbstractThis paper examines the social contract theories of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke, highlighting the failure of their contractarian defenses of the military and military service. In order to ground the duties of military service, each theorist presumes a chivalric gender order wherein men as men are expected to be willing to sacrifice themselves as violent instruments for the sake of their families and communities. While Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf use the contract method to defend absolute, or near absolute, political authority wherein subject's primary political obligation is to serve the sovereign in war upon command, Locke uses the contract method to create a liberal political order that preserves the natural rights of subjects. Nevertheless, Locke maintains the commitment to self-sacrificial military service. In Locke, then, the military is peeled away from liberal civil society and we see the first statement of the civil-military distinction that persists today.

Normative Legitimacy and the State

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Levitov
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
State Legitimacy ◽  
The Social ◽  
Critical Overview ◽  
Hybrid Theory

This article offers a critical overview of the major normative theories of political legitimacy from the seventeenth century to the present day, with a special focus on the leading representatives of the social contract tradition: the voluntarist theory, according to which legitimate political authority must derive from the free choices of its subjects; and the natural duty theory, which holds that a state’s legitimacy depends on the extent to which its institutions are just, regardless of whether it has been freely authorized by its subjects. The article then explores the prospects of a hybrid theory that would combine elements of the two and concludes by examining the ways in which the various conceptions of state legitimacy under consideration might be applied or adapted to the case of supranational political institutions.

Another Voluntarism

Legitimacy ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 43-66
Author(s):  
Paul Weithman
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Social Contract Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Corporate Body ◽  
The Social ◽  
Real Work ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Philosophical Questions

John Rawls’s presentation of his famous principle of legitimacy raises a number of exegetical and philosophical questions which his texts leave unresolved. The key to their solution lies in a claim Rawls makes about the character of political power. Rawls uses language familiar from social contract theory to describe that power, saying that it is the power of the public as a corporate body. This chapter considers but ultimately rejects the suggestion that Rawls’s treatment of legitimacy is Lockean. Rather, Rawls follows Kant in thinking that talk of a contractual incorporation is best understood as a way of expressing fundamental moral claims about the object of a constitution, about citizens’ standing, and about legislators’ duties. These are the claims that do the real work in Rawls’s account of legitimacy. To show this, the chapter lays out Kant’s conception of the social contract and argues that we can draw on that conception to understand Rawls’s account of political legitimacy. It then spells out the philosophical pay-offs of the reading offered here by showing how it solves some textual puzzles and how Rawls’s account differs from others that have recently been defended in political philosophy. The chapter concludes by mentioning some lingering questions about Rawlsian legitimacy.

Contractarian Business Ethics: Credentials and Design Criteria

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (10) ◽  
pp. 1337-1355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Wempe
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Choice Situation ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
The Social ◽  
Stakeholder Model ◽  
Practical Guidance

Contractarian business ethics (CBE) is in great vogue in the present study of corporate morality. Its stated ambition is to provide better practical guidance than the more general ethical theories of business ethics, such as Kantianism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics or the stakeholder model. But how good is this new trend in business ethics theorizing? This article aims to assess CBE's credentials as a social contract argument. For this purpose, it embarks on a comparative analysis of the use of the social contract model in two earlier domains: political authority and social justice. Building on this comparison, it then develops four criteria for any future CBE. To apply the social contract model properly to the domain of corporate morality, it should be: (1) self-disciplined, i.e. not aspire to results beyond what the contract model can realistically establish; (2) argumentative, i.e. provide principles that are demonstrative results of the contractarian method; (3) task-directed, i.e. it should be clear what the social contract thought-experiment is intended to model; and (4) domain-specific, i.e. the contractarian choice situation should be tailored to the defining problems of corporate morality.

Thomas Hobbes's Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics

2008 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Dungey
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
English Civil War ◽  
The Social

AbstractThomas Hobbes sought a reconstruction of philosophy, ethics, and politics that would end, once and for all, the bitter disputes that led to the English Civil War. This reconstruction begins with the first principles of matter and motion and extends to a unique account of consent and political obligation. Hobbes intended to produce a unified philosophical system linking his materialist account of human nature to his moral and political theory. However, his materialism gives rise to a set of perceptions, imagination, and desires that contribute to the chaos of the state of nature. The sort of person that emerges from Hobbes's materialist anthropology is unlikely to be able to make the necessary agreements about common meaning and language that constitute the ground of the social contract. Therefore, Hobbes's materialism frustrates the very purpose for which it is conceived.

Hobbes's Confusing “Clarity”—The Case of “Liberty”

1960 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 428-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Roland Pennock
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Psychological Explanation ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social ◽  
Analytical System ◽  
Acceptable Theory

The Leviathan has been described as “original, persuasive, solid, coherent.” General commentaries on Hobbes usually single out his logic for special praise; more detailed critiques generally unearth a mass of confusions and inconsistencies. Confusions and inconsistencies there certainly are; more, I believe, than one would expect to find in the work of a man of such undeniable logical powers. Speculation upon the psychological explanation of this fact is intriguing, but no part of the purpose of the present article. It is part of my purpose, however, to contend that Hobbes's passion for clarity and certainty may have played a part in leading him to adopt perverse definitions, to which even he did not consistently adhere and which constituted a major source of confusion. Conversely, I disagree with those who say his analytical system is sound and only his empirical assumptions about human nature are open to serious criticism.More specifically, one may profitably inquire whether there is some central concept that serves as a focal point for many of these difficulties. For example, it is often suggested, with merit, that Hobbes's perversion, or inversion, of the traditional meaning of “jus naturale” plays such a role. Without making any exclusive claim or denying the insights that may be gained by concentrating attention upon other focal points, my hypothesis is that understanding of Hobbes may be deepened by an examination of his use of the word “liberty.” I shall deal first with his definitions of the term, and then in turn with his applications of it to natural right and natural law, to sovereignty by acquisition, and finally to the social contract. I shall argue that his method, as illustrated by his definitions, leads him occasionally into confusion or inconsistency, and more frequently tends to confuse the reader and so to enable Hobbes to make an unsound conclusion appear sound, by means of specious reasoning. In particular, I shall contend that Hobbes's treatment of liberty (1) leads him into self-contradiction regarding the extent of natural liberty, (2) enables him to argue persuasively but speciously in support of the obligation to obey a sovereign who has attained his position by violence, and (3) prevents him from developing an acceptable theory of political obligation.

scholarly journals The Theory of Social Contract and Legitimacy Today

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 19-28
Author(s):  
Neophitos Economides
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Ancient Greece ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
The Political ◽  
Renaissance Period ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
Modern Era

Abstract The theory of social contract has played - and still plays - an important role in the central stage of political philosophy. The social contract answers the question of the origin of the society. The history of the theory originates in the ancient Greece political philosophy and extends to the recent years. However, the foundation of the theory resulted in the Renaissance period through the treatises of classical contractarians Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The manuscript describes the main arguments regarding the theory of social contract and suggests the main similarities and differences among them. Finally, the manuscript, according to the main description of the theories, suggests the main categorization of their results in legitimizing the political authority. In the final section, the article proposes the contribution of the theory of the social contract to the modern era and summarizes the positive aspects of its arguments to the legitimization of the political authority of modern states.

On Using the Concept of Hypothetical Consent

1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-808
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Subjective Meaning ◽  
Hypothetical Consent ◽  
The Right ◽  
As If

AbstractThis article argues that the concept of hypothetical consent advanced by Hanna Pitkin has little force as a basis for political obligation. It reformulates the meaning of hypothetical consent by emphasizing the subjectivity of consent, and it points out how this subjective meaning expresses the right of actual citizens to dissent. It suggests how subjective hypothetical consent can be used from the perspective of a sovereign as a standard that requires the sovereign to treat citizens as if they had consented, although they have not consented. It concludes by arguing that although this standard may appear to corrode political authority, instead it enhances political authority. It drives the sovereign to relinquish the claim that citizens are obligated to obey, and to treat them so they will have reason to obey.

Commercial Licenses as Political Contracts

2019 ◽  
pp. 201-229
Author(s):  
Katie Jarvis
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
The State ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Food Retailers ◽  
The Social ◽  
Justices Of The Peace ◽  
Economic Citizenship ◽  
Fiscal Contract ◽  
The Relationship

From 1791 to 1793 and again from 1795 to 1798, the deputies taxed work through occupational licenses called the patente. This chapter reveals how the revolutionaries refracted the relationship among work, property, and autonomous citizenship through this tax. To replace the revenue generated by guild fees, the deputies created graduated tax brackets to target the wealth generated by an individual’s occupation. By exchanging fees for permissions, the patente created a fiscal contract between citizens and the state that mirrored the social contract. Legislators assessed the patente according to criteria for full citizenship including independence and immobile property. From 1796 to 1798, the patente fashioned a type of economic citizenship not predicated on gender and enabled the Dames to form a fiscal contract with the nation, unlike all male wage laborers. In patente hearings before justices of the peace, the Dames articulated their trade as autonomous work. When the deputies reorganized taxes by familial unit and exempted food retailers in 1798, the Dames lost their licenses and fiscal autonomy. The Directory simultaneously reconsolidated political authority into male heads of households.

Sovereignty and Associative Obligations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron James
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Right ◽  
Associative Obligations ◽  
Rival View

Conservative American jurisprudence often staunchly maintains that each society—and especially the United States—enjoys an absolute right of sovereignty as against the constraints of international law. This position is often maintained in a philosophically dogmatic way—as a morally unsupported assertion that political authority can only have a domestic source. Yet the social contract tradition, especially in the work of Thomas Hobbes, but also in contemporary arguments by Michael Walzer, offers something of a principled defense of this view. This chapter will outline a fundamental alternative to this conservative position, also located within the social contract tradition. Domestic political authority, on this rival view, partly has its source in the larger state system that constitutes and defines the right of sovereignty with a political social practice of global scope.

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