Contractarianism

Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman

The idea that political relations originate in contract or agreement has been applied in several ways. In Plato’s Republic Glaucon suggests that justice is but a pact among rational egoists. Thomas Hobbes developed this idea to analyse the nature of political power.Given the predominantly self-centred nature of humankind, government is necessary for society. Government’s role is to stabilize social cooperation. By exercising enforcement powers, government provides each with the assurance that everyone else will abide by cooperative rules, thereby making it rational for all to cooperate. To fulfil this stabilizing role, Hobbes argued that it is rational for each individual to agree to authorize one person to exercise absolute political power. Neo-Hobbesians eschew absolutism and apply the theory of rational choice to argue that rules of justice, perhaps even all morality, can be construed in terms of a rational bargain among self-interested individuals. John Locke, working from different premises than Hobbes, appealed to a social compact to argue for a constitutional government with limited powers. All men are born with a natural right to equal freedom, and a natural duty to God to preserve themselves and the rest of mankind. No government is just unless it could be commonly agreed to form a position of equal freedom, where agreement is subject to the moral constraints of natural law. Absolutism is unjust according to this criterion. Rousseau developed egalitarian features of Locke’s view to contend for a democratic constitution.The Social Contract embodies the General Will of society, not the unconstrained private wills of its members. The General Will wills the common good, the good of society and all of its members. Only by bringing our individual wills into accord with the General Will can we achieve civic and moral freedom. In this century, John Rawls has recast natural rights theories of the social contract to argue for a liberal egalitarian conception of justice. From a position of equality, where each person abstracts from knowledge of their historical situations, it is rational for all to agree on principles of justice that guarantee equal basic freedoms and resources adequate for each person’s independence. T.M. Scanlon, meanwhile, has outlined a right-based contractualist account of morality. An act is right if it accords with principles that could not be reasonably rejected by persons who are motivated by a desire to justify their actions according to principles that no one else can reasonably reject.

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-192
Author(s):  
A. Khudori Soleh

Rawls' justice theory is based on three basic concepts: concept of property from John Locke, social contract from Rousseau, and imperative categories from Kant. This Rawls' justice conception itself emerges as a respond for social injustice in society as well as i nequitable behavior affected by the ethics of utilitarianism. Furthermore, according to Rawls, justice is fairness. The principles of justice are, (1) equal and maximum feasible liberty for all, (2) power and wealth to be distributed equally, except where inequalities; would work for the adage of all and where all would have equal opportunity to attain the higher position. The first principle supposes as permanent principle and, which cannot be interpreted. On the other hand, the second principle degrades two formulas: (a) everyone’s  advantage (b) equally open. So forth, from formula (a) can be degraded two possibilities: principle of efficiency and principle of differentiation, whereas from formula (b) also can be degraded two possibilities: equality as careers open to talents and equality as equality of fair opportunity): Hencefonh, from possibility of (a) and (b) yielded four possibilities of justice interpretation: natural freedom, free equality, free aristocracy and the equality democratize.  


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.


Author(s):  
Amy E. Eckert

The social contract tradition derives its ethical force from the hypothetical agreement that parties would reach in an initial choice situation. This initial choice situation brings together a description of the circumstances of justice, various extra-contractarian moral assumptions, and an instrumental theory of rational choice. The circumstances of justice refer to the conditions that require principles of justice. These conditions include the existence of social cooperation along with moderate scarcity. In the absence of such conditions, principles of justice are either unnecessary or impossible to sustain. Social cooperation generates both benefits and burdens, and it is the allocation of those components of social cooperation that requires principles of justice. The application of the social contract to the domestic context dates back to the ancient Greeks, though their version of the contract was somewhat crude and rather one-sided in favor of state authority. Later versions of the social contract would oblige the state to provide much more to citizens in return for their allegiance. John Rawls is widely credited with resurrecting the social contract tradition in the twentieth century. His thought holds special significance for the international social contract, as he extends the contractual approach ethics into the international system where his predecessors declined to do so.


Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 255-271
Author(s):  
Eduarda Santos Silva

Given the union of individuals by a convention, as idealized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The social contract, the political body that is formed will be directed by the general will, which gives unity to the people, considering the person of each associate, their assets and their freedom. Although the general will is the foundation for the maintenance of citizens' political freedom, it is possible to ask whether it will really prevail in all spheres of civil society, if the individuals who deliberate in the exercise of sovereignty are sufficiently informed about what is good common, or if they are led to accept what suits the Legislator, that is, if the general will is not manipulated, corrupted or deceived by this extraordinary figure, considered a guide endowed with superior intelligence to better lead citizens to pass good laws and preserving the common good. We are interested, then, in contrasting the very important issue of the popular participation of individuals in public subjects, highlighted by Rousseau, with the apparent limits that such participation would encounter in a republican state, and its consequences for political freedom.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Keyt

John Rawls, in his distinguished revival and animation of the theory of the social contract, maintains that “the procedure of contract theories provides … a general analytic method for the comparative study of conceptions of justice ” (p. 121). As a corollary, he holds, secondly, that “if one interpretation [of the contractual situation] is philosophically most favoured, and if its principles characterize our considered judgments, we have a procedure for justification as well ” (p. 122). Finally, Rawls uses the social contract as a critical or polemic device; he is prepared to reject a conception of justice if the contractual situation associated with it contains objectionable features.


Author(s):  
Zoe Beenstock

As a sociable being that is barred from society, Frankenstein’s monster presents a sustained engagement with social contract theory’s major dilemma of whether individualism can produce sociability. The male creature’s isolation and inner disunity suggest that contract theory displaces men and is unable to concatenate even those members that should be eligible for full citizenship. Shelley focuses on the gender inequality of contract theory through her different creation stories of the creatures’ bodies. In Victor’s decision not to complete the female creature she rejects Wollstonecraft’s revisionist approach to Rousseau, and demonstrates that social contract theory cannot be rewritten to include women. Women are not defined as political subjects but do have independent wills. Therefore, they are potentially resistant to contract and a threat to political control. Contending with Wollstonecraft and Rousseau, and also Coleridge and Godwin, Shelley suggests that intertextual relations produce unpredictable results. The creatures are test cases for the social contract’s respective failures in terms of social cohesion and gender.


Author(s):  
Zoe Beenstock

Coleridge wrote frequently about Rousseau throughout his varied career. His early lectures and letters draw on Rousseau’s critique of luxury and frequently allude to the general will, depicting Rousseau as a Christ-like figure. Coleridge’s subsequent disappointment with Pantisocracy led him to reject Rousseau and the social contract. Comparing Rousseau to Luther in The Friend, Coleridge argues that Rousseau’s unhappiness arises from a conflict between an age of individualism and an ongoing need for community. According to Coleridge, poetry tolerates this conflict better than philosophy. In ‘Reflections on Having Left a Place of Retirement’ Coleridge suggests that social retreat offers illusory solace from war and social crisis. He critiques the state of nature, sympathy, and even religion for failing to balance the self with its environment. Thematically and formally The Rime of the Ancient Mariner explores this crisis in cohering systems. Through the mariner’s relationship to the albatross, the wedding that frames the poem, and episodes of the supernatural that disrupt the ballad form, Coleridge defines a breaking point between the individual and general wills.


Author(s):  
Mogens Lærke

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.


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