On the Way Toward a Phenomenological Psychology: The Psychology of William James.

1968 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
D. C. Mathur ◽  
Hans Linschoten ◽  
Amedo Giorgi
1969 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 384
Author(s):  
Thomas S. Knight ◽  
Hans Linschoten

Author(s):  
Christopher Hanlon

Emerson’s Memory Loss is about an archive of texts documenting Emerson’s intellectual state during the final phase of his life, as he underwent dementia. It is also about the way these texts provoke a rereading of the more familiar canon of Emerson’s thinking. Emerson’s memory loss, Hanlon argues, contributed to the shaping of a line of thought in America that emphasizes the social over the solipsistic, the affective over the distant, the many over the one. Emerson regarded his output during the time when his patterns of cognition transformed profoundly as a regathering of focus on the nature of memory and of thinking itself. His late texts theorize Emerson’s experience of senescence even as they disrupt his prior valorizations of the independent mind teeming with self-sufficient conviction. But still, these late writings have succumbed to a process of critical forgetting—either ignored by scholars or denied inclusion in Emerson’s oeuvre. Attending to a manuscript archive that reveals the extent to which Emerson collaborated with others—especially his daughter, Ellen Tucker Emerson—to articulate what he considered his most important work even as his ability to do so independently waned, Hanlon measures the resonance of these late texts across the stretch of Emerson’s thinking, including his writing about Margaret Fuller and his meditations on streams of thought that verge unto those of his godson, William James. Such ventures bring us toward a self defined less by its anxiety of overinfluence than by its communality, its very connectedness with myriad others.


1927 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 253-264
Author(s):  
M. H. Ingraham

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: A good many times today I have heard it said that we should emphasize in class those things that would interest the man in the street. I suppose that this is good doctrine. But if it is sound, it seems to me that our most important task is to find the right man in the street. Some years ago I succeeded in doing this to a marked degree here in Worcester. Between my sophomore and junior years in college I spent some time tramping in the White Mountains and on the way took the opportunity to see a little of New England. I had a very pleasant trolley trip starting from Hartford, including Springfield, Amherst, Northampton and ending here in Worcester. I had never been off the train in Worcester before and had only a few hours to stay. I knew nothing of the city except its population and the hours of a few departing trains. What should I see? What should T do? I went to the man in the street, the first policeman that I saw, and told him my plight. To my surprise he directed me to the Art Gallery. It was an unexpected answer but a very good one, for it is truly a gallery of which to be proud.


2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Ashworth

The realm of intentionality is definitive of phenomenology as a reflective methodology. Yet it is precisely the focus on the intentional given that has been condemned recently. Speculative realism (e.g. Meillassoux, 2008/2006) argues that phenomenology is unsatisfactory since the reduction to the intentional realm excludes the ‘external’, i.e. reality independent of consciousness. This criticism allows me to clarify the nature of intentionality. Material phenomenology finds, in contrast, that the intentional realm excludes the ‘inner’ (‘auto-affective life’—Henry, 1973/1963). This criticism allows me to discuss the way in which ipseity enters as an element of experience. Intentionality, viewed psychologically, is rightly the distinct arena of phenomenological psychology. However, there is no doubting the difficulty of maintaining a research focus precisely on the realm of intentionality; there are aporias of the reduction. I discuss some of the difficulties.


2003 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Bufton

AbstractPhenomenological psychology has typically avoided the "importation" of such concepts as social class from sociology.Within the epoche, such terminology is bracketed on the grounds that it brings with it excess theoretical baggage and threatens the return to experience in itself. Yet, in uncovering the lifeworld of university students who—in what in Britain is still predominantly a preserve of the privileged—come from relatively economically disadvantaged homes, "class" or some cognate concept is found to be necessary to capture the range of modes of alienation and disjunction experienced. Following Casey's discussion of the way in which Bourdieu's notion of habitus relates to Merleau-Ponty's description of the interpenetration of the natural and the cultural in the lived body, social class is shown to bring together students' accounts of their multi-faceted sense that "University is not for the likes of us"—encompassing issues of identity, sociality, and spatio-temporal dislocation.


1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-442
Author(s):  
J. Kellenberger

Both philosophy and theology are given a raison d'etre by their problems. Some of their problems they share, and some they do not. They share a concern with the nature of morality and they share the problem of human freedom. But the filioque issue and the controversy between Arius and Athanasius regarding the consubstaniality of the persons of the Trinity belong to theology, if contemporary theology will have them. The problems of reference and denotation, and of classes, in the cast given them by Frege, Russell and others, are exclusively in the domain of philosophy. Sometimes the problems shared by philosophy and theology are also human problems: they intimately touch human lives and have palpable ramifications for the way men live. Camus, who said with a flourish that the only philosophical problem is whether or not to commit suicide, was saying in part that the only philosophical problems worth considering are human problems. And William James would perhaps concur; he would insist that only philosophical problems that are “living, forced and momentous” present a genuine option to men.


2019 ◽  
pp. 196-263
Author(s):  
James W. Underhill ◽  
Mariarosaria Gianninoto

This chapter treats the individual as a conceptual problem, both a modern ideal and a European characteristic. But the authors set out by considering the European traditions that have warned against excessive individualism, from the Church, from Marxists, and even from those who are now seen today as the champions of individual rights (such as John S. Mill). The enlightened individualism of William James and John Dewey, and the celebration of the individual by American poets such as Walt Whitman, is contrasted with Marxist objections to the keyword. Milan Kundera’s story about Ludvík, in The Joke, shows the way Czech communists mistrusted individualists and considered them to be enemies of the people. The Chinese section treats ‘individual’ as a foreign term, like citizen, that is introduced to Chinese after being borrowed from Japanese. The authors argue that the keywords used to denote the individual in Chinese and other languages have never been neutral. Clearly perceived in negative terms for many decades in China, the authors explore the way citizens began to discuss individual rights and individual obligations when the Chinese economy and the society began to open up after 1978.


2020 ◽  
pp. 211-223
Author(s):  
Robert H. Abzug

This chapter explores May’s leading role as the American leader of the existential psychology movement and the irony that as he gained in notice and attended a series of international conference, he came to realize that Existentialism had much in the way of American roots, especially in the work of William James. He was critical of his European colleagues for their narrower conception of existential thought. Meanwhile, with Existence published and an existential movement under way, May turned to his longstanding interest in creativity and in that regard participated in various panels and article collections on the topic. He also edited, with a long introduction, Symbolism in Religion and Literature. But, in attempting at least two novels in various versions, he found that writing about literature wasn’t quite the same as creating it. Meanwhile, he developed various strong friendships at Yale, especially William Sloane Coffin.


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