The Proposed Termination of the Iraq Mandate

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quincy Wright

The announcement on November 4, 1929, that Great Britain intended to recommend Iraq for admission to membership in the League of Nations in 1932 has presented some interesting constitutional questions to the Permanent Mandates Commission, as well as the unusual spectacle of a great Power seeking to convince a skeptical outside body that its dependency is ripe for independence. Heretofore, dependencies that wanted independence have usually had to fight for it, as did the United States, the Latin American States, Belgium, and the various successors to the Ottoman, Romanoff and Hapsburg Empires. It is true, Colombia and Panama, Sweden and Norway, Denmark and Iceland have separated without war but with some heartburnings. British statesmen experienced in the loss of colonies by violence, talked freely in the mid-nineteenth century of the natural destiny of colonies to drop from the mother tree when ripe, and in the twentieth century they have acquiesced in a status of virtual independence for the dominions, soon to include India. They have rationalized this “ climbing process” as one “ common to all the communities which form part of the Empire. Each of them, whether the population is predominantly white or predominantly colored, is gradually, as it develops in strength and capacity, passing upward from the stage in which the community is wholly subject to control exercised from London to that in which the measure of control diminishes, and so on to that in which the control has ceased entirely.”But this was after the event. Before it, history records military episodes in Ireland, India, South Africa, and even Canada.

1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 714-727
Author(s):  
Bryce Wood ◽  
Minerva Morales M.

When the governments of the Latin American states were taking part in the negotiations leading to the founding of the UN, they could hardly have done so with nostalgic memories of the League of Nations. The League had provided no protection to the Caribbean countries from interventions by the United States, and, largely because of United States protests, it did not consider the Tacna-Arica and Costa Rica-Panama disputes in the early 1920's. Furthermore, Mexico had not been invited to join; Brazil withdrew in 1926; and Argentina and Peru took little part in League affairs. The organization was regarded as being run mainly for the benefit of European states with the aid of what Latin Americans called an “international bureaucracy,” in which citizens from the southern hemisphere played minor roles. The United States was, of course, not a member, and both the reference to the Monroe Doctrine by name in Article 21 of the Covenant and the organization's practice of shunning any attempt to interfere in inter-American affairs against the wishes of the United States made the League in its first decade a remote and inefficacious institution to countries that were seriously concerned about domination by Washington.


Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-282
Author(s):  
Christine Gray

In 1908 international law governed relations between ‘civilised states’ only. It applied exclusively to those states within the Family ofNations - 45 fully sovereign states according to the first edition of Oppenheim's International Law. These 45 included the six ‘Great Powers’, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, various lesser European states, the United States of America and 20 Latin American states. In Africa ‘The Negro Republic of Liberia and the Congo Free State were the only real and full members ofthe Family of Nations’, in Asia only Japan. The position ofsuch states as Persia, Siam, China, Korea and Abyssinia was doubtful; ‘These states are certainly civilised states, and Abyssinia is even a Christian state.


Author(s):  
Mary S. Barton

This is a book about terrorism, weapons, and diplomacy in the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars. It charts the convergence of the manufacture and trade of arms; diplomacy among the Great Powers and the domestic politics within them; the rise of national liberation and independence movements; and the burgeoning concept and early institutions of international counterterrorism. Key themes include: a transformation in meaning and practice of terrorism; the inability of Great Powers—namely, Great Britain, the United States, France—to harmonize perceptions of interest and the pursuit of common interests; the establishment of the tools and infrastructure of modern intelligence—including the U.S.-U.K. cooperation that would evolve into the Five Eyes intelligence alliance; and the nature of peacetime in the absence of major wars. Particular emphasis is given to British attempts to quell revolutionary nationalist movements in India and elsewhere in its empire, and to the Great Powers’ combined efforts to counter the activities of the Communist International. The facilitating roles of the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations are explored here, in the context of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919, the Arms Traffic Conference of 1925, and the 1937 Terrorism Convention.


Author(s):  
Sarah Elizabeth Stockwell

This chapter considers processes of decolonization in Britain’s ‘empires’, incorporating discussion not just of the key dynamics and manifestations of decolonization in the colonial empire in India, Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere, but also in Britain’s residual ‘informal’ empire in the Middle East, and in the ‘old’ Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. The chapter argues that decolonization across these different contexts was driven by geo-political forces operating across the European empires, as the international order was reconfigured by two world wars, tilting power away from Britain and other European imperial powers. Stockwell nevertheless identifies elements of British imperial exceptionalism. She suggests that these were not to be found, as contemporaries liked to claim, in the form of a British liberal imperialism. Rather, Britain, which was at the centre of an empire larger than any other, retained a semblance of great power status, shaping British relations with the United States and Britain’s ambitions to exercise influence after empire.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-151
Author(s):  
Tanya Harmer

This article explains how Latin American governments responded to the Cuban revolution and how the “Cuban question” played out in the inter-American system in the first five years of Fidel Castro's regime, from 1959 to 1964, when the Organization of American States imposed sanctions against the island. Drawing on recently declassified sources from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and the United States, the article complicates U.S.-centric accounts of the inter-American system. It also adds to our understanding of how the Cold War was perceived within the region. The article makes clear that U.S. policymakers were not the only ones who feared Castro's triumph, the prospect of greater Soviet intervention, and the Cuban missile crisis. By seeking to understand why local states opposed Castro's ascendance and what they wanted to do to counter his regime, the account here offers new insight into the Cuban revolution's international impact and allows us to evaluate U.S. influence in the region during key years of the Cold War.


1975 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Meek

Literature on U.S. influence in the Organization of American States reveals a marked diversity of views. Some authors consider that U.S. influence is absolute or very nearly so; others hold that it is relative; still others think it is minimal.In the nearly-absolute school, former Guatemalan President Arévalo (1961: 126) says that the United States “always wins” in the OAS. The Ecuadorian writer Benjamín Cardón (1965: 29) says that the OAS “receives orders and complies with them, with the appearance of discussion, and the appearance of votes that satisfy pro-forma the hypocritical quakerism of the masters.” This view might be summed up by a comment attributed to a Latin American delegate to one Inter-American Conference: “If the United States wanted to badly enough, it could have a resolution passed declaring two and two are five ” (New York Times, March 8, 1954).


1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-311
Author(s):  
William R. Manning

It was two years after the United States formally declared for the recognition of the new Latin-American states and after several Spanish-American states had been recognized before the question of recognizing Brazil arose. When, in April, 1824, Rebello presented himself in Washington as the Brazilian chargé, a difference of opinion arose in Monroe’s cabinet, because Brazil was a monarchy, while all of the other American governments were republics, and some hoped that monarchy might have no foothold on the continent. Others, however, advocated the recognition of Brazil the more strongly because it was a monarchy in order to show the world that it was the fact of independence which actuated the United States rather than the form of government.The opposition to recognition was strengthened by recent news of a formidable separatist movement in the north, with Pernambuco as a center, the purpose of which was to establish an independent republic under the name of the Federation of the Equator. This; raised a serious doubt whether the government at Rio de Janeiro were really in effective control. It was reported, too, that the assistance of French naval vessels had been accepted in order to repress the Pernambuco revolt. This conjured up the specter of the so-called Holy Alliance, for the exclusion of which from America Monroe’s famous message of the preceding December had declared. There was also a strong suspicion, supported by persistent rumors, that Dom Pedro (who had allowed himself to be made Emperor when in 1822 Brazilian independence from Portugal was declared, who had summoned a constituent assembly and then quarreled with it and finally forcibly dismissed it because it proved too liberal to suit his ideas of prerogative, and who had appointed a council that had drawn up a fairly liberal constitution in harmony with his wishes which he had not yet taken the oath to observe) really wished to restore Portuguese sovereignty and rule Brazil as a vassal of his father, the King of Portugal. About the middle of May, however, word came that in the preceding March the Emperor had taken the oath to the constitution of the independent Brazilian Empire. After Rebello had given assurances concerning the suppression of the slave trade and the observance of treaties that had been negotiated with Portugal, he was formally received by President Monroe as Brazilian chargé on May 26, 1824. He expressed his gratitude that “the Government of the United States has been the first to acknowledge the independence of Brazil.”


Author(s):  
Theodore J. Stein

Civil liberties refer to certain freedoms granted to all citizens. They have been established as bills of rights in the constitutions of such countries as the United States, India, South Africa, and Great Britain. Civil rights differ from civil liberties in that the former are expressed in statutes enacted by legislative bodies. Civil liberties limit the state's power to interfere in the lives of its citizens, whereas civil rights take a more proactive role to ensure that all citizens have equal protection. Civil liberties are most endangered during national emergencies when governments infringe on individual liberties to safeguard the nation.


Author(s):  
Konstantin S. Strigunov ◽  
◽  
Andrei V. Manoilo ◽  

The aim of the article is to reveal the mechanism of the coup d'etat in Bolivia in November 2019. Based on the research of Russian and foreign experts, as well as official documents of international organizations, a research center, speeches by world leaders, and the media, the authors analyze the internal causes and external factors that contributed to the overthrow of Evo Morales and the coming to power of the right opposition, oriented to the United States and supranational structures. The methods for the research were selected based on the requirements of a multilateral and systematic analysis of the domestic political situation in Bolivia, its cultural, historical, territorial, and economic characteristics, as well as foreign policy factors that influenced the situation in the country. A comparative analysis of the coup d'etat in Bolivia with the situation in some other Latin American states was done. The first section analyzes the domestic political situation in Bolivia, economic factors, and a number of actions by Evo Morales which led to the weakening of his position on the eve of the presidential election. The second section discusses the mechanism of influence of the Organization of American States on the election process in Bolivia. The influence of neo-fascist organizations, which receive external support and financing and became the main shock force of the coup d'etat, is investigated. The channels of influence of international players and organizations on the internal political processes of Bolivia are studied. The authors infer that the ousted president did not solve the task of creating and implementing a development project for all social and ethnic groups of Bolivia while maintaining their own support and state sovereignty. In addition, the authors give a critical assessment to the decision of the Bolivian leadership led by Evo Morales to entrust election monitoring exclusively to the Organization of American States where the US position dominates. The authors suggest that, for political support, in the monitoring of the election, Evo Morales should have involved representatives of states and organizations not controlled by Washington, for example, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. For the first time, the authors reveal and thoroughly study the trigger mechanism for activating a coup d'etat using technologies for dismantling political regimes adapted to Bolivian conditions. They conclude that, in fact, counteraction to left-wing political regimes by the United States in Latin America is de facto a continuation of the formally completed Operation Condor, but using modern technologies to eliminate the unwanted regime in a particular country in new geopolitical conditions.


Polar Record ◽  
1951 ◽  
Vol 6 (42) ◽  
pp. 179-184
Author(s):  
Anders K. Orvin

By a treaty signed in Paris on 9 February 1920, Norway was given the sovereignty of Svalbard, comprising all the islands situated between longs. 10° and 35° E. and lats. 74° and 81° N., thus including Spitsbergen, Bjørnøya (Bear Island), Hopen (Hope Island), Kong Karls Land, and Kvitøya (White Island). The treaty, which has since been recognized by a number of other states, was signed by the United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland, the Dominions of Canada and New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India, and Sweden. The U.S.S.R. recognized Norway's sovereignty of Svalbard in 1924 but did not sign the treaty until 1935; Germany signed the treaty in 1925. On 14 August 1925, Norway formally took possession and the Norwegian flag was hoisted in Longyearbyen. Since then, twenty-five years have elapsed, and in honour of the occasion the anniversary was celebrated at Longyearbyen in 1950.


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