Pure-projective modules and positive constructibility

2000 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. G. Kucera ◽  
Ph. Rothmaler

In modules many ‘positive’ versions of model-theoretic concepts turn out to be equivalent to concepts known in classical module theory—by ‘positive’ we mean that instead of allowing arbitrary first-order formulas in the model-theoretic definitions only positive primitive formulas are taken into consideration. (This feature is due to Baur's quantifier elimination for modules, cf. [Pr], however we will not make explicit use of it here.) Often this allows one to combine model-theoretic methods with algebraic ones. One instance of this is the result proved in [Rot1] (see also [Rot2]) that the Mittag-Leffler modules are exactly the positively atomic modules. This paper is parallel to the one just mentioned in that it is proved here, Theorem 3.1, that the pure-projective modules are exactly the positively constructible modules. The following parallel facts from module theory and from model theory led us to this result: every pure-projective module is Mittag-Leffler and the converse is true for countable (in fact even countably generated) modules, cf. [RG]; every constructible model is atomic and the converse is true for countable models, cf. [Pi].


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-82
Author(s):  
Iqbal Maulana

Modules are a generalization of the vector spaces of linear algebra in which the “scalars” are allowed to be from a ring with identity, rather than a field. In module theory there is a concept about projective module, i.e. a module over ring R in which it is projective module relative to all modules over ring R. Next, there is the fact that every module over ring R is projective module relative to all semisimple modules over ring R. If P is a module over ring R which it’s projective relative only to all semisimple modules over ring R, then P is called p-poor module. In the discussion of the projective module, there is a lemma associated with the equivalence of two modules K1 and K2 provided that there are two projective modules P1 and P2 such that is isomorphic to . That lemma is known as Schanuel’s lemma in projective modules. Because the p-poor module is a special case of the projective module, then in this paper will be discussed about Schanuel’s lemma in p-poor modules



2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (02) ◽  
pp. 833-848
Author(s):  
LEVON HAYKAZYAN

AbstractWe introduce a notion of the space of types in positive model theory based on Stone duality for distributive lattices. We show that this space closely mirrors the Stone space of types in the full first-order model theory with negation (Tarskian model theory). We use this to generalise some classical results on countable models from the Tarskian setting to positive model theory.



Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman

We continue our study of Model Theory. This is the branch of logic concerned with the interplay between sentences of a formal language and mathematical structures. Primarily, Model Theory studies the relationship between a set of first-order sentences T and the class Mod(T) of structures that model T. Basic results of Model Theory were proved in the previous chapter. For example, it was shown that, in first-order logic, every model has a theory and every theory has a model. Put another way, T is consistent if and only if Mod(T) is nonempty. As a consequence of this, we proved the Completeness theorem. This theorem states that T ├ φ if and onlyif M ╞ φ for each M in Mod(T). So to study a theory T, we can avoid the concept of ├ and the methods of deduction introduced in Chapter 3, and instead work with the concept of ╞ and analyze the class Mod(T). More generally, we can go back and forth between the notions on the left side of the following table and their counterparts on the right. Progress in mathematics is often the result of having two or more points of view that are shown to be equivalent. A prime example is the relationship between the algebra of equations and the geometry of the graphs defined by the equations. Combining these two points of view yield concepts and results that would not be possible in either geometry or algebra alone. The Completeness theorem equates the two points of view exemplified in the above table. Model Theory exploits the relationship between these two points of view to investigate mathematical structures. First-order theories serve as our objects of study in this chapter. A first-order theory may be viewed as a consistent set of sentences T or as an elementary class of structures Mod(T). We shall present examples of theories and consider properties that the theories mayor may not possess such as completeness, categoricity, quantifier-elimination, and model-completeness. The properties that a theory possesses shed light on the structures that model the theory. We analyze examples of first-order structures including linear orders, vector spaces, the random graph, and the complex numbers.



1981 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 490-498
Author(s):  
Douglas E. Miller

AbstractWe discuss the problem of defining the collection of first-order elementary classes in terms of the natural topological space of countable models.



1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 1410-1413
Author(s):  
C. J. Ash

The following fairly elementary result seems to raise possibilities for the study of countable models of a theory in a countable language. For the terminology of model theory we refer to [CK].Let L be a countable first-order language. Let L′ be the relational language having, for each formula φ of L and each sequence υ1,…,υn of variables including the free variables of φ, an n-ary relation symbol Pφ. For any L-structure and any formula Ψ(υ) of L, we define the Ψ-fraction of to be the L′-structure Ψ whose universe consists of those elements of satisfying Ψ(υ) and whose relations {Rφ}φϵL are defined by letting a1,…,an satisfy Rφ in Ψ if, and only if, a1,…, an satisfy φ in .An L-elementary class means the class of all L-structures satisfying each of some set of sentences of L. The countable part of an L-elementary class K means the class of all countable L-structures from K.Theorem. Let K be an L-elementary class and let Ψ(υ) be a formula of L. Then the class of countable Ψ-fractions of structures in K is the countable part of some L′-elementary class.Comment. By the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, the countable Ψ-fractions of structures in K are the same as the Ψ-fractions of countable structures in K.Proof. We give a set Σ′ of L′-sentences whose countable models are exactly the countable Ψ-fractions of structures in K.



1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Butz ◽  
Ieke Moerdijk

In this paper, we will present a definability theorem for first order logic.<br />This theorem is very easy to state, and its proof only uses elementary tools. To explain the theorem, let us first observe that if M is a model of a theory T in a language L, then, clearly, any definable subset S M (i.e., a subset S = {a | M |= phi(a)} defined by some formula phi) is invariant under all<br />automorphisms of M. The same is of course true for subsets of M" defined<br />by formulas with n free variables.<br /> Our theorem states that, if one allows Boolean valued models, the converse holds. More precisely, for any theory T we will construct a Boolean valued model M, in which precisely the T-provable formulas hold, and in which every (Boolean valued) subset which is invariant under all automorphisms of M is definable by a formula of L.<br />Our presentation is entirely selfcontained, and only requires familiarity<br />with the most elementary properties of model theory. In particular, we have added a first section in which we review the basic definitions concerning<br />Boolean valued models.<br />The Boolean algebra used in the construction of the model will be presented concretely as the algebra of closed and open subsets of a topological space X naturally associated with the theory T. The construction of this space is closely related to the one in [1]. In fact, one of the results in that paper could be interpreted as a definability theorem for infinitary logic, using topological rather than Boolean valued models.



Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.



2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-91
Author(s):  
Gianmarco Giovannardi

AbstractThe deformability condition for submanifolds of fixed degree immersed in a graded manifold can be expressed as a system of first order PDEs. In the particular but important case of ruled submanifolds, we introduce a natural choice of coordinates, which allows to deeply simplify the formal expression of the system, and to reduce it to a system of ODEs along a characteristic direction. We introduce a notion of higher dimensional holonomy map in analogy with the one-dimensional case [29], and we provide a characterization for singularities as well as a deformability criterion.



1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.



1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Fuhrken ◽  
W. Taylor

A relational structure is called weakly atomic-compact if and only if every set Σ of atomic formulas (taken from the first-order language of the similarity type of augmented by a possibly uncountable set of additional variables as “unknowns”) is satisfiable in whenever every finite subset of Σ is so satisfiable. This notion (as well as some related ones which will be mentioned in §4) was introduced by J. Mycielski as a generalization to model theory of I. Kaplansky's notion of an algebraically compact Abelian group (cf. [5], [7], [1], [8]).



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