The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. King

Jurisdictions are the defining characteristics of committee systems, and they are central in any discussions about the U. S. Congress; yet we know little about them. Where do committee property rights come from? Are they rigid? Are they flexible? I introduce a distinction between statutory jurisdictions (which are written in the House and Senate Rules) and common law jurisdictions (which emerge through bill referral precedents). Turf is gained through common law advances, not through formal rules changes (like the “reforms” passed by the House in 1946, 1974, and 1980). Jurisdictional change is ongoing and incremental. The analysis draws on an examination of hearings held by the House Commerce Committee from 1947 through 1990.

2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 65-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julien-François Gerber ◽  
Rolf Steppacher

This article proposes a new way of looking at social conflicts relating to industrial tree plantations by arguing that such conflicts reflect the struggle between two distinct institutional logics, i.e., property versus possession. The abstract logic of property, enhanced by credit relations and the minimization of costs, stimulates commercial plantations and tends to be detrimental to the environment. By contrast, the concrete logic of possession forces local communities to take account of complex local social and ecological interactions, and thereby encourages a sustainable use of the forest.


Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Robé

Property rights are presented in a constitutional perspective. Property rights are constitutional rights. They grant prerogative which are protected both by the State and against the State. Contrary to what most economists think, possession plays a secondary role in the notion of property. Property is a right of decision and rule-making as a matter of principle towards the object of property. Laws affecting the use of property are only limited derogations to this principle. This view is congruent with the theory of ownership developed by Oliver Hart and applies in both Civil and Common Law legal systems. Understanding property in this fashion is a key to the understanding of the operation of the existing Power System.


Legal Studies ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iwan Davies

In any system of property law a complete specification of rights and duties raises at least two questions. First, allocation of rights and duties inter se between the parties to the transaction; secondly, the rights and duties of the parties to the original transaction against the rest of the world. The traditional common law analysis where a third party wishes to acquire an indefeasible interest in a chattel is to direct the latter to the ‘owner’ and indeed the prerequisite for the enjoyment of most property rights depends upon our ability to acquire it from someone else. Furthermore, inherent in the idea of acquiring an absolute right in property (title) is exclusivity of possession ie superiority over the transferor and third parties.


Legal Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Austin

This paper offers a new framework for thinking about the relationship between the common law of property and the rule of law. The standard way of framing this relationship is within the terms of the form/substance debate within the literature on the rule of law: Does the rule of law include only formal and procedural aspects or does it also encompass and support substantive rights such as private property rights and civil liberties? By focusing on the nature of common-law reasoning, I wish to question the form/substance dichotomy that frames this debate and to show that the formal aspects of the rule of law are in fact principles widely adopted within the practice of common-law reasoning and as such play a large role in shaping the substantive content of common-law property rights. Understanding this has implications beyond the relationship between property law and the rule of law.


2010 ◽  
pp. 15-39
Author(s):  
Victor Nee ◽  
Sonja Opper

State-centered theory asserts that political institutions and credible commitment by political elite to formal rules securing property rights provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for economic growth to take place. In this approach, the evolution of institutions favorable to economic performance is a top-down process led by politicians who control the state. Hence, in less developed and poor countries, the counterfactual is that if formal institutions secure property rights and check predatory action by the political elite, then sustained economic growth would follow. The limitation of state-centered theory stems from the problem that behavioral prescriptions - formal rules and regulations - that reflect what politicians prefer can be ignored. In contrast, we lay out the bottomup construction of economic institutions that gave rise to capitalist economic development in China. Entrepreneurship in the economically developed regions of the coastal provinces was not fueled by exogenous institutional changes. When the first entrepreneurs decided to decouple from the traditional socialist production system, the government had neither initiated financial reforms inviting a broader societal participation, nor had it provided property rights protection or transparent rules specifying company registration and liabilities. Instead, it was the development and use of innovative informal arrangements within close-knit groups of like-minded actors that provided the necessary funding and reliable business norms. This allowed the first wave of entrepreneurs to survive outside of the state-owned manufacturing system. This bottom-up process resembles earlier accounts of the rise of capitalism in the West.


Author(s):  
David Fung

This chapter examines the Malaysian position on privity and third party beneficiaries. Given that the Malaysian Contracts Act 1950 (‘MCA 1950’) is virtually a copy of the Indian Contract Act 1872, the issues are, unsurprisingly, similar. The absence of a clear statement of the rule in the MCA 1950 meant that its existence was susceptible to challenge. It was only in Kepong Prospecting Ltd v Schmidt, when the Privy Council pronounced on the fundamentality of the privity rule, that the matter was finally settled. This chapter demonstrates the ingenuity and the limitations of the common law. The strategy of finding an express trust of a promise finds a familiar trajectory in the use of that strategy in England. The need to prove the three certainties of intention to create a trust, beneficiaries, and subject matter emphasizes the clear intention to create property rights. An alternative explored by the author relates to the institutional constructive trust which requires a proprietary base by which the constructive trust may be found.


2021 ◽  
pp. 336-347

This chapter begins by defining intellectual property rights as the protection of the ‘creation’ of the mind and describing many different rights that are protected by both statute and common law. It divides intellectual property into two broad categories: industrial property and copyright. It also explores the various statutory and common law intellectual property regimes that have their own idiosyncratic criteria in order to qualify for the protection they offer. The chapter distinguishes relevant intellectual property rights for pharmaceutical product marketing authorisation holders from ‘traditional’ intellectual property rights to regulatory exclusivities. It explores the characteristics of regulatory exclusivities that are akin to other intellectual property rights but have their own unique criteria for qualification and enforcement.


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