The State of Free Speech

1998 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moon ◽  
Owen Fiss
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Mark O'Brien

This chapter examines the fraught relationship that emerged between journalists and government and amongst journalists themselves during the 1970s. As the Northern Troubles escalated the dangers for journalists, both physically and politically, quickly became apparent and the imposition of censorship brought the journalist–politician relationship to a new low. While the government was concerned about the security of the state, journalists were concerned about the survival of free speech. As the conflict wore on the debate on censorship became more fractious as did relations among and between journalists, editors and government.


2021 ◽  
pp. 187-213
Author(s):  
Dan Taylor

Chapter 7 turns to the state, and Spinoza’s ideas in the TP about the role of the state in establishing the conditions for peace, piety and mutual assistance. Does Spinoza champion a proto-liberal sovereignty of reduced scale, founded in deliberation, toleration and free speech, or should the state actively intervene in the lives of its subjects? If he seems to emphasise both, why, and are the two compatible? What late and new role does the multitude play in the establishment and maintenance of social cohesion? The TP itself has been under-appreciated in providing a deeper exposition of the pre-eminence of the affects to political life. Here the multitude appear on stage, and their common feelings and desires take a primary role in the freedom and security of the state. The chapter identifies Spinoza’s aim in this late, unfinished work as one to describe a reasonable republic, that is, an optimum state whose foundation and laws are strictly, scientifically reasonable. I then critically assess Spinoza’s attempt to load the burden of becoming freer onto the state itself, resulting in some potentially unresolvable paradoxes for individual freedom


Art Attacks ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 29-57
Author(s):  
Malvika Maheshwari

The preliminary chapter outlines the conceptual foundation of India’s free speech regime by focussing on the debates of the Constituent Assembly of India that took place between 1946 and 1949, and traces the development of Article 19 of the Constitution, which guarantees all citizens the right to free speech and expression, albeit with certain ‘reasonable restrictions’ such as public order, decency and morality, and security of the state, among others. While offering a synoptic account of the sundry forms that the right to free speech took as the framers navigated the discrepancies between their imagined ideal and the existent, conflicting reality, the idea is not to uncover some grand master-plan of the Indian democracy from which it has faltered, but to explore how it might lend a fissure to the violent accusations of offending religious, cultural, or national sentiments in contemporary India.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 99-107
Author(s):  
Catherine M. Cole

"Californians, this is the time for us to do our utmost for the University because it has done its utmost for us,” said Chief Justice Earl Warren at the April 1967 convocation at Berkeley. And what a time it was—on the heels of the Free Speech Movement in 1964, the Vietnam Day marches in 1965, an escalation of anti-war protests in 1966, and, in January of 1967, the dramatic firing of UC President Clark Kerr by Governor Ronald Regan at a meeting of the Board Regents. The following year the University of California would celebrate its hundredth year, and to celebrate this, the UC hired photographer Ansel Adams to take thousands of images of the rapidly expanding UC system. Adams was charged to take photographs of the future. What might these images from futures past tell us about the future for both this university and the state to which it belongs?


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Richard Moon

A commitment to freedom of expression means that an individual must be free to speak to others and to hear what others may say, without interference from the state. It is said that the answer to bad or erroneous speech is not censorship, but rather more and better speech. Importantly the listener, and not the speaker, is seen as responsible (as an independent agent) for his or her actions, including harmful actions, whether these actions occur because he or she agrees or disagrees with the speaker’s message.


1937 ◽  
Vol 7 (19) ◽  
pp. 41-50
Author(s):  
Lionel Pearson

One of the privileges which the Athenians prized very highly was parrhesia—the right of free speech. From the foundation of the democracy until the dangers of uncensored speech in the Pelopon-nesian War made some restraint advisable this privilege remained unimpaired, and it is an important part of their political, if not of their social, system. The recognition of this right of free speech should mean that no grievance need remain unspoken, and that politicians could be well informed about the state of public opinion.


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 662-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert McCloskey

The state of modern jurisprudence is not inaptly reflected in the range of considerations to which this title might give rise. If the illusion of certitude still survived as a legal premise, if the judicial process were conceived in terms of “tidy formulas,” one could feel more assurance that the enterprise itself is meaningful and potentially fruitful. But if the past fifty years have taught us nothing else, they have made us aware of the complex and ambiguous evaluation of alternatives that underlies the judicially enforced command. Even the word “constitutionality,” which once seemed to express a coherent idea, has lost its definable contours as understanding of public law has progressed. The salutary result of all this is that we recognize the great network of imponderables which we must assess before declaring with confidence that a given exercise of governmental power conflicts with our fundamental law. But by the same token uncertainties have been multiplied, and flat statement and prediction have become increasingly hazardous. The penalty of understanding is doubt.


Author(s):  
Catriona Mackenzie ◽  
Denise Meyerson

This chapter evaluates the relationship between autonomy and freedom of speech, examining a variety of autonomy-based justifications for the importance of speech and especially of freedom of speech. The differences between these justifications relate not only to the different conceptions of autonomy that underpin them, but also to their different responses to the problem of competing autonomy interests. It is plausible to think that the state should respect, protect, and promote the autonomy of everyone—speakers, listeners, thinkers, bystanders, and members of the public at large. Enhancing the autonomy of some might, however, require restricting the speech of others. The liberty-based conceptions of autonomy prioritize the interests of speakers and listeners and hold that the primary obligation of the state is the negative duty not to interfere with the autonomy of individual speakers and listeners. By contrast, the relational conceptions of autonomy hold that the negative liberty interests of individual speakers and hearers should be balanced against the positive duties of the state to promote the social conditions necessary for the development and exercise of autonomy by all citizens.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

This introductory chapter provides an overview of value democracy. According to value democracy, all viewpoints should be protected by rights of free speech from coercive bans or punishment. However, the state also has an obligation in value democracy that extends beyond protecting freedom of speech. It should engage in democratic persuasion, actively defending the democratic values of freedom and equality for all citizens when it “speaks.” The notion of state speech is common in First Amendment jurisprudence. It often refers to the various non-coercive functions of the state, ranging from pure expression, such as speeches, to issues of funding. By using democratic persuasion to articulate the reasons for rights, value democracy aims to answer the critics who contend that liberalism cannot defend its most basic values or counter the threat to equality that might come from hate groups in civil society.


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