Explaining National Party Tides in Senate Elections:

2021 ◽  
pp. 70-86
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson
Author(s):  
Wendy J. Schiller ◽  
Charles Stewart

This chapter integrates findings on indirect elections with current scholarship on the impact of the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment and onset of direct elections. It constructs a comprehensive counterfactual analysis that helps demonstrate what the political outcomes would have been with direct elections in place since the founding, and in contrast, what Senate elections would look like after 1913 if indirect elections were still in place. It also addresses the question of whether U.S. senators represented states as units and responded to state governmental concerns more under the indirect system than they do under direct elections. It argues that indirect election had little impact on the Senate's overall partisan composition prior to 1913. Contrary to widespread belief, had direct election been in effect during the years immediately preceding the Seventeenth Amendment's passage, Republicans, not Democrats, would have benefited.


Author(s):  
Wendy J. Schiller ◽  
Charles Stewart III

From 1789 to 1913, U.S. senators were not directly elected by the people—instead the Constitution mandated that they be chosen by state legislators. This radically changed in 1913, when the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, giving the public a direct vote. This book investigates the electoral connections among constituents, state legislators, political parties, and U.S. senators during the age of indirect elections. The book finds that even though parties controlled the partisan affiliation of the winning candidate for Senate, they had much less control over the universe of candidates who competed for votes in Senate elections and the parties did not always succeed in resolving internal conflict among their rank and file. Party politics, money, and personal ambition dominated the election process, in a system originally designed to insulate the Senate from public pressure. The book uses an original data set of all the roll call votes cast by state legislators for U.S. senators from 1871 to 1913 and all state legislators who served during this time. Newspaper and biographical accounts uncover vivid stories of the political maneuvering, corruption, and partisanship—played out by elite political actors, from elected officials, to party machine bosses, to wealthy business owners—that dominated the indirect Senate elections process. The book raises important questions about the effectiveness of Constitutional reforms, such as the Seventeenth Amendment, that promised to produce a more responsive and accountable government.


Author(s):  
Kim Fridkin ◽  
Patrick Kenney

This book develops and tests the “tolerance and tactics theory of negativity.” The theory argues that citizens differ in their tolerance of negative campaigning. Also, candidates vary in the tactics used to attack their opponents, with negative messages varying in their relevance to voters and in the civility of their tone. The interplay between citizens’ tolerance of negativity and candidates’ negative messages helps clarify when negative campaigning will influence citizens’ evaluations of candidates and their likelihood of voting. A diverse set of data sources was collected from U.S. Senate elections (e.g., survey data, experiments, content analysis, focus groups) across several years to test the theory. The tolerance and tactics theory of negativity receives strong empirical validation. First, people differ systematically in their tolerance for negativity, and their tolerance changes over the course of the campaign. Second, people’s levels of tolerance consistently and powerfully influence how they assess negative messages. Third, the relevance and civility of negative messages consistently influence citizens’ assessments of candidates competing for office. That is, negative messages focusing on relevant topics and utilizing an uncivil tone produce significant changes in people’s impressions of the candidates. Furthermore, people’s tolerance of negativity influences their susceptibility to negative campaigning. Specifically, relevant and uncivil messages are most influential for people who are least tolerant of negative campaigning. The relevance and civility of campaign messages also alter people’s likelihood of voting, and the impact of negative messages on turnout is more consequential for people with less tolerance of negativity.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Malcolm Saunders ◽  
Neil Lloyd

Probably no one who has entered either federal or state Parliament in Australia departed from it as loathed and despised as Malcolm Arthur Colston. A Labor senator from Queensland between 1975 and 1996, he is remembered by that party as a ‘rat’ who betrayed it for the sake of personal advancement. Whereas many Labor parliamentarians – most notably Prime Minister ‘Billy’ Hughes in 1917 have left the party because they strongly disagreed with it over a major policy issue or a matter of principle, in the winter of 1996 Colston unashamedly left it to secure the deputy presidency of the Senate and the status, income and several other perquisites that went with it. Labor's bitterness towards Colston stems not merely from the fact that he showed extraordinary ingratitude towards a party that had allowed him a parliamentary career but more especially because, between his defection from the party in August 1996 and his retirement from Parliament in June 1999, his vote allowed the Liberal-National Party government led by John Howard to pass legislation through the Senate that might otherwise have been rejected.


Author(s):  
Alex Badas ◽  
Elizabeth Simas

Abstract Judicial nominations, particularly those to the Supreme Court, have been a salient topic in recent presidential and senate elections. However, there has been little research to determine whether judicial nominations motivate political behavior. Across three studies we demonstrate the important role judicial nominations play in influencing political behavior. In Study 1, we analyze the extent to which voters perceive judicial nominations as an important electoral issue. We find that Republicans—and especially strong Republicans—are more likely to perceive judicial nominations as important. In Study 2, we analyze how congruence with an incumbent Senator's judicial confirmation votes influences voters’ decision to vote for the incumbent. We find that congruence with a Senator's judicial confirmation votes is a strong predictor of vote choice. Finally, in Study 3, we analyze data from an original conjoint experiment aimed at simulating a Senate primary election where voters must select among co-partisans. We find that Republican subjects are more likely to select a primary candidate who prioritizes confirming conservative Supreme Court nominees. Among Democratic subjects, however, we find that Democratic candidates who prioritize the Court might actually suffer negative electoral consequences. Overall, our results demonstrate the importance of judicial nominations as an electoral issue.


2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hopkin

This article addresses the relationship between political decentralization and the organization of political parties in Great Britain and Spain, focusing on the Labour Party and the Socialist Party, respectively. It assesses two rival accounts of this relationship: Caramani's `nationalization of politics' thesis and Chhibber and Kollman's rational choice institutionalist account in their book The Formation of National Party Systems. It argues that both accounts are seriously incomplete, and on occasion misleading, because of their unwillingness to consider the autonomous role of political parties as advocates of institutional change and as organizational entities. The article develops this argument by studying the role of the British Labour Party and the Spanish Socialists in proposing devolution reforms, and their organizational and strategic responses to them. It concludes that the reductive theories cited above fail to capture the real picture, because parties cannot only mitigate the effects of institutional change, they are also the architects of these changes and shape institutions to suit their strategic ends.


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