Intellectual Virtues of Indigenous African Wisdom:

2021 ◽  
pp. 335-362
Author(s):  
Husein Inusah ◽  
Michael Segbefia
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtues

scholarly journals Unity of the intellectual virtues

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan T. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Unity Thesis ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Future Work

AbstractThe idea that moral virtues form some sort of “unity” has received considerable attention from virtue theorists. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of unity among intellectual virtues has been wrongly overlooked. My approach has two main components. First, I work to distinguish the variety of different views that are available under the description of a unity thesis. I suggest that these views can be categorised depending on whether they are versions of standard unity or of strong unity. Standard unity claims that the possession of one virtue implies possession of all the others. Strong unity claims that the virtues are, in some sense, all the same thing. By exploring what these different versions of unity would look like when applied to intellectual virtues, I aim to provide a menu of options for future work in virtue epistemology. I then develop and defend one of these options in more detail, arguing that the initially less plausible strong unity has merit when applied to the intellectual sphere. In these two ways, I aim to show that the possibility of unity among the intellectual virtues is deserving of serious consideration.

How to Distinguish Aristotle's Virtues

Phronesis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marguerite Deslauriers
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Art ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Way

AbstractThis paper considers the distinctions Aristotle draws (1) between the intellectual virtue of phronêsis and the moral virtues and (2) among the moral virtues, in light of his commitment to the reciprocity of the virtues. I argue that Aristotle takes the intellectual virtues to be numerically distinct hexeis from the moral virtues. By contrast, I argue, he treats the moral virtues as numerically one hexis, although he allows that they are many hexeis 'in being'. The paper has three parts. In the first, I set out Aristotle's account of the structure of the faculties of the soul, and determine that desire is a distinct faculty. The rationality of a desire is not then a question of whether or not the faculty that produces that desire is rational, but rather a question of whether or not the object of the desire is good. In the second section I show that the reciprocity of phronêsis and the moral virtues requires this structure of the faculties. In the third section I show that the way in which Aristotle distinguishes the faculties requires that we individuate moral virtues according to the objects of the desires that enter into a given virtue, and with reference to the circumstances in which these desires are generated. I then explore what it might mean for the moral virtues to be different in being but not in number, given the way in which the moral virtues are individuated. I argue that Aristotle takes phronêsis and the political art to be a numerical unity in a particular way, and that he suggests that the moral virtues are, by analogy, the same kind of unity.

Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

scholarly journals ARE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES TRUTH-RELEVANT?

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-392
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Narrow Sense ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Ernest Sosa ◽  
Value Of Knowledge ◽  
Wide Range

ABSTRACTAccording to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology.

Intellectual Virtues in Higher Education

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Floyd Kuntz ◽  
Rebecca M. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Emerging Adults ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Colleges And Universities ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Cognitive Limitations ◽  
Intellectual Autonomy ◽  
The Individual

Intellectual virtues are characteristics that motivate individuals to pursue knowledge and understanding. They support the intellectual flourishing of the individual and consequently of society writ large. Scholars are only beginning to examine how these virtues are developed. An interdisciplinary approach that bridges philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and education research is needed to add empirical grounding to philosophical conceptions of intellectual virtues and to provide recommendations for educators to advance these virtues. Schools arguably have a vital role to play in the development of the intellectual virtues. Colleges and universities embrace several core aims, among them fostering the individual flourishing of their students and the broader public good. Interpreted through a philosophical lens, achieving these aims invokes intellectual virtues. Two intellectual virtues—intellectual autonomy and intellectual fairness—are particularly salient for emerging adults in the higher education context. Empirical research has the potential to shed light on how these virtues are developed and what educators can do to better promote them. Although empirical studies suggest that emerging adults in college may be developmentally primed for the virtues of intellectual autonomy and intellectual fairness, many emerging adults do not leave college reliably demonstrating these virtues. Colleges and universities can do more to support their development by (a) providing students with challenging situations and supportive conditions, (b) creating opportunities for self-directed learning and intellectual risk-taking, and (c) raising awareness of cognitive limitations that undermine fairness.

Socrates as Intellectual Character Builder

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-147
Author(s):  
Alkis Kotsonis ◽  
Iliana Lytra ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Dory Scaltsas
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Socratic Method ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Intellectual Character ◽  
Contemporary View

Our aim in this paper is to argue that Socrates is an intellectual character builder. We show that the Socratic Method, properly understood, is a tool for developing the intellectual character of students. It motivates agents towards the truth and helps them to develop the cognitive skills to gain knowledge of the truth. We further elucidate this proposal by comparing the Socratic Method, so understood, with the widely held contemporary view that the epistemic aim of education is the development of the intellectual virtues.

Eudemian Ethics

2014 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
English Translation ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Good Fortune ◽  
Eudemian Ethics

This section presents the English translation of Eudemian Ethics, which offers reflections on happiness—described in the text as the noblest, the best, and the most pleasant of human goods—and how it is acquired and attained. Eudemian Ethics also addresses two kinds of virtue, one intellectual and one moral, and goes on to argue that man alone is an originating principle of action. It also discusses examples of moral virtue such as courage, temperance, liberality, pride, and magnificence, as well as the five intellectual virtues: knowledge, craftmanship, wisdom, intelligence, and understanding. Other arguments in the text relate to justice and injustice, continence and incontinence, pleasure, friendship, good fortune, and gentlemanliness.

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