The Problem of Political Obligation

Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Luis Cabrera

While there have been numerous recent analyses of the legitimacy of suprastate governance institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or United Nations Security Council, few accounts have considered individual duties in relation to those institutions, broadly analogous to suprastate political obligation. Identified in this chapter are three categories of duties that should be salient to a range of institutions. These include duties to support their reform, to resist specific institutional features or practices, and to reject the continued operation of some institutions and support the creation of alternate ones. These duties would correspond roughly to how well an institution would appear to fit into a global institutional scheme that actually would fulfill cosmopolitan aims for rights promotion and protections and related global moral goods. An implication is that the current global system itself is a candidate for rejection, given its inherent tendencies toward the gross underfulfillment of individual rights.


Author(s):  
Richard Dagger

Although it is an ancient and much-discussed problem, political obligation continues to pose challenges to political and legal philosophers. Some of these challenges are conceptual, for they require explanations of what a political obligation is and how it differs from other obligations, duties, or responsibilities. Other challenges concern the practical matters of whether and to what extent political obligations are truly binding on us. In this respect, the foremost challenge is that of anarchism, including the “philosophical anarchism” that has become increasingly influential in recent decades. This chapter aims to meet these challenges by setting out a coherent account of political obligation and providing reason to believe that neither political nor philosophical anarchists have made a satisfactory a priori case against the possibility of a compelling theory of political obligation.


Author(s):  
Richard Dagger

This book aims to develop a unified theory of political obligation and the justification of punishment that takes its bearings from the principle of fair play. Much has been written on each of these subjects, of course, including numerous essays in recent years that approach one or the other topic in fair-play terms. However, there has been no sustained effort to link the two in a fair-play theory of political obligation and punishment. This book undertakes such an effort. This introduction explains why such a theory is an attractive possibility and how the argument for it unfolds in the succeeding chapters.


1971 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellis Sandoz

The present essay brings together through the technique of illustrative analysis certain reflections on political obligation which seem to be of critical importance if contemporary civil disobedience and widespread erosion of established public authority are to be understood. The attempt is here made to sketch the theoretical and historical context of the current American crisis in political obligation. This context is, however, so vast that a genuinely comprehensive analysis cannot be given within the scope of a brief essay. I have, consequently, resorted to illustration; and rather full notes have been supplied in order to indicate the range of relevant materials and to allay at least some of the misgivings that must inevitably arise from oversimplification.


1991 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 676-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko

It is commonly held that theories of political obligation based on consent, whether express or tacit, cannot account for most people's obligations; that political obligations generally stem from being born into specific societies rather than from voluntary choice. In recent years, consent theorists have turned to ‘reformist’ consent, arguing that consent theory could be rescued if political institutions were reformed to allow the possibility of widespread consent. Various possible reforms are examined and shown to be inadequate. The most obvious mechanism, ‘consent-or-leave’, is disqualified because it is coercive. Other mechanisms would be unable to induce widespread consent while preserving consent's essential voluntary character. I refer to the most plausible model as ‘Hobbes's choice’, though because it must unacceptably limit non-consentors' ability to defend themselves, it too is unsatisfactory.


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