Real Earnings Management by Benchmark-Beating Firms: Implications for Future Profitability

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brooke D. Beyer ◽  
Sandeep M. Nabar ◽  
Eric T. Rapley

SYNOPSIS Prior studies document both an improvement (Gunny 2010) and deterioration (Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009) in the future operating performance of firms engaging in real earnings management (REM) to meet earnings benchmarks. These results suggest that some firms use REM to signal their favorable prospects, whereas others use REM opportunistically. We hypothesize that firms with less robust information environments, more costly REM, and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks are more likely to engage in REM to signal future performance. Consistent with expectations, we find the positive relation between REM and future profitability is limited to firms that have less robust information environments (measured with stock return volatility, bid/ask spread, and analysts following), more costly REM (measured with market share and financial health), and fewer incentives to meet short-term earnings benchmarks (measured with market-to-book ratio, transient investors, and seasoned equity offering). In supplementary analysis, we note that Bhojraj et al. (2009) restrict their sample to relatively large firms, whereas Gunny's (2010) sample includes both large and small firms. Our analysis indicates that the difference in sample composition explains the differing results. We find that small firms use REM to signal positive future performance, but large firms do not. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesper Haga ◽  
Fredrik Huhtamäki ◽  
Dennis Sundvik

ABSTRACT In this study, we investigate how country-level long-term orientation affects managers' willingness to engage in earnings management and choice of earnings management strategy. Using a comprehensive dataset of 47 countries for the period from 2003 to 2015, we find that firms in long-term-oriented cultures rely relatively more on earnings management through accruals, while firms in short-term-oriented cultures engage in relatively more real earnings management. Furthermore, we find a larger discontinuity around earnings benchmarks in long-term-oriented cultures suggesting that manipulation of accruals enables benchmark beating with high precision. JEL Classifications: M14; M16; M21; M41.


2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 1611-1636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jérôme Reboul ◽  
Anna Toldrà-Simats

We empirically study the strategic behavior of levered firms in competitive and noncompetitive environments. We find that regulation induces firms to increase leverage, and this reduces their ability to compete when deregulation occurs. Large and small levered firms adopt different strategies upon deregulation. Whereas more levered small firms charge higher prices to increase margins at the expense of market shares, highly levered large firms prey on their rivals by increasing output and reducing prices to increase their market shares. The difference in their behavior is due to differences in their probability of bankruptcy and their financing constraints.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1287-1300
Author(s):  
Sun-young Park

This study investigates whether short-term debt is related to earnings management. Short-term debt is divided into total current liabilities, debt in current liabilities and short-term borrowings. In addition, this study examines how short-term debt is related to how firms manage their earnings. I use discretionary accruals and real operating decisions as the earnings management method. The study finds that debt in current liabilities only has a statistically significant impact on accrual earnings management, and short-term borrowings are only shown to have a statistically significant impact on real earnings management. These results indicate that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt included in current liabilities and use real earnings management of short-term borrowings from financial institutions.Therefore, this evidence indicates that managers engage in accrual earnings management of debt in included current liabilities when they face the liquidity risk of short-term debt, and the firms with debt financing constraints are likely to manage real earnings in spite of enhanced firm monitoring by lenders such as financial institutions. The findings in this study may have implications in the debate about the monitoring function of financial institutions such as banks.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn B. Levine ◽  
Michael J. Smith

ABSTRACT This study addresses the effect of clawbacks on earnings management (EM). In a two-period model, the manager can report truthfully or distort an interim report using either accrual or real EM. The principal can make short-term payments based on a manipulable accounting signal and long-term payments based on unmanipulable cash flows. The strength of the clawbacks determines the likelihood that the manager's compensation is reclaimed when the interim report was managed. Stronger clawback provisions may result in (1) a substitution between accrual and real earnings management, or (2) earnings management when no earnings management was optimal with weak clawbacks, and (3) lower expected profits for the principal. Numerical analysis suggests that strong clawbacks do not reduce aggregate earnings management. JEL Classifications: J33; M48; M52; G38. Data Availability: All data are simulated.


2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1051-1085 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Cheng ◽  
Jimmy Lee ◽  
Terry Shevlin

ABSTRACT We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: G32; M40.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 222
Author(s):  
Danella Rachel Muljono ◽  
Kim Sung Suk

This research investigates the impact of financial distress on the magnitude of different earnings management approaches, namely real earnings management and accruals earnings management. This research utilizes a total of 2002 firm-year observations from 259 publicly-listed companies and 20 sub-industries in Indonesia from the year 2005 to 2014. Financial distress causes a significant increase of real earnings management and a significant decrease of accruals earnings management. It means that the healthier the company, the bigger the magnitude of real earnings management that is conducted through managing production costs and discretionary expenses. On the other hand, the lower the financial health of the company, the bigger the magnitude of accruals earnings management that is conducted through managing discretionary component of accruals.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Alex Johanes Simamora

This research is aimed to examine (1) effect of discretionary and innate accrual on earnings predictability (2) effect of market share and financial health on relationship between real earnings management and earnings predictability. This research use manufacture firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange 2003-2015 as research sample, with 2013-2014 as research period. Accrual earnings management is measured by discretionary and innate abnormal accrual. Real earnings management is measured by aggregate of abnormal cash flow of operation, abnormal production, abnormal discretionary expenses. As expected, discretionary accrual as opportunist act does not support earnings predictability, while innate accrual as information signaling of business model improves earnings predictability. Real earnings management as information signaling of market share and financial health improves earnings predictability as well. In general, earnings management as information signaling is more likely to communicate condition of firm and leads to informativeness of earnings.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren A. Cooper ◽  
Jimmy F. Downes ◽  
Ramesh P. Rao

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