Who Did the Audit? Audit Quality and Disclosures of Other Audit Participants in PCAOB Filings

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1939-1967 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Callaway Dee ◽  
Ayalew Lulseged ◽  
Tianming Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Multivariate Model ◽  
Significant Decline ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Absolute Value ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
First Time

ABSTRACT We empirically test whether audit quality is affected when part of an SEC issuer's audit is outsourced to auditors other than the principal auditor (“participating auditors”). We find a significantly negative market reaction and a significant decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for experimental issuers disclosed for the first time as having participating auditors involved in their audits. However, we find no market reaction and no decline in ERCs for a matching sample of issuers that are not disclosed as using participating auditors, nor for issuers disclosed for the second or third time as using participating auditors. We also find actual audit quality as measured by absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals is lower for the experimental issuers, although we find no difference in audit fees paid by the experimental and matching issuers in a multivariate model. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB's proposed rule requiring disclosure of the use of other auditors in addition to the principal auditor would provide information useful to investors in assessing audit quality for SEC issuers.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Earnings Quality

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Balsam ◽  
Jagan Krishnan ◽  
Joon S. Yang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Brand Name ◽  
Absolute Level ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Earnings Response

This study examines the association between measures of earnings quality and auditor industry specialization. Prior work has examined the association between auditor brand name and earnings quality, using auditor brand name to proxy for audit quality. Recent work has hypothesized that auditor industry specialization also contributes to audit quality. Extending this literature, we compare the absolute level of discretionary accruals (DAC) and earnings response coefficients (ERC) of firms audited by industry specialists with those of firms not audited by industry specialists. We restrict our study to clients of Big 6 (and later Big 5) auditors to control for brand name. Because industry specialization is unobservable, we use multiple proxies for it. After controlling for variables established in prior work to be related to DAC and the ERC, we find clients of industry specialist auditors have lower DAC and higher ERC than clients of nonspecialist auditors. This finding is consistent with clients of industry specialists having higher earnings quality than clients of nonspecialists.

How does reciprocal rent-seeking between politicians and auditors influence audit quality? - Evidence from China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ku He ◽  
Xiaofei Pan ◽  
Gary Gang Tian ◽  
Yanling Wu ◽  
Chun Cai
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Capital Costs ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Audit Opinions

In this study, we propose a reciprocal rent-seeking game between politicians and individual auditors with political connections, and examine how these auditors' political connections influence their audit quality. Using hand-collected data from the Chinese market from 2008 to 2013, we find that politically connected auditors have a significantly lower tendency to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs). In addition, we also find that politicians' career prospects are significantly adversely influenced by MAOs being issued in their jurisdictions, while auditors' political connections enable them to charge higher audit fees, acquire larger market share, and reduce the likelihood of encountering regulatory sanctions. Further evidence suggests that compared with their non-connected counterparts, the politically connected auditors tend to issue less accurate audit opinions, reduce client firms' earnings response coefficients (ERCs), and increase client firms' capital costs. Collectively, our study results suggest that individual auditors' political connections facilitate the reciprocal rent-seeking activities between these auditors and politicians, which ultimately undermines audit quality.

Was Andersen’s audit quality lower than its peers?

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (8/9) ◽  
pp. 911-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Kumar ◽  
Lucy Lim
Keyword(s):  
Big Five ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Lower Likelihood ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Pooled Samples

Purpose – This paper aims to examine whether Andersen’s audit quality in the five years preceding its collapse lagged that of other Big-Five auditors. Design/methodology/approach – This paper compares Andersen’s audit quality and the other Big-Five auditors using five methodologies, namely, earnings response coefficients, magnitudes of abnormal accruals, propensities to issue going-concern opinions, usefulness of going-concern opinions in predicting bankruptcy and the frequency of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. The comparisons are based on both pooled samples of all observations and propensity-score-based matched-pairs. Findings – The preponderance of evidence shows that Andersen’s audit quality did not differ materially in audit quality from other Big-Five auditors prior to its failure. However, it was found that Andersen’s independence was compromised in the year leading to its collapse (2000), as indicated by the lower likelihood to issue going-concern opinions. Originality/value – This paper complements and improves on Cahan et al. (2011) by using more measures of audit quality, as no one measure is perfect, showing that their results using discretionary accruals are sensitive to the model used and showing that there is a more powerful direct measure of audit quality, namely, going-concern opinions.

Overseeing the external audit function: Evidence from audit committees’ reported activities

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Bratten ◽  
Monika Causholli ◽  
Valbona Sulcaj
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Composite Measure ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
External Auditor

Recently, in response to calls for more transparency, many firms have begun reporting the activities undertaken by their audit committees in overseeing the work of the external auditor. We use a composite measure of audit committees’ reported oversight activities for a sample of S&P 1500 firms and examine the extent to which these reported activities are associated with audit quality. We find that when firms’ audit committees report exerting strong oversight, they have higher audit quality as proxied by audit fees, discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, and restatements. We also find that the market reacts positively to reports indicating strong oversight, consistent with perceptions of higher audit quality. This study extends prior literature on audit committees by introducing a new comprehensive measure of audit committees’ reported oversight activities and sheds light on how these activities map into audit quality.

scholarly journals Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality?

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong-Hag Choi ◽  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Yoonseok Zang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Normal Level ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Difference

SUMMARY: This study examines whether and how audit quality proxied by the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals is associated with abnormal audit fees, that is, the difference between actual audit fee and the expected, normal level of audit fee. The results of various regressions reveal that the association between the two is asymmetric, depending on the sign of the abnormal audit fee. For observations with negative abnormal audit fees, there is no significant association between audit quality and abnormal audit fee. In contrast, abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality for observations with positive abnormal audit fees. Our findings suggest that auditors’ incentives to deter biased financial reporting differ systematically, depending on whether their clients pay more than or less than the normal level of audit fee. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

scholarly journals Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality: Evidence from the Korean Audit Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 37-60
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Behrend ◽  
Sarfraz Khan ◽  
Young Woo Ko ◽  
Sung-Jin Park
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Confounding Effect ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Analyst Earnings ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Quality Evidence

ABSTRACT Do abnormally high or low audit fees reflect audit quality? In this paper, we re-examine this issue after controlling for the confounding effect of audit hours by using a sample of public firms in the Korean audit market, which publicly discloses both audit fees and audit hour information. While we do not find a significant association between abnormally high audit fees and audit quality, we find that abnormally low audit fees are associated with larger discretionary accruals and a higher likelihood of meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts. Further, we find that the relationship between abnormally low audit fees and audit quality indicators persists regardless of the level of audit hours. To the extent that audit hours represent audit effort, these findings suggest that greater audit effort alone may not lead to higher audit quality as fee pressure from abnormally low fees may discourage the provision of high-quality audit services. JEL Classifications: M42; M48.

Does Fee Disclosure Type Matter? Evidence from Price Adjustment in the Audit Market of Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-61
Author(s):  
Jengfang Chen ◽  
Rong-Ruey Duh ◽  
Kuei-Fu Li
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Regulatory Change ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT While mandatory audit fee disclosure makes fee information transparent, there have been concerns about the impact of price adjustment on audit quality. Taking advantage of a regulatory change in Taiwan that required public companies to disclose audit fee but allowed two alternative disclosure forms (amount disclosure or range disclosure), this study investigates the impact of the fee disclosure form on price adjustment and the influence of such adjustment on audit quality. Using a dataset including audit fees under the two disclosure forms, we find that, for overcharged companies, the downward adjustment is larger for amount disclosure companies than range disclosure companies and such downward adjustment increase discretionary accruals in amount disclosure companies but not for range disclosure companies. Our study helps understand the impact of different fee disclosure forms on price adjustment and audit quality, which should be of interest to regulators and financial statement users in Taiwan and beyond.

Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality

2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 585-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aloke Ghosh ◽  
Doocheol Moon
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Information Intermediaries ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
One Year ◽  
Reported Earnings

We analyze how investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor tenure. Using earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we document a positive association between investor perceptions of earnings quality and tenure. Further, we find that the influence of reported earnings on stock rankings becomes larger with extended tenure, although the association between debt ratings and reported earnings does not vary with tenure. Finally, we find that the influence of past earnings on one-year-ahead earnings forecasts becomes greater as tenure increases. In general, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor tenure as improving audit quality. One implication of our study is that imposing mandatory limits on the duration of the auditor-client relationship might impose unintended costs on capital market participants.

Education Requirements, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Allen ◽  
Angela Woodland
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Accounting Profession ◽  
Quality Of Work ◽  
Education Requirements ◽  
Additional Education ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Audit Services Market

SUMMARY: We examine whether additional education requirements to enter the accounting profession lead to higher costs to clients. Using the 150-hour education requirement in the U.S. and the audit services market during the period 2000–2004 as the setting for our study, we find that corporations headquartered in states that have implemented the 150-hour requirement pay, on average, 4.8 percent more in audit fees than corporations in states that have not implemented the 150-hour requirement. Additionally, we find that audit fees increase as time passes after implementing additional education requirements. We also provide evidence that corporations headquartered in states with higher general wage levels pay higher audit fees. In supplementary analyses, we do not find an association between additional education requirements and differential quality of work product as measured by discretionary accruals.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document