City-Level Auditor Industry Specialization, Economies of Scale, and Audit Pricing

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1281-1307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Yu Kit Fung ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Jagan Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Scale Economies ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The United States ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Negative Effect

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000–2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are “forced” to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Evidence of Cost Efficiencies in Homogenous Industries

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1721-1754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Debra C. Jeter ◽  
Sarah E. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Service Quality ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Competitive Advantages ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Cost Efficiencies

ABSTRACT This study examines the audit pricing effects when auditors specialize in industries conducive to transferable audit processes. Our results indicate that industry specialists charge incrementally lower fees in industries with homogenous operations, and particularly in industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices. Moreover, we discover that audit quality is no lower for clients audited by these specialists offering fee discounts, consistent with a conclusion that the reduction in fees indicates cost efficiencies rather than lower-quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the shared economies of scale only occur in a subsample of client firms with relatively high bargaining power. When considered in conjunction with prior research using a survivorship approach, our study provides evidence that certain industries lend themselves to specialization because auditors generate cost-based competitive advantages without compromising service quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Pricing

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Casterella ◽  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Barry L. Lewis ◽  
Paul L. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Sustainable Competitive Advantage ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Absolute Size ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Differentiation Strategy ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
A Company

Porter's (1985) analysis of competitive strategy is used to explain industry specialization by Big 6 accounting firms. In Porter's framework, industry specialization can be viewed as a differentiation strategy whose purpose is to create a sustainable competitive advantage relative to nonspecialist auditors. A differentiation strategy will lead to higher audit fees if valued by clients. We find evidence of higher fees for Big 6 industry specialists relative to nonspecialists in the U.S. audit market, but only for companies in the lower half of the sample based on size (assets <$123 million). By contrast, companies in the upper half of the sample do not pay a specialist premium, and audit fees actually decrease as a company becomes increasingly large relative to its auditor's industry clientele. Together these results suggest that audit fees are higher when clients are small and have little bargaining power, but audit fees are lower when clients have greater bargaining power and this is more likely when companies are large in absolute size and large relative to their auditor's industry clientele.

The Effect of Supply Chain Knowledge Spillovers on Audit Pricing

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jengfang Chen ◽  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
Hsin-Chi Chen ◽  
Sungsoo Kim
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Spillovers ◽  
National Level ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Office Level

ABSTRACT We present evidence on the effect of audit firms' supply chain knowledge spillover on audit pricing. Analyzing data from Audit Analytics and Compustat for the seven-year period from 2003 to 2009, we find that audit firms' supply chain knowledge has a negative effect on audit fees. Specifically, an audit firm with more supply chain knowledge charges lower audit fees to its clients when the firm also audits its clients' major buyers. In addition, we find that the fee discount is greater when the audit firm possesses major buyer-related supply chain knowledge at the office level compared to the national level. Our findings are consistent, albeit weaker, to an expanded sample of companies that voluntarily disclose their major buyers. Data Availability: The data are publicly available.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Pricing and Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Soo Bae ◽  
Seung Uk Choi ◽  
Jae Eun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Production Efficiency ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Production ◽  
Industry Expertise

SUMMARY We find that auditor industry expertise is both a firm-level and partner-level phenomenon, which suggests that industry expertise captured by accounting firms is dispersed among engagement partners through knowledge sharing and transfers within audit firms. We also find that the higher audit fees by expert auditors are due to more hours and not higher rates. While spending more hours allows expert auditors to extract higher fees in total, the finding that expert firms/partners exert greater effort does not support the suggestion that expert auditors are in general more efficient in audit production. However, we find weak evidence that audit hours for expert auditors are lower in industries and companies with homogenous operations and comparable accounting than in other industries and companies. This finding suggests that knowledge transfers more likely take place in homogeneous and comparable industries, leading to production efficiency that moderates the increase in audit hours charged by experts. JEL Classifications: M4; M42. Data Availability: All data are available from the identified sources.

Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Fees: Further Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hua-Wei Huang ◽  
Li-Lin Liu ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The U.S

Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker (CFLW 2004) find, using survey data from 1993, that (1) there is a Big 6 industry specialization audit fee premium in the small client segment of the U.S. audit market, but (2) audit fees decrease for large companies as the client becomes increasingly large relative to an auditor's clientele. In this study, we first replicate and confirm the results of CFLW (2004), using audit fee data from SEC filings for fiscal 2000 and 2001. In the post-SOX period, we find that the results related to specialization continue to hold in fiscal 2004 but not in 2003—suggesting that 2003 is perhaps a unique year due to the flux in the audit market following the enactment of SOX. With respect to client bargaining power, our results in the post-SOX period differ from CFLW (2004) in that we observe a negative association between client bargaining power and audit fees for both the small and large client segments.

Pricing Initial Audit Engagements: A Test of Competing Theories

1999 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen T. Craswell ◽  
Jere R. Francis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Experience Goods ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Time Period

Two competing theories of initial engagement audit pricing are examined empirically. DeAngelo's (1981a) model predicts initial engagement discounts in all settings, while Dye's (1991) model specifically predicts discounting will not occur in settings where audit fees are publicly disclosed. Unlike the United States and most countries, audit fees are publicly disclosed in Australia. Our study examines initial engagement pricing in Australia during a time period when comparable U.S. studies report discounts of 25 percent (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Simon and Francis 1988). The Australian evidence finds initial engagement discounting only for upgrades from non-Big 8 to Big 8 auditors. Discounting for upgrades to Big 8 auditors is consistent with economic theories of discount pricing by sellers of higher-priced, higher-quality experience goods as an inducement to purchase when uncertainty about product quality is resolved through buying (experiencing) the goods. The evidence in our study is generally consistent with Dye's (1991) conclusion that public disclosure of audit fees precludes initial engagement discounting and the potential independence problems arising from such discounting.

Auditor Rotation and Perceived Competence and Independence: The Effect of Fees and Industry Specialization

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-175
Author(s):  
Roger Kamath ◽  
Ting-Chiao Huang ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Perceived Competence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Attention To Detail ◽  
Industry Specialist

ABSTRACT Regulators and practitioners argue the relative merits of firm and partner rotation, while researchers report mixed results on the consequences of rotation. This study uses an experiment to examine the effect of an upcoming rotation on perceptions of auditor competence and independence and finds that participants appear to be indifferent to whether rotation is at the firm or partner level; they only react to concurrent changes in audit fees and the industry specialization status of the new auditor. Specifically, participants assess auditor competence and independence (specifically attention to detail, effort, and skeptical attitude) to be higher when fees increase rather than decrease significantly at the time of a rotation, and they assess auditor competence to be higher when rotation is to an industry specialist rather than a nonindustry specialist. These findings hold regardless of whether rotation is at the firm or partner level. JEL Classifications: M42. Data Availability: Data and the tasks used in this study are available on request.

scholarly journals The effect of auditor characteristics on tax avoidance of Iranian companies

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Hossein Tarighi ◽  
Tahereh Alidoust Shahri
Keyword(s):  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Auditor Characteristics

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between auditor characteristics and the level of tax avoidance in an emerging market. Design/methodology/approach In this regard, the effect of various factors such as auditor tenure, auditor industry specialization, audit reports and audit fees on tax avoidance was examined. The study sample includes listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The time period of study is six years from 2011 to 2016. Also in this study, firm size, leverage, firm age and auditor size were controlled. Findings The results of this research were determined in four hypotheses. First and second hypotheses that explore the relationship between auditor tenure and auditor industry specialization with tax avoidance were not confirmed. But the results showed a significant relationship between the type of audit opinions and audit fees with tax avoidance. Originality/value The current study investigates the auditor characteristics on tax avoidance in a developing nation of Iran and the results may helpful the developing countries.

scholarly journals Investor Reactions to Company Disclosure of High CEO Pay and High CEO-to-Employee Pay Ratio: An Experimental Investigation

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khim Kelly ◽  
Jean Lin Seow
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Effects ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Perceptions ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Significant Positive Effect ◽  
Workplace Climate ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Ratio Versus

ABSTRACT There is significant debate about the usefulness of disclosing the CEO-to-median employee pay ratio, as required under Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States. Using an experiment, we find that disclosing higher-than-industry CEO pay (versus comparable-to-industry CEO pay) marginally decreases perceived CEO pay fairness and perceived workplace climate, which is counteracted by a significant positive effect on perceived CEO attraction/retention ability, although there are no significant indirect effects through these perceptions on perceived investment potential. However, incrementally disclosing a higher-than-industry pay ratio (versus disclosing only higher-than-industry CEO pay) significantly decreases perceived CEO pay fairness and marginally deceases perceived workplace climate, and we find a significant indirect negative effect on perceived investment potential through perceived CEO pay fairness. If companies are concerned about negative public perceptions, then our results suggest that pay ratio disclosures may be better able than current CEO pay disclosures at shaming companies into restraining CEO pay. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

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