Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Fees: Further Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hua-Wei Huang ◽  
Li-Lin Liu ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The U.S

Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker (CFLW 2004) find, using survey data from 1993, that (1) there is a Big 6 industry specialization audit fee premium in the small client segment of the U.S. audit market, but (2) audit fees decrease for large companies as the client becomes increasingly large relative to an auditor's clientele. In this study, we first replicate and confirm the results of CFLW (2004), using audit fee data from SEC filings for fiscal 2000 and 2001. In the post-SOX period, we find that the results related to specialization continue to hold in fiscal 2004 but not in 2003—suggesting that 2003 is perhaps a unique year due to the flux in the audit market following the enactment of SOX. With respect to client bargaining power, our results in the post-SOX period differ from CFLW (2004) in that we observe a negative association between client bargaining power and audit fees for both the small and large client segments.

Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Pricing

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Casterella ◽  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Barry L. Lewis ◽  
Paul L. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Sustainable Competitive Advantage ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Absolute Size ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Differentiation Strategy ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
A Company

Porter's (1985) analysis of competitive strategy is used to explain industry specialization by Big 6 accounting firms. In Porter's framework, industry specialization can be viewed as a differentiation strategy whose purpose is to create a sustainable competitive advantage relative to nonspecialist auditors. A differentiation strategy will lead to higher audit fees if valued by clients. We find evidence of higher fees for Big 6 industry specialists relative to nonspecialists in the U.S. audit market, but only for companies in the lower half of the sample based on size (assets <$123 million). By contrast, companies in the upper half of the sample do not pay a specialist premium, and audit fees actually decrease as a company becomes increasingly large relative to its auditor's industry clientele. Together these results suggest that audit fees are higher when clients are small and have little bargaining power, but audit fees are lower when clients have greater bargaining power and this is more likely when companies are large in absolute size and large relative to their auditor's industry clientele.

Auditor switching and audit fee discounting: the Iranian experience

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei ◽  
Norman Mohd-Saleh
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Maximum Point ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Auditor Switching ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of auditor switching on audit fee discounting in Iran. The increased competition in the Iranian audit market following audit market liberalization in 2001 has resulted in a rapid increase in auditor switching and reduces the relative bargaining power of auditors compared to the clients. It is expected that auditor switching results in fee discounting because the relative bargaining power of an auditor (client) is likely to be at the minimum (maximum) point during the initial period of engagement. Since the increased bargaining power of a client in initial year seems to be different in the case of different type of auditor switching (from a state auditor to a private and from a private auditor to another), the magnitude of fee discounting is expected to be different. Design/methodology/approach The objective is tested using a sample of 1,022 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2010. This study applies the multivariate regression model using the first difference specification of audit fee as a dependent variable. Findings Multivariate analysis reveals that auditor switching results in 14 percent of fee discounting. In addition, the results show that 18 and 13 percent of fees discounting during the initial year of engagement arise from cases of auditor switching involving a change from state auditors to private auditors, and a change from one private auditor to another, respectively. The findings support bargaining power view explanation in relation to audit fees discounting in initial year engagement. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the impact of auditor switching (and analyzed different types of auditor switching) on audit fee discounting using the bargaining power view.

City-Level Auditor Industry Specialization, Economies of Scale, and Audit Pricing

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1281-1307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Yu Kit Fung ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Jagan Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Scale Economies ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The United States ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Negative Effect

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000–2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are “forced” to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.

Spatial Competition in Local Audit Markets and the Fallout on Deloitte from the 2007 PCAOB Censure

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Face ◽  
Market Leader

SUMMARY We examine whether Deloitte's spatial location in local audit markets affected the firm's adverse fallout—in terms of decreased ability to retain new clients and maintain audit fees—from the 2007 PCAOB censure. We motivate our inquiry by the notion that auditor-client alignment and auditor-closest-competitor distance can help differentiate the incumbent Big 4 auditor from other Big 4 auditors and thus provide market power, i.e., inhibit clients from shopping for another supplier because of the lack of a similar Big 4 provider in the local audit market. Consequently, it seems reasonable that the increase in switching risk and loss of fee growth suffered by Deloitte following the 2007 PCAOB censure will be lower in local markets where Deloitte was the market leader and its market share distance from its closest competitor was greater. Our findings suggest that the decline in Deloitte's audit fee growth rate following the 2007 PCAOB censure was concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry, although the client loss rate appears to have occurred more broadly (across all cities and industries). Collectively, our findings suggest that audit quality issues override auditor market power, i.e., differentiation does not provide Big 4 firms market power in the face of adverse regulatory action. JEL Classifications: G18; L51; M42; M49.

Long-Term Trends in Audit Fees

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishnagopal Menon ◽  
David D. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Expectation Gap ◽  
Long Term Effect ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Model Coefficient ◽  
Long Term Trends ◽  
Wage Increases

The audit fees literature contains little by way of systematic evidence on long-term trends in audit fees. This study analyzes trends in audit fees from 1980 through 1997, adjusting for changes in client size, complexity, and risk. The sample is restricted to clients of Big 6 firms that voluntarily disclosed audit fees in the period 1980–1997. Evidence is found that audit fees increased in the 1980s but stayed flat in the 1990s. Most important, a significant increase is noted in 1988, the year in which the Auditing Standards Board issued the “expectation gap” standards. These results hold even after controlling for wage increases in accounting firms, suggesting an expansion of auditing effort. There is no evidence that auditors obtain any price premium from industry specialization. The 1989 Big 8 mergers appear to have had a short-term, but not long-term, effect on fees. Finally, the magnitude of the audit fee model coefficient for accounts receivable and inventory has declined over the period, presumably due to productivity improvements.

CEO Domination, Growth Opportunities, and their Impact on Audit Fees

2001 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judy S. L. Tsui ◽  
Bikki Jaggi ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul
Keyword(s):  
High Growth ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines the relationship between a firm's internal monitoring mechanism and its impact on the audit fee. The first hypothesis investigates whether firms with independent corporate boards (chief executive officer and chairman being separate individuals) provide a more effective internal monitoring mechanism and are thus associated with lower control risk, resulting in lower audit effort and fees as compared to nonindependent, CEO-dominated boards. The second hypothesis examines whether the effectiveness of the internal monitoring mechanism provided by independent corporate boards is independent of the firms' growth opportunities. High-growth firms are by nature more difficult to monitor due to the existence of discretionary investments and measurement problems associated with future assets. Thus, the negative association between independent corporate boards and audit fees is expected to be affected by a firm's growth. Results using 650 observations from Hong Kong companies provide support for both hypotheses.

scholarly journals The effect of auditor characteristics on tax avoidance of Iranian companies

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Hossein Tarighi ◽  
Tahereh Alidoust Shahri
Keyword(s):  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Auditor Characteristics

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between auditor characteristics and the level of tax avoidance in an emerging market. Design/methodology/approach In this regard, the effect of various factors such as auditor tenure, auditor industry specialization, audit reports and audit fees on tax avoidance was examined. The study sample includes listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange. The time period of study is six years from 2011 to 2016. Also in this study, firm size, leverage, firm age and auditor size were controlled. Findings The results of this research were determined in four hypotheses. First and second hypotheses that explore the relationship between auditor tenure and auditor industry specialization with tax avoidance were not confirmed. But the results showed a significant relationship between the type of audit opinions and audit fees with tax avoidance. Originality/value The current study investigates the auditor characteristics on tax avoidance in a developing nation of Iran and the results may helpful the developing countries.

Industry Specialization by Global Audit Firm Networks

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Carson
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Global Industry ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Firm Networks ◽  
National Industry

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the role of global audit firm networks in the market for audit services. Underlying theory suggests that there are benefits from the use of network structures, which enable these firms to expand efficiently into the global audit market and to develop global industry specializations. I identify global and national industry specialist auditors via market share metrics based on client assets audited, and use a large sample of 15,583 clients from 62 countries in 2000 and 14,628 clients from 60 countries in 2004. I find in both periods that audit fee premiums are consistently associated with global specialist auditors, irrespective of whether those audit firms are or are not national specialists.

scholarly journals A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small-Client Segment: A Comment

1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willie E. Gist
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Size Classes ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
The U.S

This study is the second to provide a richer test of the association between auditor size and audit fees by using three audit firm size classes in the small-client segment of the U.S. audit market. The finding of a Big 8 (now Big 6) price premium is consistent with Francis and Simon [1]. However, this price premium exists only with respect to local/regional firms. Francis und Simon showed that the Big 8 price premium exists with respect to both second-tier and local/regional firms. The present study also provides evidence of a second-tier price premium over local/regional firms. The results imply product differentiation to both Big 8 and second-tier firms. Plausible reasons for differences in results between the two studies are given.

Industry specialization and audit fees: a meta-analytic approach

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina de Fuentes ◽  
Eva Sierra
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Published Data ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Auditor Specialization

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature that links auditor’s industry specialization (AIS) and audit fees (AFs) in order to clarify the puzzle of published results and provide overall conclusions that would help in future research. Design/methodology/approach To achieve this goal, the authors applied meta-analysis techniques in order to summarize, quantify and evaluate the published data related to the association between AIS and AF. Findings The meta-results are more robust when the proxy for AIS is the audit firm’s market share above 20 percent or the audit firm is jointly the national and city leader. For US-based studies, results are homogeneous in the post-SOX period. This is likely due to the higher demand for specialized auditors. The authors found positive and homogeneous results in the upper and lower market segment, which led to the conclusion that the bargaining power of the big auditees does not fully counteract the higher auditor specialization costs. Although the authors identified a publication selection bias, a specialization coefficient of around 2.0 percent was estimated. Originality/value The conclusions are relevant for those researchers that would benefit from a structured and systematic review of the published results. The outcomes help to understand the somehow contradictory empirical evidence and to provide solid foundations for future hypothesis developments. This contribution is also relevant for the regulatory bodies, always watchful of audit market behavior and the evolution of audit prices.

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