Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Pricing

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Casterella ◽  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Barry L. Lewis ◽  
Paul L. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Sustainable Competitive Advantage ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Absolute Size ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Differentiation Strategy ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
A Company

Porter's (1985) analysis of competitive strategy is used to explain industry specialization by Big 6 accounting firms. In Porter's framework, industry specialization can be viewed as a differentiation strategy whose purpose is to create a sustainable competitive advantage relative to nonspecialist auditors. A differentiation strategy will lead to higher audit fees if valued by clients. We find evidence of higher fees for Big 6 industry specialists relative to nonspecialists in the U.S. audit market, but only for companies in the lower half of the sample based on size (assets <$123 million). By contrast, companies in the upper half of the sample do not pay a specialist premium, and audit fees actually decrease as a company becomes increasingly large relative to its auditor's industry clientele. Together these results suggest that audit fees are higher when clients are small and have little bargaining power, but audit fees are lower when clients have greater bargaining power and this is more likely when companies are large in absolute size and large relative to their auditor's industry clientele.

City-Level Auditor Industry Specialization, Economies of Scale, and Audit Pricing

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1281-1307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Yu Kit Fung ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Jagan Krishnan
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Scale Economies ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The United States ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Negative Effect

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000–2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are “forced” to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Pricing and Effort

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Soo Bae ◽  
Seung Uk Choi ◽  
Jae Eun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Production Efficiency ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Production ◽  
Industry Expertise

SUMMARY We find that auditor industry expertise is both a firm-level and partner-level phenomenon, which suggests that industry expertise captured by accounting firms is dispersed among engagement partners through knowledge sharing and transfers within audit firms. We also find that the higher audit fees by expert auditors are due to more hours and not higher rates. While spending more hours allows expert auditors to extract higher fees in total, the finding that expert firms/partners exert greater effort does not support the suggestion that expert auditors are in general more efficient in audit production. However, we find weak evidence that audit hours for expert auditors are lower in industries and companies with homogenous operations and comparable accounting than in other industries and companies. This finding suggests that knowledge transfers more likely take place in homogeneous and comparable industries, leading to production efficiency that moderates the increase in audit hours charged by experts. JEL Classifications: M4; M42. Data Availability: All data are available from the identified sources.

Auditor Industry Specialization, Client Bargaining Power, and Audit Fees: Further Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hua-Wei Huang ◽  
Li-Lin Liu ◽  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The U.S

Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker (CFLW 2004) find, using survey data from 1993, that (1) there is a Big 6 industry specialization audit fee premium in the small client segment of the U.S. audit market, but (2) audit fees decrease for large companies as the client becomes increasingly large relative to an auditor's clientele. In this study, we first replicate and confirm the results of CFLW (2004), using audit fee data from SEC filings for fiscal 2000 and 2001. In the post-SOX period, we find that the results related to specialization continue to hold in fiscal 2004 but not in 2003—suggesting that 2003 is perhaps a unique year due to the flux in the audit market following the enactment of SOX. With respect to client bargaining power, our results in the post-SOX period differ from CFLW (2004) in that we observe a negative association between client bargaining power and audit fees for both the small and large client segments.

Long-Term Trends in Audit Fees

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishnagopal Menon ◽  
David D. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Expectation Gap ◽  
Long Term Effect ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Model Coefficient ◽  
Long Term Trends ◽  
Wage Increases

The audit fees literature contains little by way of systematic evidence on long-term trends in audit fees. This study analyzes trends in audit fees from 1980 through 1997, adjusting for changes in client size, complexity, and risk. The sample is restricted to clients of Big 6 firms that voluntarily disclosed audit fees in the period 1980–1997. Evidence is found that audit fees increased in the 1980s but stayed flat in the 1990s. Most important, a significant increase is noted in 1988, the year in which the Auditing Standards Board issued the “expectation gap” standards. These results hold even after controlling for wage increases in accounting firms, suggesting an expansion of auditing effort. There is no evidence that auditors obtain any price premium from industry specialization. The 1989 Big 8 mergers appear to have had a short-term, but not long-term, effect on fees. Finally, the magnitude of the audit fee model coefficient for accounts receivable and inventory has declined over the period, presumably due to productivity improvements.

scholarly journals A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small-Client Segment: A Comment

1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willie E. Gist
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Price Premium ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Size Classes ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
The U.S

This study is the second to provide a richer test of the association between auditor size and audit fees by using three audit firm size classes in the small-client segment of the U.S. audit market. The finding of a Big 8 (now Big 6) price premium is consistent with Francis and Simon [1]. However, this price premium exists only with respect to local/regional firms. Francis und Simon showed that the Big 8 price premium exists with respect to both second-tier and local/regional firms. The present study also provides evidence of a second-tier price premium over local/regional firms. The results imply product differentiation to both Big 8 and second-tier firms. Plausible reasons for differences in results between the two studies are given.

Auditor switching and audit fee discounting: the Iranian experience

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei ◽  
Norman Mohd-Saleh
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Initial Period ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Maximum Point ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Auditor Switching ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of auditor switching on audit fee discounting in Iran. The increased competition in the Iranian audit market following audit market liberalization in 2001 has resulted in a rapid increase in auditor switching and reduces the relative bargaining power of auditors compared to the clients. It is expected that auditor switching results in fee discounting because the relative bargaining power of an auditor (client) is likely to be at the minimum (maximum) point during the initial period of engagement. Since the increased bargaining power of a client in initial year seems to be different in the case of different type of auditor switching (from a state auditor to a private and from a private auditor to another), the magnitude of fee discounting is expected to be different. Design/methodology/approach The objective is tested using a sample of 1,022 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2010. This study applies the multivariate regression model using the first difference specification of audit fee as a dependent variable. Findings Multivariate analysis reveals that auditor switching results in 14 percent of fee discounting. In addition, the results show that 18 and 13 percent of fees discounting during the initial year of engagement arise from cases of auditor switching involving a change from state auditors to private auditors, and a change from one private auditor to another, respectively. The findings support bargaining power view explanation in relation to audit fees discounting in initial year engagement. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the impact of auditor switching (and analyzed different types of auditor switching) on audit fee discounting using the bargaining power view.

Industry specialization and audit fees: a meta-analytic approach

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina de Fuentes ◽  
Eva Sierra
Keyword(s):  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Published Data ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Auditor Specialization

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature that links auditor’s industry specialization (AIS) and audit fees (AFs) in order to clarify the puzzle of published results and provide overall conclusions that would help in future research. Design/methodology/approach To achieve this goal, the authors applied meta-analysis techniques in order to summarize, quantify and evaluate the published data related to the association between AIS and AF. Findings The meta-results are more robust when the proxy for AIS is the audit firm’s market share above 20 percent or the audit firm is jointly the national and city leader. For US-based studies, results are homogeneous in the post-SOX period. This is likely due to the higher demand for specialized auditors. The authors found positive and homogeneous results in the upper and lower market segment, which led to the conclusion that the bargaining power of the big auditees does not fully counteract the higher auditor specialization costs. Although the authors identified a publication selection bias, a specialization coefficient of around 2.0 percent was estimated. Originality/value The conclusions are relevant for those researchers that would benefit from a structured and systematic review of the published results. The outcomes help to understand the somehow contradictory empirical evidence and to provide solid foundations for future hypothesis developments. This contribution is also relevant for the regulatory bodies, always watchful of audit market behavior and the evolution of audit prices.

Audit prices and Big 4 fee premiums: further evidence from Thailand

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanyawee Pratoomsuwan
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Using Data

Purpose Because there is mixed evidence regarding Big N fee premiums across countries, the purpose of this paper is to re-examine the phenomenon of audit price differentiations in the market for auditing services in Thailand. Although Hay et al. (2006) and Hay (2013) reviewed over 80 audit fee papers from 20 countries over 25 years, 13 of which were based in emerging economies, the understanding of the market for auditing services in Thailand remains limited. Because the Thai auditing market is also classified as a segmented market – i.e., a market that is less competitive for large-client firms and more competitive for small-client firms – this study tests audit price competition in an emerging audit market using Thailand as an example. Design/methodology/approach The traditional audit fee model is used to estimate audit fee premiums for a sample of over 300 non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2011. Findings Although the market for auditing services in Thailand is consistent with that described in Ferguson et al. (2013) – in which Big N audit firms dominate only the large-client segment – the results show that Big N auditors charge higher audit fees and earn higher fee premiums compared with non-Big N auditors in both the small- and large-client segments of the audit market. Research limitations/implications The evidence from this study reveals the existence of Big N fee premiums across market segmentations. Audit price differentials between Big N and non-Big N firms in both small- and large-client market segments might concern regulators regarding competition in the audit market with respect to whether the Big N firms are charging uncompetitive audit fees. These findings also imply that audit pricing varies across countries and the Big N price deferential is typically larger in emerging markets than in more developed audit markets and that it might be inadequate to study single-country audit pricing. However, the question whether the Big N fee premium results from Big N product differentiation is not directly investigated in this study. Originality/value Because earlier studies focusing on audit fee premiums have been conducted using data from the USA and Australia, the findings add to the limited evidence regarding audit fee premiums in an emerging country such as Thailand.

scholarly journals Determinants of audit fees: Evidence from Poland

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (53) ◽  
pp. 323-336
Author(s):  
Karol Rewczuk ◽  
Piotr Modzelewski
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Central And Eastern Europe ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
The United States ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Warsaw Stock Exchange ◽  
A Company ◽  
Big Four

AbstractUnlike many studies concerning audit fees in Western Europe or the United States, literature concerning this kind of research is very limited in Central and Eastern Europe. This study aimed to show what factors shape audit fees in Poland. It was conducted based on data collected from the financial statements of 111 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2018. The study used a linear regression model to verify the determinants of audit fees. The research results indicate a positive relationship between audit fees and company size, measures of complexity (in addition to the ratio of inventories and receivables to total assets) and the fact that a company is audited by the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms.

Audit Market Structure and Audit Pricing

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Bradley P. Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
First Year ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The U.S

SYNOPSIS Extant literature finds mixed evidence on the association between audit market concentration and audit fees. We re-examine this issue using a large sample of U.S. audit clients covering 90 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) spanning 2000–2013. We find that audit market concentration is associated with significantly higher audit fees, consistent with the concerns of regulators and managers. We also find that increases in audit market concentration are associated with fewer initial engagement fee discounts (i.e., reduced lowballing), particularly for non-Big 4 clients. We reconcile our findings with those of prior research and find that our divergent findings are attributable to controls for MSA fixed effects. In supplemental analyses, we find that audit market concentration is associated with higher audit quality. We also find that concentration is associated with higher audit quality for first-year engagements, but only if the auditor does not lowball on the engagement. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the consequences of increased concentration within the U.S. audit market (GAO 2003, 2008). JEL Classifications: M41; M42; L13.

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