Voluntary Disclosure Incentives and Earnings Informativeness

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1679-1708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sugata Roychowdhury ◽  
Ewa Sletten
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Information Source ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Earnings Differential ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Negative News ◽  
Disclosure Incentives

ABSTRACT We propose that the value of the earnings reporting process as an information source lies in limiting delays in the release of bad news, either by inducing managers to disclose it voluntarily or by directly releasing the negative news that managers have incentives to withhold. We compare earnings informativeness in bad-news and good-news quarters. Using returns to measure news, we find, consistent with our prediction, that earnings informativeness relative to other sources is higher in bad-news quarters than in good-news quarters. Further, cross-sectional tests indicate that earnings differential informativeness in bad-news quarters is more pronounced when managers do not voluntarily disclose the news, information asymmetry is stronger, and managers are net sellers of stock. JEL Classifications: G3; M4; M40; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from Compustat, CRSP, First Call, I/B/E/S, ISSM, TAQ, and Thompson Financial.

Do Managers Disclose or Withhold Bad News? Evidence from Short Interest

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dichu Bao ◽  
Yongtae Kim ◽  
G. Mujtaba Mian ◽  
Lixin (Nancy) Su
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
General Tendency ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Conflicting Evidence ◽  
Short Interest

ABSTRACT Prior studies provide conflicting evidence as to whether managers have a general tendency to disclose or withhold bad news. A key challenge for this literature is that researchers cannot observe the negative private information that managers possess. We tackle this challenge by constructing a proxy for managers' private bad news (residual short interest) and then perform a series of tests to validate this proxy. Using management earnings guidance and 8-K filings as measures of voluntary disclosure, we find a negative relation between bad-news disclosure and residual short interest, suggesting that managers withhold bad news in general. This tendency is tempered when firms are exposed to higher litigation risk, and it is strengthened when managers have greater incentives to support the stock price. Based on a novel approach to identifying the presence of bad news, our study adds to the debate on whether managers tend to withhold or release bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Good News for Corporate Bondholders?

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark L. DeFond ◽  
Mingyi Hung ◽  
Emre Carr ◽  
Jieying Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Market Reaction ◽  
Bond Market ◽  
Significant Decline ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Primary Analysis ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Bondholder Value

SYNOPSIS We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate bondholder value by examining the bond market reaction to news events leading up to the passage of SOX. The net impact of SOX on bondholder value is difficult to predict, and there are many reasons why it may be viewed as either good or bad news. Our primary analysis reveals a significant decline in average bondholder value around these events. In addition, cross-sectional tests find that the decline is significantly larger among riskier bonds and among bonds held by firms that are expected to experience the greatest changes under SOX. Thus, our findings are consistent with the bond market expecting the exogenously imposed changes under SOX to make bondholders worse off.

Discretionary Aggregation

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ebert ◽  
Dirk Simons ◽  
Jack D. Stecher
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
News Source ◽  
Hide Information ◽  
Many Sources ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We study a disclosure decision for a firm's manager with many sources of private information. The presence of multiple numerical signals provides the manager with an opportunity to hide information via aggregation, presenting net amounts in order to show information in its best light. We show that this ability to aggregate fundamentally changes the nature of voluntary disclosure, due to the market's inability to verify that a report is free of strategic aggregation. We find that, in equilibrium, the manager fully discloses if and only if the manager's private information makes the firm look sufficiently weak. By separating bad news from good news, a disaggregate report informs the market of as much offsetting news as possible, revealing how close the news is to a neutral benchmark. The result is, therefore, pooling at the top and separation at the bottom, the opposite of what transpires with a single news source. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; D83.

Are Seemingly Self-Serving Attributions in Earnings Press Releases Plausible? Empirical Evidence

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 635-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Kimbrough ◽  
Isabel Yanyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Attribution Theory ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
External Causes ◽  
Earnings Press Releases ◽  
Industry Peers

ABSTRACT Seemingly self-serving attributions either attribute favorable performance to internal causes (enhancing attributions) or poor performance to external causes (defensive attributions). Managers presumably provide such attributions in earnings press releases to heighten (dampen) investors' perceptions of the persistence of good (bad) earnings news, thereby increasing (decreasing) the market reward (penalty) for good (bad) earnings news. Building on attribution theory and prior research on earnings commonality, this study investigates cross-sectional differences in investors' responses to quarterly earnings press releases that contain seemingly self-serving attributions. Using a random sample of press releases from 1999 to 2005, we find that firms that provide defensive attributions to explain earnings disappointments experience less severe market penalties when: (1) more of the their industry peers also release bad news, and (2) their earnings share higher commonality with industry- and market-level earnings. On the other hand, firms that provide enhancing attributions to explain good earnings news reap greater market rewards when: (1) more of their industry peers release bad news, and (2) their earnings share lower commonality with industry- and market-level earnings. Collectively, our results demonstrate that investors neither ignore seemingly self-serving attributions nor accept them at face value, but rely on industry- and firm-specific information to assess their plausibility. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Evaluating Good and Bad News During Pre and Post Financial Meltdown: Nigerian Stock Market Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Kamaldeen Ibraheem Nageri
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Share Price ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
Negative News ◽  
On Line ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Abstract The Nigerian stock market, prior to the 2007-09 global financial crisis witnessed growth but the market encountered sharp reversal from 2007 due to the global financial crisis. This study evaluates good and bad news on the Nigerian stock market with regards to the policy responses as a result of the meltdown. The study used the TGARCH, EGARCH and PGARCH models under three error distributional assumptions for data covering January 2010 to December 2016 using the All Share Index to generate the return series. Findings shows that good news impact return more than negative news of the same magnitude before the meltdown while bad news insignificantly impact return more than positive news after the meltdown. The study concludes that there is information asymmetry in the Nigerian stock market. Thus, it is recommended that on-line real time access to share price movement for investors should be introduced to improve liquidity level and enhance free flow of relevant securities information.

Do Firms Strategically Disseminate? Evidence from Corporate Use of Social Media

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 225-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Jung ◽  
James P. Naughton ◽  
Ahmed Tahoun ◽  
Clare Wang
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Traditional Media ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Quarterly Earnings ◽  
Investor Sophistication ◽  
Negative News ◽  
Use Of Social Media

ABSTRACT We examine whether firms use social media to strategically disseminate financial information. Analyzing S&P 1500 firms' use of Twitter to disseminate quarterly earnings announcements, we find that firms are less likely to disseminate when the news is bad and when the magnitude of the bad news is worse, consistent with strategic behavior. Furthermore, firms tend to send fewer earnings announcement tweets and “rehash” tweets when the news is bad. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that incentives for strategic dissemination are higher for firms with a lower level of investor sophistication and firms with a larger social media audience. We also find that strategic dissemination behavior is detectable in high litigation risk firms, but not low litigation risk firms. Finally, we find that the tweeting of bad news and the subsequent retweeting of that news by a firm's followers are associated with more negative news articles written about the firm by the traditional media, highlighting a potential downside to Twitter dissemination. JEL Classifications: G14; G38; M10; M21; M41.

scholarly journals The Roles that Forecast Surprise and Forecast Error Play in Determining Management Forecast Precision

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong-Hag Choi ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Yoonseok Zang ◽  
David A. Ziebart
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Forecast Error ◽  
Absolute Magnitude ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Forecast Precision

SYNOPSIS: Studying the determinants of management forecast precision is important because a better understanding of the factors affecting management’s choice of forecast precision can provide investors and other users with cues about the characteristics of the information contained in the forecasts. In addition, as regulators assess the regulation of voluntary management disclosures, they need to better understand how managers choose among forecast precision disclosure alternatives. Using 16,872 management earnings forecasts collected from 1995 through 2004, we provide strong evidence that forecast precision is negatively associated with the magnitude of the forecast surprise and that this negative association is stronger when the forecast is bad news than when it is good news. We also find that forecast precision is negatively associated with the absolute magnitude of the forecast error that proxies for the forecast uncertainty that managers face when they issue forecasts, and that the negative association is stronger when forecast errors are negative. These results are consistent with greater liability concerns related to bad news forecasts and negative forecast errors, respectively. Our study provides educators and researchers with important insights into management’s choice of earnings forecast precision, which is a component of the voluntary disclosure process that is not well understood.

scholarly journals Shareholder Litigation and the Information Content of Management Voluntary Disclosure

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 279-298
Author(s):  
Yuanyuan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Information Content ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Legal Liability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures ◽  
Shareholder Litigation

ABSTRACT I study the information content of management voluntary disclosures disciplined by shareholder litigation. I model the litigation mechanism in which legal liabilities are based on the damages that shareholders suffer from buying a stock at an inflated price. I find that management does not fully reveal private information in equilibrium. Instead, their disclosures reveal only a range in which their private information lies. Thus, the precision of information is, to some extent, lost. Notably, increasing the severity of legal liability does not always reduce the loss of precision. In fact, when the legal liability reaches a certain level, more severe legal liability will result in less precise disclosures. I also find that good news and bad news have different precision. Specifically, good news is more precise than is bad news when legal liabilities are high, and bad news is more precise than is good news when legal liabilities are low.

The Effect of Voluntary Disclosure and Preemptive Preannouncements on Earnings Response Coefficients (ERC) When Firms Manage Earnings

2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Ronen ◽  
Tavy Ronen ◽  
Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficient ◽  
Earnings Surprise ◽  
Response Coefficient ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Disclosure Strategy

We study analytically the effect of preliminary voluntary disclosure and preemptive preannouncement on the slope of the regression of returns on earnings surprise—the earnings response coefficient (ERC). When firms do not manage earnings, additional disclosure has no effect, and the ERC is proportional to price/permanent earnings ratio. If they manage earnings by attempting to inflate them, the response to (100% credible) negative earnings surprise is stronger than the response to (less than 100% credible) positive surprise. To avert litigation, firms that manage earnings adopt a partial voluntary disclosure strategy—either public revelation of good news and withholding bad news, or public revelation of bad news and withholding good news. Voluntary disclosure affects ERC on positive earnings surprise only, depending on what the firm reveals: the good- news revealing ERC (GRC) is higher than the bad-news revealing ERC (BRC), because good news enhances the credibility of the positive earnings surprise, even though the market discounts good news. Furthermore, preemptive pre-announcements improve ERC accuracy by narrowing the scope of earnings management.

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