The Impact of Management Alumni Affiliation and Persuasion Tactics on Auditors' Internal Control Judgments

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Bhattacharjee ◽  
J. Owen Brown

ABSTRACT Concerns over “revolving door” practices of companies hiring directly from their external auditor led to a Sarbanes-Oxley Act provision mandating a one-year cooling-off period before such hires can occur. Yet little is known as to whether these alumni affiliations, still prevalent today, actually impair audit quality. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we conduct an experiment to examine whether auditors experience heightened identification with an alumni-affiliated client manager and, if so, how this perceived relationship affects their professional skepticism in response to a management persuasion attempt. As predicted, absent the use of a management persuasion tactic, auditors identify more with an alumni-affiliated manager than a non-alumnus with equal professional experience, and this perceived social bond enhances the manager's influence. However, the use of a common persuasion tactic, while effective at influencing auditor judgment when used by an unaffiliated manager, “backfires” when used by an alumni-affiliated manager, leading to diminished persuasion and increased professional skepticism. Evidence suggests that auditors are better able to identify the inappropriateness of the persuasion attempt when the tactic is used by an alumni-affiliated manager.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cassandra Estep

I investigate how auditors integrate information technology (IT) specialist input into internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) issue classifications. Given the ill-structured nature of evaluating ICFR issues and the impact of these issues on audit quality, combining knowledge from different perspectives is likely beneficial. Drawing on social identity theory, I predict and find that a weaker one-team identity between auditors and IT specialists yields benefits. Auditors with a weaker versus stronger team identity place more weight on IT specialist input for IT-related issues and differentially weight higher and lower quality input for non-IT issues. I also find that more severe ICFR issues drive the predicted results. My study provides insight into how team identity influences auditor integration of input from specialists. The implications of my study are of interest to researchers, regulators, and practitioners, especially as recent firm initiatives encourage a one-team view for auditors and IT specialists.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Syahril Djaddang ◽  
Shanti Lysandra

<em>This study focus on internal control application based on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The research objective is to examine the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act implementation and the financial reporting reliability toward audit quality and audit opinion. The research is conducted on public companies implementing Sarbanes- Oxley Act in Indonesia. The internal audit section in the companies are used as respondents. Based on questionnaires distributed, there were 35 samples of public companies used in this research. This study employs WarpPLS to handle the SEM model in testing the hypotheses and multigroup analysis to conduct the sensitivity analysis. The research’s results showed that application of Sarbanes-Oxley Act based internal control and financial reporting reliability are positively affect the audit opinions and directly influence the audit quality. However, the independent auditor's opinion is not a moderating variables between other variables. The research results are expected to be used as considerations by the companies in implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act based internal control.</em>


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 222-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Brody ◽  
Christine M. Haynes ◽  
Craig G. White

Purpose – This research aims to explore whether recent audit reforms have improved auditor objectivity when performing non-audit services. Design/methodology/approach – In two separate experiments, the authors tested whether external and internal auditors' inventory obsolescence judgments are influenced by their client's (or company's) role as the buyer or seller in an acquisition setting. Findings – External auditors assessed the likelihood of inventory obsolescence objectively, regardless of their consulting role in the acquisition setting. Internal auditors assessed the likelihood of inventory obsolescence as higher when consulting for the buyer than when consulting for the seller, consistent with the supposition that the buyer would prefer to write-down inventory and negotiate a lower purchase price, whereas the seller would prefer the inventory not be written down. Practical implications – From a regulatory perspective, external auditors may be relying too much on the work of internal auditors if internal auditors' lack of objectivity as consultants extends to their assurance role. Originality/value – This paper extends prior research in the area of internal and external auditor objectivity and is the first paper to include both subject groups in the same experiment. It also addresses the current policy issues that may have a significant effect on audit quality and auditor liability.


Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050028
Author(s):  
Gregory McKee ◽  
Albert Kagan

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) were passed to address weaknesses in the internal control environment of the firm. Elements of these Acts reduce risky behavior of financial institutions by reducing informational asymmetry with borrowers. An important element of managing earnings quality in financial institutions is the loss provision, an annual expense set aside for uncollected loan and lease payments. These Acts affect the selection of loss provision expense levels in distinct ways. Using a dataset of community bank financial information observed between 1998 and 2017, it is shown that banks experience a complementary effect between SOX and DFA on loss provision expenses. Improved governance procedures to establish policy responses to nonperforming loans result in reduced expenses, whereas reduced information asymmetry tends to enhance a moral hazard effect. These results show that incentives for firm growth, income, capital, and loan specialization under the SOX and DFA regulatory environments complicate the loan risk management process.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Ann Barra

ABSTRACT: Little prior research exists on the parameters of internal control activities. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002) makes identifying the properties of these parameters under various conditions important. In this paper, an analytical/reliability engineering methodology is used to investigate the relative impact of penalties versus other types of internal controls on managerial and non-managerial employees’ propensity to commit fraud. Ceteris paribus, increasing required effort with internal controls and/or increasing employee penalties, increases the minimum amount stolen when a fraud incident occurs; that is, more net assets will be taken per fraud incident with controls than without controls. The findings show that the firm’s least-cost scenario with managerial employees is to enforce maximum penalties. The firm’s least-cost scenario with non-managerial employees is to utilize alternative internal controls while imposing minimum penalties. Further, the effectiveness of separation of duties is dependent on the detective controls in the internal control system.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad M. Stefaniak ◽  
Richard W. Houston ◽  
Robert M. Cornell

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) encourages external auditors to rely on internal auditors to increase the efficiency of lower-risk internal control evaluations (PCAOB 2007). We use post-SOX experimental data to compare the levels and effects of employer (client) identification on the control evaluations of internal (external) auditors. First, we find that internal auditors perceive a greater level of identification with the evaluated firm than do external auditors. We also find some evidence that, ceteris paribus, internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors when evaluating internal control deficiencies (i.e., tend to support management's preferred position to a lesser extent). Further, while we support Bamber and Iyer's (2007) results by finding that higher levels of external auditor client identification are associated with more lenient control evaluations, we demonstrate an opposite effect for internal auditors—higher levels of internal auditor employer identification are associated with less lenient control evaluations. Our results are important because we are the first to capture the relative levels of identification between internal and external auditors, as well as the first to compare directly internal and external auditor leniency, both of which are important in light of AS5. That is, we provide initial evidence that external auditors' increased reliance on internal auditors' work, while increasing audit efficiency, also could improve audit quality by resulting in less lenient internal control evaluations, due, at least in part, to the effects of employer and client identification. Data Availability: Contact the first author.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Ling Ho ◽  
Gene Lai ◽  
Jin-Ping Lee

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance and audit quality on risk-taking in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. The evidence shows that some corporate governance variables, as well as some audit quality variables are related to risk-taking. We find that longer board tenure is associated with low underwriting risk. But the higher percentage of financial experts on the board is associated with high underwriting risk. The possible reason is that financial experts possess a deep understanding of a firm’s financial situation and may encourage the management to take higher risk in anticipation of a higher return for a positive net present value project. The results are consistent with agency theory and wealth transfer hypothesis in that high risk taking is consistent with shareholder interest maximization. In addition, we find a non-monotonic relation between insider ownership and leverage risk. Finally, we do not find evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley act have impact on the risk taking behavior.


2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qianhua (Q) Ling ◽  
Michael D. Akers

The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heightened the importance of internal controls and accordingly, a key control - the internal audit function.  Consequently, management and external auditors have both increased their reliance on internal auditors’ work.  While there has been considerable research regarding the impact of the underreporting of time and premature sign-offs on the external audit, there has only been one study that has examined the impact of these two items on the internal auditors’ work.  Such research is dated (1994) and prior to the passage of SOX.  We surveyed members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) in the Midwest to examine their behavior and perceptions regarding these two items.  The respondents in our study believe the underreporting of time is unethical and is supported by their reporting of all time worked, even if such time exceeded the budget.  Our findings also show that the respondents feel premature sign-offs are unethical and result primarily from lack of professional skepticism and inadequate training.  Increasing training in audit areas and improving communications within the audit team are possible solutions to reduce premature sign-offs.  Premature sign-offs are more likely to occur in operational audits and to a lesser degree in financial audits and compliance audits. 


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document