The Impact of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Legislation on Loan Loss Provisioning in US Banks

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050028
Author(s):  
Gregory McKee ◽  
Albert Kagan

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) were passed to address weaknesses in the internal control environment of the firm. Elements of these Acts reduce risky behavior of financial institutions by reducing informational asymmetry with borrowers. An important element of managing earnings quality in financial institutions is the loss provision, an annual expense set aside for uncollected loan and lease payments. These Acts affect the selection of loss provision expense levels in distinct ways. Using a dataset of community bank financial information observed between 1998 and 2017, it is shown that banks experience a complementary effect between SOX and DFA on loss provision expenses. Improved governance procedures to establish policy responses to nonperforming loans result in reduced expenses, whereas reduced information asymmetry tends to enhance a moral hazard effect. These results show that incentives for firm growth, income, capital, and loan specialization under the SOX and DFA regulatory environments complicate the loan risk management process.

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Md. Thasinul Abedin

The study has tried to find out the key parameters through which a non-bank financial institution can embellish its earnings. The study has found that loan loss provisions increases in line with the increase in loan and advances and interest suspense. Moreover, non-bank financial institutions always report other assets except accounts receivable figure which foreshadows an existence of deliberate inflation of earnings. The study has found a positive impact of total loan loss provisions and interest suspense on accrued income, a clear message that non-bank financial institutions always report more accrued earnings to safeguard their profit. Increase in accrued income in line with total loan loss provision and interest suspense is also validated by increase in accrued income with respect to other assets except accounts receivable figure even though the impact of other assets on accrued income is insignificant at 5% level, an accounting channel through which excess other assets except accounts receivable would be inflated for excess increase in accrued income. The study has deduced that other assets except accounts receivable is a reserve bank for discretionary inflation of earnings even though it is insignificant. The study has used time series monthly data of International Leasing and Financial Services Limited, a non-bank financial institution from 2009-2015 reported in the Statement of NBDC sent to Bangladesh Bank each month. Two-time series models have been used in this study. The first model has tried to find out the impact of loan and advances, interest suspense, and other assets except accounts receivable on total loan loss provision. In the first model, there is a significant impact of loan and advances, interest suspense, and other assets except accounts receivable on total loan loss provision. The second model has tried to discern the impact of total loan loss provision, interest suspense, and other assets on accrued income along with other independent variables namely-loan and advances, total fixed assets, and operating income. The study has found a significant positive impact of total loan loss provision and interest suspense on accrued income and insignificant impact of other assets except accounts receivable on accrued income. For both models, there is no long-run relationship among the variables.


2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudip Bhattacharjee ◽  
J. Owen Brown

ABSTRACT Concerns over “revolving door” practices of companies hiring directly from their external auditor led to a Sarbanes-Oxley Act provision mandating a one-year cooling-off period before such hires can occur. Yet little is known as to whether these alumni affiliations, still prevalent today, actually impair audit quality. Drawing on Social Identity Theory, we conduct an experiment to examine whether auditors experience heightened identification with an alumni-affiliated client manager and, if so, how this perceived relationship affects their professional skepticism in response to a management persuasion attempt. As predicted, absent the use of a management persuasion tactic, auditors identify more with an alumni-affiliated manager than a non-alumnus with equal professional experience, and this perceived social bond enhances the manager's influence. However, the use of a common persuasion tactic, while effective at influencing auditor judgment when used by an unaffiliated manager, “backfires” when used by an alumni-affiliated manager, leading to diminished persuasion and increased professional skepticism. Evidence suggests that auditors are better able to identify the inappropriateness of the persuasion attempt when the tactic is used by an alumni-affiliated manager.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Ann Barra

ABSTRACT: Little prior research exists on the parameters of internal control activities. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002) makes identifying the properties of these parameters under various conditions important. In this paper, an analytical/reliability engineering methodology is used to investigate the relative impact of penalties versus other types of internal controls on managerial and non-managerial employees’ propensity to commit fraud. Ceteris paribus, increasing required effort with internal controls and/or increasing employee penalties, increases the minimum amount stolen when a fraud incident occurs; that is, more net assets will be taken per fraud incident with controls than without controls. The findings show that the firm’s least-cost scenario with managerial employees is to enforce maximum penalties. The firm’s least-cost scenario with non-managerial employees is to utilize alternative internal controls while imposing minimum penalties. Further, the effectiveness of separation of duties is dependent on the detective controls in the internal control system.


2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ettredge ◽  
Chan Li ◽  
Lili Sun

This study analyzes the impact of internal control quality on audit delay following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (SOX). Unlike prior studies of audit delay that obtain information about internal control strength via surveys, or use fairly crude proxies for internal control quality, our study employs external auditor assessments of internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) that are publicly disclosed in SEC 10-K filings under SOX Section 404. Thus, the empirical evidence provided in this study is both timely and reliable (i.e., not subject to small sample bias or weak proxies). Consistent with our expectation, we find that the presence of material weakness in ICOFR is associated with longer delays. The types of material weakness also matter. Compared to specific material weakness, general material weakness is associated with longer delays. Additional analyses indicate that companies with control problems in personnel, process and procedure, segregation of duties, and closing process experience longer delays. After controlling for other impact factors, this study also documents a significant increase in audit delay associated with the fulfillment of the SOX Section 404 ICOFR assessment requirement. This suggests that Section 404 assessments have made it more difficult for firms to comply with the SEC's desire to shorten 10-K filing deadlines. Our finding thus supports and helps explain the SEC's decisions in 2004 and 2005 to defer scheduled reductions in 10-K filing deadlines (from 75 days to 60 days) for large, accelerated filers.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicky Arnold ◽  
Tanya S. Benford ◽  
Joseph Canada ◽  
John R. Kuhn ◽  
Steve G. Sutton

This paper reports the results of a series of case studies conducted to explore the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This issue is critical as the SEC and the PCAOB continue to defend the requirement that SMEs adhere to the internal control reporting requirements of Section 404 in the Act, albeit at a revised level of expectation focusing on more of a top-down risk-based approach. Cross-sectional case study data is used to explore the impacts of SOX on SMEs adopting organizational theories as a lens for observing behavior and outcomes. The results of the study confirm that there are both benefits and costs associated with SOX compliance. All of the organizations studied experienced substantial improvements in enterprise risk management approaches. However, the level of difficulty experienced by the various organizations in implementing SOX requirements was highly variable and could be traced back to the underlying factors in structural inertia theory: size, complexity, experience with change, experience with strict controls, and adaptability. Perhaps the most important finding is that SOX does impact organizational flexibility to various degrees as predicted by theory; and this impact can in turn affect production cycle times, information technology investment, supply chain performance, and ultimately, market competitiveness.


Author(s):  
Gurpreet Dhillon ◽  
Sushma Mishra

This chapter discusses the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on corporate information security governance practices. The resultant regulatory intervention forces a company to revisit its internal control structures and assess the nature and scope of its compliance with the law. This chapter reviews the organizational implications emerging from the mandatory compliance with SOX. Industry internal control assessment frameworks, such as COSO and COBIT, are reviewed and their usefulness in ensuring compliance evaluated. Other emergent issues related to IT governance and the general integrity of the enterprise are identified and discussed.


2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lemuria D. Carter ◽  
Brandis Phillips ◽  
Porche Millington

Since the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002, companies have begun to place more emphasis on information technology (IT) internal controls. IT internal controls are policies that provide assurance that technical systems operate as intended, provide reliable data, and comply with regulations. Research suggests that firms with strong internal controls perform better than those with internal control weaknesses. In this study, the authors evaluate the impact of IT internal controls on firm performance. The sample includes 72 publicly traded firms, 36 that reported IT internal control weaknesses and 36 that did not. The results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression indicate that substantive IT internal control weaknesses negatively impact firm performance. Results and implications for research and practice are discussed.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Morris

ABSTRACT: Software vendors that market enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems have taken advantage of the increased focus on internal controls that grew out of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation by emphasizing that a key feature of ERP systems is the use of “built-in” controls that mirror a firm’s infrastructure. They argue that these built-in controls and other features will help firms improve their internal control over financial reporting as required by SOX. This study tests that assertion by examining SOX Section 404 compliance data for a sample of firms that implemented ERP systems between 1994 and 2003. The results suggest that ERP-implementing firms are less likely to report internal control weaknesses (ICW) than a matched control sample of non-ERP-implementing firms. It also finds that this difference exists for both general (entity-wide), and individual (account-level) controls.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parveen P. Gupta ◽  
Heibatollah Sami ◽  
Haiyan Zhou

Post-SOX (Sarbanes–Oxley Act) academic research on internal control focuses on the characteristics of publicly listed companies disclosing material control weaknesses or the consequences experienced by these companies. However, to date, limited research has empirically examined whether these new disclosures truly enhance “public interest” by promoting “equity” in the capital markets through enhanced information distribution. In this article, we empirically investigate the impact these disclosures have on information asymmetry and related market micro-structure. We hypothesize that both the management’s and the auditor’s reporting on internal control provide outside investors additional and higher quality information about a firm’s future prospects, thereby reducing the information asymmetry in capital markets. Such reduction in information asymmetry should be reflected in decreased bid-ask spreads and price volatility, as well as increased trading volume. Our cross-sectional analyses show that, subsequent to the management’s report on internal control per Section 302, the information environment improves for U.S. firms as manifested by decreased bid-ask spread and price volatility, and increased trading volume. However, we find no similar results subsequent to the auditors’ reporting on a company’s internal control over financial reporting. In our time-series intervention analyses, about 70% of sample firms have experienced significant and permanent reductions in their bid-ask spreads subsequent to the implementation of Section 302 of SOX, in contrast to only 30% of firms subsequent to the implementation of Section 404 of SOX. Our findings point to the public policy issue of whether financial reporting quality of public companies can be improved at a lower cost.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parveen P. Gupta ◽  
Thomas R. Weirich ◽  
Lynn E. Turner

SYNOPSIS Since its passage, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been criticized, and praised, by many on numerous grounds and claims. However, no single provision of this law has come under more attack than Section 404, which mandates public reporting of internal control effectiveness by an issuer's management as well as its independent auditors. Even after 10 years, the opposition to the Section 404 internal control requirements has continued to the point where the U.S. Congress through two separate Acts—the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and the 2012 Jump Start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act—have permanently exempted the non-accelerated SEC filers and the “emerging growth” issuers with revenues of $1 billion or less from Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Many of those who oppose the Section 404 requirements rest their claim on grounds that the U.S. Congress acted in haste in mandating the public reporting of internal controls by U.S.-listed companies and that the issue was not well thought out or debated. They also contend that the U.S. Congress acted under pressure because of the public outrage over the bankruptcy filings of Enron and WorldCom. To the contrary, this paper shows that the debate over public reporting of internal control by U.S. public companies is more than six decades old, dating back to the McKesson & Robbins fraud. This paper reviews relevant legislative proposals, bills introduced in both the House and the Senate, regulatory efforts by the SEC, and the recommendations of many commissions set up by the private sector to inform the reader how these efforts were the deliberative precursors to what was eventually codified in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.


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