Client-Auditor Supply Chain Relationships, Audit Quality, and Audit Pricing

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karla M. Johnstone ◽  
Chan Li ◽  
Shuqing Luo

SUMMARY: We investigate the association between auditors' supply chain knowledge and companies' audit quality and audit pricing. Auditor supply chain knowledge is a specialized understanding of information and processes regarding accounting and auditing issues that relates to both a supplier and its major customer, regardless of industry commonalities, that is particularly useful for understanding complexities associated with the revenue cycle. We find that auditors' supply chain knowledge at the city level is associated with higher audit quality and lower audit fees, compared to companies employing auditors with supply chain knowledge at the national level or employing auditors without supply chain knowledge. Such effects are stronger for supplier companies that derive a high proportion of revenue from their major customers, and when the revenue cycle for the supplier companies is more important. We obtain these results while controlling for the usual determinants of audit quality and fees, along with auditors' industry specialization.

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jengfang Chen ◽  
Hsihui Chang ◽  
Hsin-Chi Chen ◽  
Sungsoo Kim

ABSTRACT We present evidence on the effect of audit firms' supply chain knowledge spillover on audit pricing. Analyzing data from Audit Analytics and Compustat for the seven-year period from 2003 to 2009, we find that audit firms' supply chain knowledge has a negative effect on audit fees. Specifically, an audit firm with more supply chain knowledge charges lower audit fees to its clients when the firm also audits its clients' major buyers. In addition, we find that the fee discount is greater when the audit firm possesses major buyer-related supply chain knowledge at the office level compared to the national level. Our findings are consistent, albeit weaker, to an expanded sample of companies that voluntarily disclose their major buyers. Data Availability: The data are publicly available.


2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong-Hag Choi ◽  
Chansog (Francis) Kim ◽  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Yoonseok Zang

SUMMARY: Using a large sample of U.S. audit client firms over the period 2000–2005, this paper investigates whether and how the size of a local practice office within an audit firm (hereafter, office size) is a significant, engagement-specific factor determining audit quality and audit fees over and beyond audit firm size at the national level and auditor industry leadership at the city or office level. For our empirical tests, audit quality is measured by unsigned abnormal accruals, and the office size is measured in two different ways: one based on the number of audit clients in each office and the other based on a total of audit fees earned by each office. Our results show that the office size has significantly positive relations with both audit quality and audit fees, even after controlling for national-level audit firm size and office-level industry expertise. These positive relations support the view that large local offices provide higher-quality audits compared with small local offices, and that such quality differences are priced in the market for audit services.


Author(s):  
Muhammad Shahin Miah

This paper examines the effects of industry specialization (city-level, nationallevel, and joint-level) on audit pricing in the Australia. By using Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed companies, this study documents that auditors who are industry specialists at both city-and national-level charge significantly higher audit fees compare to those auditors who are specialists either only at city-level or only at national-level industry specialist. However, in further analysis, this study documents that firms who are city-level industry specialists they charge relatively higher audit fees than nationallevel industry specialists, which is consistent with prior research on audit fee premiums studies concentrated in Australia. The greater audit fees charged by city-level industry specialists auditors are possibly attributed to recent changes in accounting regulations environment in Australia (e.g., mandatory adoption of IFRS). Such a significant shift in financial reporting environment due of IFRS adoption can affect audit expertise which may be reflected in this study. This study findings are robust in a set of alternative tests following prior research.


2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey R. Casterella ◽  
Jere R. Francis ◽  
Barry L. Lewis ◽  
Paul L. Walker

Porter's (1985) analysis of competitive strategy is used to explain industry specialization by Big 6 accounting firms. In Porter's framework, industry specialization can be viewed as a differentiation strategy whose purpose is to create a sustainable competitive advantage relative to nonspecialist auditors. A differentiation strategy will lead to higher audit fees if valued by clients. We find evidence of higher fees for Big 6 industry specialists relative to nonspecialists in the U.S. audit market, but only for companies in the lower half of the sample based on size (assets <$123 million). By contrast, companies in the upper half of the sample do not pay a specialist premium, and audit fees actually decrease as a company becomes increasingly large relative to its auditor's industry clientele. Together these results suggest that audit fees are higher when clients are small and have little bargaining power, but audit fees are lower when clients have greater bargaining power and this is more likely when companies are large in absolute size and large relative to their auditor's industry clientele.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Panos N. Patatoukas ◽  
Annika Yu Wang

ABSTRACT What are the implications of major customer dependency, i.e., the degree of a supplier firm's dependency on its major customers, for external auditors? While the conventional view emphasizes the negatives of major customer dependency for client business risk, we find that suppliers with more concentrated customer bases spend less on audit fees. The evidence is consistent with reduced audit effort due to efficiency gains in the audit process, especially when suppliers with more concentrated customer bases share the same auditors with their long-standing major customers. The audit fee discount we identify does not imply that audit quality declines with customer-base concentration. In fact, we find that suppliers with more concentrated customer bases are less likely to experience material restatements of previously audited financial statements. Taking the external auditors' perspective, our study provides new managerial insights on the costs and benefits of major customer relationships for supplier firms. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the text.


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Daniel Eshleman ◽  
Bradley P. Lawson

SYNOPSIS Extant literature finds mixed evidence on the association between audit market concentration and audit fees. We re-examine this issue using a large sample of U.S. audit clients covering 90 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) spanning 2000–2013. We find that audit market concentration is associated with significantly higher audit fees, consistent with the concerns of regulators and managers. We also find that increases in audit market concentration are associated with fewer initial engagement fee discounts (i.e., reduced lowballing), particularly for non-Big 4 clients. We reconcile our findings with those of prior research and find that our divergent findings are attributable to controls for MSA fixed effects. In supplemental analyses, we find that audit market concentration is associated with higher audit quality. We also find that concentration is associated with higher audit quality for first-year engagements, but only if the auditor does not lowball on the engagement. Our results are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the consequences of increased concentration within the U.S. audit market (GAO 2003, 2008). JEL Classifications: M41; M42; L13.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chan Li ◽  
Yuan Xie ◽  
Jian Zhou

SYNOPSIS: We examine the relation between industry specialist auditors and cost-of-debt financing using a national and city level industry specialist framework. Consistent with the assumption that higher audit quality is associated with lower information risk, which benefits clients in raising debt capital, we find that firms audited by city level industry specialist auditors, either alone or jointly with national level industry specialist auditors, enjoy significantly lower cost-of-debt financing measured by both credit rating and bond spread. Our results suggest that, compared to clients of non-industry specialists, firms’ odds of worse credit ratings are 0.859 (0.664) times lower, and their bond spreads are 17 (16) basis points lower if they are clients of city-level-only (joint national and city level) industry specialists. In addition, our evidence shows that, for joint national and city level industry specialists, both information and insurance roles are significant to reduce cost-of-debt financing.


2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 1281-1307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Yu Kit Fung ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Jagan Krishnan

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of city-level auditor industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing in the United States. Using a sample of Big N clients for the 2000–2007 period, and a scale measure based on percentile rankings of the number of audit clients at the city-industry level, we document significant specialization premiums and scale discounts in both the pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) periods. However, the effects of industry specialization and scale economies on audit pricing are highly interactive. The negative effect of city-industry scale on audit fees obtains only for clients of specialist auditors. By contrast, clients of non-specialist auditors obtain scale discounts only when they enjoy strong bargaining power, suggesting that auditors are “forced” to pass on scale economies to clients with greater bargaining power. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the article.


Author(s):  
Sabirin, Afif Prasetyo

The purpose of this study is to obtain empirical evidence of the influence of audit fees, and audit engagement period both simultaneously and partially on audit quality at public accounting firms in Bandung. The population in this study is the Public Accountant Office in the city of Bandung which is registered at the IAPI Directorate. The technique of determining the sample using census techniques. The number of samples selected in the study was 60 respondents. The analysis technique uses multiple analysis. The results showed that partially Audit Fee had a positive and significant effect on audit quality. While the engagement period does not affect the audit quality. While simultaneously shows that the Audit Fee, and the Engagement Period, significantly influence the Audit Quality Survey at the Bandung Public Accountant Office.Keywords : Audit Fee, Audit Engagement Period, Audit Quality


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gil Soo Bae ◽  
Seung Uk Choi ◽  
Jae Eun Lee

SUMMARY We find that auditor industry expertise is both a firm-level and partner-level phenomenon, which suggests that industry expertise captured by accounting firms is dispersed among engagement partners through knowledge sharing and transfers within audit firms. We also find that the higher audit fees by expert auditors are due to more hours and not higher rates. While spending more hours allows expert auditors to extract higher fees in total, the finding that expert firms/partners exert greater effort does not support the suggestion that expert auditors are in general more efficient in audit production. However, we find weak evidence that audit hours for expert auditors are lower in industries and companies with homogenous operations and comparable accounting than in other industries and companies. This finding suggests that knowledge transfers more likely take place in homogeneous and comparable industries, leading to production efficiency that moderates the increase in audit hours charged by experts. JEL Classifications: M4; M42. Data Availability: All data are available from the identified sources.


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