The Influence of PCAOB Inspections on Audit Committee Members' Judgments

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie S. Persellin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Short Term ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Governance Process ◽  
Option Compensation

ABSTRACT: This paper experimentally examines whether the likelihood of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) audit engagement inspection can moderate the negative incentives created by short-term stock option compensation on audit committee members' decisions. Prior research suggests that short-term option compensation may weaken audit committee member objectivity and oversight quality (Archambeault et al. 2008; Magilke et al. 2009; Keune and Johnstone 2010); however, holding individuals accountable for their actions has been shown to result in less self-serving decisions (Rus et al. 2012). Ninety-two Executive M.B.A.s, serving the role of audit committee members, evaluate a hypothetical audit case that involves a dispute between management and the external auditors, with likelihood of PCAOB inspection and type of compensation manipulated between participants. Results confirm prior research on option compensation, finding that participants show less support for recording a proposed income-reducing audit adjustment when compensated primarily with short-term options rather than cash. In addition, a significant interaction reveals that PCAOB inspection likelihood moderates the effect of compensation form, such that option compensation only causes audit committee members to not recommend recording the proposed adjustment when PCAOB inspection likelihood is low. These results allow stakeholders to gain valuable insights into ways in which loyalties that have been potentially misaligned may be realigned by regulatory requirements aimed at improving the corporate governance process. Data Availability: Data available upon request.

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marsha B. Keune ◽  
Karla M. Johnstone
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

SUMMARY We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources

Does Audit Firm Tenure Matter to Audit Committee Members? Evidence from an Accounting Dispute

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice E. Rummell ◽  
F. Todd DeZoort ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Analyst Expectations ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Management Experience ◽  
Support Relation

SYNOPSIS This study examines the effects of Big 4 audit firm tenure on audit committee member support for the auditor in an auditor/management dispute over a subjective accounting issue. One hundred eighteen U.S. public company audit committee members participated in an experiment with audit firm tenure (short/long) manipulated randomly between subjects. The results indicate that participants in the long audit firm tenure group provide more support for the auditor in the dispute than participants in the short tenure group. Audit committee support for the auditor is positively related to audit committee member experience and CPA status, as well as perceived management pressure to meet analyst expectations, but negatively related to perceived management experience in financial reporting. Finally, audit committee members' perceptions of audit firm reliability (i.e., credibility and dependability) mediate the audit firm tenure-auditor support relation. Overall, our results suggest enhanced audit committee support for longer-tenured auditors.

The Role of Accounting Mechanisms for Corporate Governance in Reducing Creative Accounting Practices in Telecommunications Sector Companies in Riyadh City: An Empirical Study: دور الآليات المحاسبية لحوكمة الشركات في الحد من ممارسات المحاسبة الإبداعية في شركات قطاع الاتصالات بمدينة الرياض: دراسة ميدانية

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (15) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lamis Jameel Banasser, Maha Faisal Alsayegh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Riyadh City ◽  
Creative Accounting ◽  
Telecommunications Sector

The study aimed to identify the role of accounting mechanisms for corporate governance in reducing creative accounting practices in telecommunications sector companies in Riyadh city. A descriptive analytical approach was followed to conduct the field study. Sample of the study consisted of members of the audit committee, internal auditors, accountants from the surveyed telecommunications’ sector companies, and the external auditors in the audit offices that specialized on auditing the examined sample of companies. Questionnaire was used as a data collection method. Results showed that activating the role of accounting mechanisms for corporate governance can greatly contribute in limiting creative accounting practices. As they are controlling mechanisms that capable of protecting companies, shareholders and stakeholders from any manipulation or misleading information in the financial statements. Further, internal audit plays a major role in limiting creative accounting practices by examining and evaluating the effectiveness of the internal control system. Furthermore, the independence and competence of the external auditor and his commitment to the rules of conduct and ethics of the profession contribute greatly in limiting creative accounting practices in the examined companies. The study recommended the necessity of holding specialized training courses for members of audit committees, internal auditors and external auditors on methods of detecting creative accounting practices to combat and reduce them.

The Effects of Employer and Client Identification on Internal and External Auditors' Evaluations of Internal Control Deficiencies

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad M. Stefaniak ◽  
Richard W. Houston ◽  
Robert M. Cornell
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Internal Auditor ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Audit Efficiency ◽  
Public Company ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Internal Control Deficiencies

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) encourages external auditors to rely on internal auditors to increase the efficiency of lower-risk internal control evaluations (PCAOB 2007). We use post-SOX experimental data to compare the levels and effects of employer (client) identification on the control evaluations of internal (external) auditors. First, we find that internal auditors perceive a greater level of identification with the evaluated firm than do external auditors. We also find some evidence that, ceteris paribus, internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors when evaluating internal control deficiencies (i.e., tend to support management's preferred position to a lesser extent). Further, while we support Bamber and Iyer's (2007) results by finding that higher levels of external auditor client identification are associated with more lenient control evaluations, we demonstrate an opposite effect for internal auditors—higher levels of internal auditor employer identification are associated with less lenient control evaluations. Our results are important because we are the first to capture the relative levels of identification between internal and external auditors, as well as the first to compare directly internal and external auditor leniency, both of which are important in light of AS5. That is, we provide initial evidence that external auditors' increased reliance on internal auditors' work, while increasing audit efficiency, also could improve audit quality by resulting in less lenient internal control evaluations, due, at least in part, to the effects of employer and client identification. Data Availability: Contact the first author.

scholarly journals What Drives Auditor Selection?

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. A26-A42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Dreike Almer ◽  
Donna R. Philbrick ◽  
Kathleen Hertz Rupley
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Information Source ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
Auditor Selection ◽  
View Management

SUMMARY This study provides evidence on the factors that currently impact audit committee members' selection of external auditors. Using a two-stage approach, we survey and interview public company audit committee members (ACMs), and find evidence that management continues to provide input into the decision process even as SOX regulations require audit committees to take responsibility for the auditor selection decision. ACMs view management as an important information source when they assess the proposing audit partner's reputation for accessibility, timeliness, and ability to liaise with the firm's national technical office, as well as the proposing audit firm's technical and industry expertise. Results of this study can help firms be more competitive in the audit bidding process, inform policy makers when considering whether to impose further audit committee regulations, and aid academics in ensuring an up-to-date understanding of the audit committee's role in the auditor selection process.

Audit Committee Compensation, Fairness, and the Resolution of Accounting Disagreements

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Bierstaker ◽  
Jeffrey R. Cohen ◽  
F. Todd DeZoort ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Incentive Compensation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Perceived Fairness ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Public Company ◽  
External Auditor

SUMMARY An emerging body of research examines the relation of incentive-based audit committee compensation with accounting outcomes (e.g., Archambeault et al. 2008; Magilke et al. 2009). We extend this literature by examining the effects of audit committee compensation and perceived fairness to shareholders on actual public company audit committee members' judgments in accounting disagreements. Fifty-six highly experienced public company audit committee members participated in an experiment involving an accounting disagreement between management and the external auditor, with three types of audit committee compensation (i.e., cash only, cash and short-term stock options, or cash and long-term stock options) manipulated between subjects. We further measured the participants' perceptions of the fairness to shareholders if the auditor's adjustment is not recorded. We find evidence that audit committee members are more likely to support the auditor in an accounting disagreement when audit committee compensation includes long-term stock options and when members perceive that the failure to record the auditor's adjustment is less fair to shareholders. Moreover, we find that the relation between long-term incentive compensation and support for the auditor is fully mediated by a sense of fairness to shareholders. We offer implications and suggestions for future research.

Audit Committee Member Support for Proposed Audit Adjustments: Pre-SOX versus Post-SOX Judgments

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. Todd DeZoort ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Richard W. Houston
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Reporting Accuracy ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company

This study examines differences in audit committee member judgments before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“pre-SOX”) versus after the act was passed (“post-SOX”) as well as audit committee member perceptions of the effects of SOX. Based on experimental materials administered to 372 public company audit committee members (131 pre-SOX from DeZoort et al. [2003a] and 241 post-SOX), we find that audit committee support for an auditor-proposed adjustment is significantly higher in the post-SOX period. Additional analyses reveal that the effect of SOX differs between audit committee members who are CPAs versus non-CPAs. Specifically, the greater audit committee member support for the proposed adjustment post-SOX is attributable to members who are CPAs. In general, audit committee members in the post-SOX period feel more responsible for resolving the accounting issue, perceive that audit committee members have greater expertise to evaluate the accounting issue, and also are more concerned with reporting accuracy and a need for conservative financial reporting than those in the pre-SOX period. We also find that post-SOX respondents who support the auditor's proposed adjustment have more favorable views of the benefits of SOX, and they believe more strongly that audit committees in the post-SOX period are more conservative and have more power than they did pre-SOX. We discuss implications and avenues for future research.

The Role Of Audit Committee Independence, Auditor Tenure, And Their Interaction On Managers’ Accounting Discretion

2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Young Lee
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Incremental Effect ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Independent Audit

This study examines the role of audit committee independence and auditor tenure on client managers’ accounting discretion. It also examines the impact of the interaction between independent audit committees and long lasting auditors on managers’ accounting discretion. The results show that independent audit committees lower managers’ accounting discretion and auditor tenure is negatively associated with managers’ accounting discretion. In addition, this study provides evidence that the interaction between independent audit committees and external auditors having long-term relationships has an incremental effect on the managers’ reporting flexibility.

The Effect of External Auditors on Managerial Slack

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-115
Author(s):  
Junxiong Fang ◽  
Lerong He ◽  
Tara Shankar Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Firm Resources ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Auditor Choice ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Regulated Industries ◽  
Chinese Public

SYNOPSIS We investigate the role of external auditors in constraining managerial slack. Using panel data on Chinese public firms, we find that firms hiring Big 8 auditors are associated with reduced managerial slack after controlling for the endogenous auditor choice. We also document that Big 8 auditors are more effective in mitigating slack in privately controlled firms and firms located in more developed regions. Moreover, we show that international Big 4 auditors are more effective than the domestic Big 4, and the Big 8 effect is more salient in more competitive and less regulated industries, and in industries with higher litigation risks. Finally, we document a positive relationship between managerial slack and audit fees, particularly in the presence of Big 8 auditors. Overall, our results suggest that high-quality external auditors play an important corporate governance role by serving as both bonding and controlling mechanisms to mitigate managerial exploitation of firm resources. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.

scholarly journals How Misconduct Spreads: Auditors’ Role in the Diffusion of Stock-option Backdating

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aharon Mohliver
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Geographic Proximity ◽  
Local Networks ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
The U.S

I study the role of external auditors in the diffusion of stock-option backdating in the U.S. to explore the role of professional experts in the diffusion of innovative practices that subvert stakeholders’ interests. Practices that are eventually accepted as misconduct may emerge as liminal practices—ethically and legally questionable but not clearly illegitimate or outlawed—and not be categorized as misconduct until social control agents notice, scrutinize, and react to them. I examine how the role of external auditors in the diffusion of stock-option backdating changed as the practice shifted from liminality to being illegal and illegitimate. The findings suggest that professional experts’ involvement in the diffusion of liminal practices is highly responsive to the institutional environment. Initially, professional experts diffuse these practices via local networks, but when the legal environment becomes more stringent, implying that the practice will become illegitimate, experts reverse their role and extinguish the practice. The larger network remains largely uninvolved in both diffusing and extinguishing the liminal practice until the practice is publicly exposed and labeled as illegal and illegitimate. The findings further show that the diffusion and then extinguishing of backdating before it was outlawed depended on the adopter’s geographic proximity to a local office of a complacent expert and on the absence of traceable communication about backdating between these offices. This combination set the stage for each office to develop independent views about backdating, leading some offices to view backdating favorably and diffuse it, and others to view it unfavorably and curtail it—even at the same time and within the same audit firm. This study contributes to research on the diffusion of misconduct by providing insight into the role of professional experts and the mechanisms and boundary conditions governing that role.

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