An Effect of Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership Structure on Management Discussion and Analysis(MD&A) Quality

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 223-241
Author(s):  
Soo－Joon Chae ◽  
A－Young Lee
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Controlling Shareholders

Controlling Shareholders: Issues and Challenges for Shareholders’ Empowerment in Directors’ Remuneration in Corporate Malaysia

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shanthy Rachagan ◽  
Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Current Reform

AbstractCurrent reform concerning directors’ remuneration relies on improving legal rules and self-regulation to minimise expropriation of minority shareholders. These have prominently focussed on empowering shareholders. Nonetheless, it is unclear as to the extent these reform proposals are compatible within the concentrated shareholding structure. Some of the reforms taking place in developed countries are suited for dispersed shareholding structure and thus transplanting them to emerging economies with concentrated shareholders may be ineffective. Malaysia poses an interesting case study, especially to countries with similar ownership structure as the concentrated shareholding structure raises different agency problems. The issue of protection of minority shareholder rights and the prevention of abuse of the controlling power by paying excessive remuneration to the executives is therefore a subject of due consideration in Malaysia and countries with similar shareholding structures. This article recommends that Malaysia and other emerging countries look into encouraging limited shareholder empowerment in tandem with laws.

scholarly journals Controlling shareholders and corporate valuation in Brazil

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-141
Author(s):  
Ricardo P. C. Leal ◽  
Andre Carvalhal da Silva
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Valuation ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure, valuation and performance of Brazilian companies. The results show that large shareholders keep control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights. The evidence also indicates that non-voting shares and pyramiding are the main devices set to entrench the large controlling shareholder. There is some evidence that firm valuation and performance are negatively related to voting concentration, and that foreign-owned firms perform the best while government-owned firms perform the worst.

scholarly journals The Effect of Managerial Share Pledges on the Cost of Debt

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 617-650
Author(s):  
Soonhong Park ◽  
Hyeon Sook Kim ◽  
Byungkwon Lim
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Risk Premium ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Managerial Risk ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

We examines whether share pledges by controlling shareholders influence a firm’s cost of debt. We also investigate whether the relationship between share pledges and the cost of debt stems from the managerial risk-taking incentives or pursuing the private benefits of controlling shareholders. We make three major findings. First, we find the cost of debt is higher in firms with share pledges than in firms without share pledges. Furthermore, we identify a positive relationship between the cost of debt and the level of share pledges. Second, we find that there is no increased corporate financial leverage or investment activities in firms with share pledges. Finally, our empirical evidence demonstrates that the positive relationship between share pledges and cost of debt is more pronounced for lower foreign institutional investor stakes or higher controlling shareholders ownership. Overall, the results indicate that share pledges by controlling shareholders negatively affect the cost of debt. However, the effect of share pledges on the cost of debt is differently influenced by a firm’s ownership structure. Our findings suggest that share pledges induce stockholder-bondholder conflict, and the bondholder requires more risk premium due to the decrease of firm value.

scholarly journals Controlling shareholders, performance and risk taking of Tunisian listed firms

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 222-231
Author(s):  
Taher Hamza
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Size Number ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Impact

We investigate the effects of ownership structure, as an internal control mechanism of agency problem, on corporate governance. We focused specially on the impact of the size, number and type of blockholders on the performance and the risk-taking of the Tunisian listed companies during the period 2001-2004. The descriptive analysis highlights, absence of ownership-control discrepancy, high ownership concentration, low management stock-ownership and the presence of two or three large blockholders with significant difference of the block share size between the first and the other controlling shareholders. The main result of our study indicates that the presence of controlling shareholders affect performance and risk-taking and play an important role in corporate governance. However, we assume that the control contest of the leading shareholder is not conclusive but indicate a form of coalition and agreement effect to share private benefits.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and corporate governance code: The case of family business enterprises in Germany

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Weissenberger-Eibl ◽  
Patrick Spieth
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
Business Enterprises ◽  
And Control

Ownership of corporations in Germany is today highly concentrated in the hands of families and other companies. Theses ‘insider’ systems often result in core conflict tends to be between controlling shareholders and sometimes between strong stakeholders and weak minority shareholders. The aim of this paper is to research the characteristics of ownership and control in family business and point out the role of Family Business Governance in securing an appropriate control of the owning families. The authors give suggestions how to implement the German Governance Code recommendations in family businesses.

scholarly journals Corporate ownership and control: New evidence from Taiwan

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yin-Hua Yeh
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Management Participation ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Recent empirical literature on corporate governance has demonstrated that companies’ shares are generally concentrated in the hands of particular families or wealthy investors. Claessens et al. (2002) analyzed the ownership structure in East Asian eight countries, but misestimated the Taiwanese condition that made them not find the positive incentive or negative entrenchment effects in Taiwan. This study tries to clear the ultimate control in Taiwan, use the detailed data to better understand the ownership structure in Taiwan and investigates the determinants for deviation of control from cash flow rights. Based on the findings, the companies’ shares are common concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. We find that the deviation of control from cash flow rights is greater in the family-controlled companies than other type companies. Also the controlling shareholders use more pyramids and cross shareholding to increase their control rights that accompanies with deeply management participation. On the average, the controlling shareholders hold more than half board seats and usually occupy the chairman and general manger to enhance their control power in family-controlled companies. No matter in all sample or family-controlled companies, the controlling shareholders owns significantly less cash flow rights, occupy more board seats in deviation group companies than those without deviation. Corporate valuation is significantly lower in the companies with the divergence of control from cash flow rights than non-deviation companies.

Corporate governance and ownership structure: Indonesia evidence

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia Afriani Utama ◽  
Sidharta Utama ◽  
Fitriany Amarullah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Control Right

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate simultaneous relations between corporate governance (CG) practice and cash flow right, cash flow leverage (the divergence between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholders). The two ownership measures reflect alignment and expropriation incentives of controlling shareholders. This study also examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on CG practice. Design/methodology/approach The study uses publicly listed companies (PLCs) excluding those from the Indonesian finance sector during 2011-2013 as the samples of the study. Two-stages least squares regression models were used to test the simultaneous relations between CG practice and ownership structure variables. The study develops a CG instrument to measure CG practice based on ASEAN CG Scorecard, that comprehensively covers OECD CG principles and that can be used for panel data. Findings CG practice has a positive influence on cash flow right and has a marginally negative impact on cash flow leverage, while cash flow right and cash flow leverage have a marginally negative impact on CG practice. Further, the existence of large MLS complements CG practice, but as the control right of the second largest shareholders becomes closer to the largest shareholder, the complement relation becomes less important. State- or foreign-controlled PLCs practice better CG than other PLCs. Research limitations/implications Studies on CG/ownership structure need to treat CG and ownership structure as endogenous variables in their research design. In addition, the level of rule of law in a country should be taken into account when examining the relation between CG and ownership structure. The interrelation among CG, ownership structure, capital structure and firm performance has been studied in the context of dispersed ownership structure and strong rule of law. Thus, future study needs to examine the interrelation among these four concepts in countries with high concentrated ownership and weak rule of law. Practical implications To minimize the risk of expropriation, investors in the capital market need to select shares of PLCs that practice CG suitable for the ownership structure of PLCs, have high ownership by the largest shareholder and have no divergence between control and ownership right, and or have MLSs. PLCs may need to choose the level of CG mechanism in the context of their ownership structure and consider the benefits and costs implementing them. Social implications The study supports the “one size does not fit all” perspective on CG and, thus, it supports the recently enacted financial service authority (FSA) rule requiring PLCs to follow the “comply or explain” rule on the CG code for PLCs. The FSA needs to enforce the compliance of PLCs with CG rules and encourage PLCs to implement CG in substance, not just in form. To strengthen the positive impact of good CG practice in attracting investments in capital market, the regulator needs to improve investor protection rules and ensure strong rule of law. Originality/value The study is the first to examine the simultaneous relation between CG practice and both cash flow right and cash flow leverage of the largest shareholder. It is also the first that investigates the impact of MLS on CG practice. It explores the complement and substitution relation between the two concepts in reducing agency costs. In term of research design, the study develops a CG instrument that is based on OECD CG principles, that can be used for panel data and that uses public information.

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