scholarly journals Hva betyr egentlig ordene om Gud? Om språk og livstolkning i Bjørn Sortlands ungdomsroman Hver morgen dyppet min søster brystene i isvann for å bli pen (2017)

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Åse Høyvoll Kallestad

This article examines how Mariam, the main character in a Norwegian novel for youngsters, reflects on the existence and real character of God – and his relationship to her as a young refugee girl. Mariam has grown up in Syria with a Christian belief in God as caring and almighty. In particular, the article discusses what the inherited religious language means for Mariam in her desperate situation and how it influences Mariam’s interpretation of life. With support from Stanley Cavell, and the ordinary language philosophy, the article examines whether Mariam shares the criteria of the traditional religious language or if she turns to scepticism. The reading of the novel shows how Mariam maintains the established criteria for the language about God, in spite of her own experiences in a cruel world.

Author(s):  
Stephen Mulhall

Born in Atlanta, Georgia, Stanley Cavell has held the Walter M. Cabot Chair in Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University since 1963. The range, diversity and distinctiveness of his writings are unparalleled in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. As well as publishing essays on modernist painting and music, he has created a substantial body of work in film studies, literary theory and literary criticism; he has introduced new and fruitful ways of thinking about psychoanalysis and its relationship with philosophy; and his work on Heidegger and Derrida, taken together with his attempts to revitalize the tradition of Emersonian Transcendentalism, have defined new possibilities for a distinctively American contribution to philosophical culture. This complex oeuvre is unified by a set of thematic concerns – relating to scepticism and moral perfectionism – which are rooted in Cavell’s commitment to the tradition of ordinary language philosophy, as represented in the work of J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 134-155
Author(s):  
Kyle Barrowman ◽  

In this article, the author argues for the probative value of ordinary language philosophy for the discipline of film studies by way of an analysis of the conversational protocols discernible in the film Steve Jobs (2015). In particular, the author focuses on the work of J.L. Austin, specifically his theory of speech acts and his formulation of the performative utterance, and Stanley Cavell, specifically his extension of Austinian speech act theory and his formulation of the passionate utterance, and analyzes the interactions between the titular character and his daughter through this unique Austinian/Cavellian lens. In so doing, the author endeavors to encourage more scholars in the field of film-philosophy to explore the key concepts and arguments in ordinary language philosophy for use in analyzing films. Despite its having been virtually ignored by film scholars over the last half century, one of many regrettable effects of the Continental bias of film scholars generally and film-philosophers specifically, the author contends that ordinary language philosophy provides powerful tools for the analysis of dialogue and communication in film, with Steve Jobs serving as a particularly insightful test case of the broad utility of ordinary language philosophy for film studies.


Author(s):  
Larry Jackson

Stanley Cavell roams across a wide range of fields in his first book, Must We Mean What We Say? most obviously those of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. But nowhere in the book’s ten essays does he advance an explicit political theory. Still, this book, published in 1969 and written over the course of the preceding decade, quietly poses persistent political questions, even in essays on such topics as skepticism and King Lear, Kierkegaard’s Book on Adler and Beckett’s Endgame, atonal music and ordinary language philosophy. Just who is the “we” spoken of in the book’s title (we philosophers? we Americans? we human beings?)? Is there any relationship between democratic equality and the philosophical appeal to our everyday language, as described in the book’s eponymous essay? 1 Does the account that Cavell offers in his piece on Wittgenstein of practices and behaviors shared across cultures—the “whirl of organism” of our forms of life—suggest a nascent theory of human solidarity? Our freedom in language and the responsibility we bear for meaning, topics of the book’s opening essays, raise the question of what we might owe to one another and how we might offer—or withhold—it in our choices of words. Is this the beginning of a theory of justice? The concept of acknowledgment, described in the book’s final essays as a response to the challenge of skepticism, shifts the problem from what I can know to what I might do. Is this a theory of moral or political action (or both)?


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Wright

“To engage seriously with ordinary language philosophy,” Toril Moi tells us in the introduction to Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies after Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, “is a little like undergoing psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein assumes that we don't begin doing philosophy just for the sake of it, but because something is making us feel confused, as if we had lost our way.” As Moi begins her project of explaining to an audience of literary critics the insights of ordinary-language philosophy, represented primarily by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, and Stanley Cavell, and making a case for the value of their ideas for the practice we usually call close reading, this psychoanalytic metaphor makes a sudden turn to diagnosis, or to the initiation of a kind of therapeutic address that can feel coercive even in its charisma. You must recognize your sickness, Moi insists, before you can be receptive to the treatment. “Who wants to undergo philosophical therapy,” she goes on to ask, “if they feel that everything in their intellectual life is just fine as it is? Paradoxically, then, the best readers of the reputedly ‘conservative’ Wittgenstein might be those who genuinely feel the need for a change” (12). What kind of therapeutic project does Moi want to pursue in this book, which begins by distinguishing the best readers (the readiest patients) from those who think, conservatively, that everything is “just fine as it is”?


Author(s):  
Stephen Mulhall

Born in Atlanta, Georgia, Stanley Cavell held the Walter M. Cabot Chair in Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University from 1963 until his retirement in 1997. The range, diversity and distinctiveness of his writings are unparalleled in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. As well as publishing essays on modernist painting and music, he has created a substantial body of work in film studies, literary theory and literary criticism; he has introduced new and fruitful ways of thinking about psychoanalysis and its relationship with philosophy; and his work on ‘Continental’ philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, together with his attempts to revitalize the tradition of Emersonian Transcendentalism, has defined new possibilities for a distinctively American contribution to philosophical culture. This complex oeuvre is unified by a set of thematic concerns – relating to scepticism and moral perfectionism – which are rooted in Cavell’s commitment to the tradition of ordinary language philosophy, as represented in the work of J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein.


Author(s):  
Espen Hammer

Using ideas from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Stanley Cavell’s visions of ordinary language philosophy, this essay explores Kafka’s modernism. As opposed to Maurice Blanchot’s notion of literary language as non-referential, it is argued that the modernism at stake in The Trial centers on the question of intelligibility. While the court system in the novel signifies some sort of general skepticism, in which the use of language threatens to become unintelligible, Kafka offers the reader an extended reflection on the conditions of intelligibility and sense. At stake is language itself and our relation to it as agents seeking to make ourselves understandable to others. In The Trial, there are numerous examples of acts of communication that only seemingly make sense. The parallels with how, for Wittgenstein, our language can become emptied of meaning are made explicit.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Achmad Bahrur Rozi

All religion have different expressions in articulating the truth of their teachings. The differences occur not onlyamongst different religions, but also in school of thoughts, sects, and ideologies in the same religion. Thismeans that the use of religious language amongst the groups is not necessarily lead to one goal and to thesame meaning. This paper aims to examine the use of religious language from the perspective of its usageusing ordinary language philosophy approach (language philosophy) or more specifically known as languagegames intiated by the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889). Such study is veryimportant to compenstate for current analysis which tends to be empirical-positivistic. This trend emphasizesthe pragmatic aspects of the language than the grammatical aspect. Thus, in the context of religious language,one the same language of riligous language is used not for one purpose only. This means that there is no onlyone way for religious sentences to gain the meaning, but it can discribe some realities depending on the users.Key Word: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna AbstrakSemua agama memiliki ekspresi berbeda dalam mengartikulasikan kebenaran ajarannya. Cara pengungkapanyang berbeda ini bahkan tidak hanya terjadi antar-agama yang berbeda, tetapi terjadi juga dalam aliran,mazhab, dan ideology dalam satu agama yang sama. Artinya bahwa penggunaan bahasa agama antarkelompokbelum tentu megarah pada satu sasaran makna yang sama. Tulisan ini bertujuan mengkaji bahasaagama dari perspektif penggunaannya melalui pendekatan filsafat bahasa biasa (language philosophy) ataulebih spesifik dikenal dengan language games yang digagas oleh filsuf kelahiran Austria, Ludwig Josef JohannWittgenstein (1889). Studi semacam ini dipandang sangat penting guna mengimbangi analisis yang selama inicenderung empiris-positivistik. Kecenderungan ini menekankan bahasa pada aspek pragmatic daripada aspekgramatikalnya. Dengan demikian, dapat disimpulkan dalam konteks bahasa agama, bahwa satu bahasa yangsama dari bahasa agama dipakai tidak hanya untuk satu tujuan saja. Ini artinya bahwa pernyataan-pernyataanagama tidak mendapatkan maknanya dengan satu cara saja, tetapi bisa menggambarkan beberapa relaitasmenurut aturan main si pemakainya.Kata Kunci: Language, Bahasa Agama, Makna


2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-225
Author(s):  
Nikola Dedic

The main aim of this paper is the critique of poststructuralist theory of art, and particularly thesis about the avant-garde peace of art as a kind of transgression. As a starting point of this critique, the ordinary language philosophy developed by American philosopher Stanley Cavell is used, particularly his film theory. While poststructuralist philosophy was developed around the notion of ideology, Cavell interprets film and arts in general around the notion of skepticism. While poststructuralism, because of thesis about avant-garde as a kind of transgression within the field of ideology, is a kind of philosophy of negation, we point out that Cavell?s philosophy is a utopian theory of transcending of skepticism where avant-garde film has significant but not crucial place. Cavell?s thesis is used as a basis for re-thinking of modernism, which is in opposition to postmodernist turn realized by poststructuralism.


October ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 171 ◽  
pp. 47-76
Author(s):  
Kate Rennebohm

This essay uncovers and analyzes philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's little-known writings on film and related media, revealing their importance for film and media studies, the field of film philosophy, and for understanding Wittgenstein's later ethical thought. Through an explication of Wittgenstein's idiosyncratic ordinary-language philosophy, the author argues that these cinema remarks speak to Wittgenstein's sense that cinematic media offered new conceptualizations for thought on a variety of subjects. These include the nature of time, visual and phenomenological experience, and subjectivity. The remarks make clear, among other discoveries, that Wittgenstein was thinking about the relation of cinema and “the skeptical mindset” decades before Stanley Cavell made his influential arguments for such a connection. While the first half of the essay draws out the ethical stakes behind Wittgenstein's film remarks, the latter half turns explicitly to the philosopher's later, complex thought about ethics itself. Showing the importance of aesthetics, visuality, and sight to Wittgenstein's understanding of the field, this section addresses his notions of “aspect-seeing” and “aspect-change.” From this, the final section of contends that Wittgenstein's ethics want to work in the way he feels film can—by enabling one to “see anew” one's way of seeing as a way of seeing, thus opening new ethical-existential possibilities for one's way of being in the world.


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