scholarly journals Covid-19, Vaccination and Labour Discrimination

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Antonio Rodríguez Cardo

The aim of this paper is to provide a first approach to the possible discriminatory nature of the employer's decisions motivated by the refusal of the employee to be vaccinated against COVID (or by the decision of being vaccinated, even if those situations are rare). This is a sensible issue, because Labour Law does not usually provide a straightforward answer and fundamental rights are at stake (health, privacy, equality and non-discrimination and even the right to protection of personal data).

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-102
Author(s):  
Maria Belén Sánchez Domingo

The new European framework for the protection of personal data on freedom, security and justice is embodied, among other instruments, in EU Directive 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regards to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for criminal law purposes. This Directive protects fundamental rights, such as the right to the protection of personal data, as well as ensuring a high level of public security by facilitating the exchange of personal data between competent authorities within the Union, with the establishment of a legal system on the transfer of personal data.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-270
Author(s):  
Joanna Ryszka

Implementation of the internal market is one of the basic aims of cooperation between Member States within the EU, being at the same time an integration area that is perceived positively by both their supporters and opponents. Issues related to the implementation of the internal market freedoms are even more interesting in its confrontation with the protection of fundamental rights. This is undoubtedly a significant issue when we think about the degree of identification of the Union citizens with the Union itself. The reviewed monograph takes all the above-mentioned elements, focusing in particular on examining how and to what extent the protection of these rights is implemented in the EU legislation on the internal market. The scientific analysis carried out within its scope covered such important and basic rights as personal data protection, freedom of expression, basic rights related to the performance of work and the right to health protection.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-59

The paper addresses the basic rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, in particular, issues related to personal data. The development of information technology has had a significant impact on the dangers of illegal processing of personal data. The European Court of Human Rights considers the inviolability of private life as a precondition for human autonomy, independent development and protection of human dignity. According to the norms of international law, the right to respect for private life is recognized as one of the most important and fundamental rights, the protection of which is indicated by the legislation of Georgia. The aim of the paper is to analyze the legislation and practice of police law in the field of protection of the right to privacy and to offer relevant recommendations, taking into account the standards set by European and national courts. Human rights legislation must ensure the protection of all human beings against the abuse of state power. Interference with rights must be based on the principle of proportionality. The use of policing should not pose an excessive threat of fundamental human rights violations. Interference with a particular right must be done under principle of proportionality to achieve a certain public good. In clarifying the issue of alleged violation of the right, special attention should be paid to the severity and probability of the expected threat to legal good. The Constitution of Georgia, EU and Council of Europe data protection standards, national legislation, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the National Constitutional Court are analyzed around the topic. In addition, the reports of the State Inspector, the Public Defender and the relevant scientific literature are used to study the above issues.


Author(s):  
Hielke Hijmans

The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right. Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.


Author(s):  
Jef Ausloos

This chapter takes a step back and looks at fair balancing acts induced by invoking the right to erasure. It starts with comparing balancing of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Charter with balancing in the GDPR. Indeed, it re-emphasizes how the GDPR as a whole, essentially constitutes a framework for fair balancing of rights, freedoms, and interests in the context of personal data processing. The chapter then lays out the actual blueprint for such fair balancing in the GDPR. It becomes clear how fair balancing in the GDPR is an iterative process, with ex ante and ex post balancing acts. The former need to be performed before processing initiates, and the latter refer to subsequent balances as triggered by data subject rights for example. Overall, the very nature of fair balancing does not allow for clear-cut, categorical answers to conflicts of rights, freedoms, and/or interests. Instead the GDPR should be looked at as defining the basic infrastructure for ensuring fair balancing, further to be refined by relevant stakeholders. This can notably happen through standards or certification mechanisms, guidance by authorities, and by controllers themselves.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-484
Author(s):  
Niovi Vavoula

Abstract Since the past three decades, an elaborate legal framework on the operation of EU-Schengen information systems has been developed, whereby in the near future a series of personal data concerning almost all third-country nationals (TCN s) with an administrative or criminal law link with the EU/Schengen area will be monitored through at least one information system. This article provides a legal analysis on the embedment of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools at the EU level in information systems for TCN s and critically examines the fundamental rights concerns that ensue from the use AI to manage and control migration. It discusses automated risk assessment and algorithmic profiling used to examine applications for travel authorisations and Schengen visas, the shift towards the processing of facial images of TCN s and the creation of future-proof information systems that anticipate the use of facial recognition technology. The contribution understands information systems as enabling the datafication of mobility and as security tools in an era whereby a foreigner is risky by default. It is argued that a violation of the right to respect for private life is merely the gateway for a series of other fundamental rights which are impacted, such as non-discrimination and right to effective remedies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 259-272
Author(s):  
Evelien Brouwer ◽  
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius

In the YS. and M. and S. judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on three procedures in which Dutch judges asked for clarification on the right of asylum seekers to have access to the documents regarding the decision on asylum applications. The judgment is relevant for interpreting the concept of personal data and the scope of the right of access under the Data Protection Directive, and the right to good administration in the eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. At first glance, the judgment seems disappointing from the viewpoint of individual rights. Nevertheless, in our view the judgment provides sufficient grounds for effective access rights to the minutes in future asylum cases.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 472-478
Author(s):  
Gina Orga-Dumitriu

Abstract From the traditional functions of the general principles of the EU law – of interpretation, completion of the gaps and legality control, the principle of balancing seems to meet the most the exigencies of the first of these. The limits of the role of CJEU are certainly put to the test when it is called to settle conflicts between fundamental rights/fundamental freedoms. The trends formulated in Schmidberger (on the conflict between the free circulation of the commodities and the freedom of expression) or Promusicae (on the conflict between the right to the effective protection of the intellectual property and the right to the respect of the private life and the protection of the personal data) are more than illustrative. The doctrine assessments of the action of this principle reflect three fields in which the applicability thereof tends to reserve to the Court a role that is susceptible of creating controversies on its traditional extension. According to the authorized voice of Professor Norbert Reich, the balancing in the jurisprudence on the abusive clauses, the balancing for the avoidance of excessive protection and the balancing in social conflicts (making visible an aggravation of the conflict between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms) are concerned.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 722-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin M. Pfisterer

AbstractIn recent years, the CJEU has impressively brought to bear the protection of the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data as contained in the CFREU. The Court’s decisions in the Digital Rights, Schrems, Tele2, and PNR cases have reshaped the political and legal landscape in Europe and beyond. By restricting the powers of the governments of EU Member States and annulling legislative acts enacted by the EU legislator, the decisions had, and continue to have, effects well beyond the respective individual cases. Despite their strong impact on privacy and data protection across Europe, however, these landmark decisions reveal a number of flaws and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the rights to privacy and protection of personal data as endorsed and interpreted by the CJEU. This Article identifies and discusses some of the shortcomings revealed in the recent CJEU privacy and data protection landmark decisions and proposes to the CJEU a strategy aimed at resolving these shortcomings going forward.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Abbt

AbstractThe notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.


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