scholarly journals NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT IN REGARDS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-206
Author(s):  
Rahmah Kusumayani

Abstract Self defence known as an inherent right that is owned by states to protect its sovereignty from attack by other states. The international rules about self defence do not give any limitation about the type of weapon that can be used by states, including the threat or use of nuclear weapons to act self defence. In Practice, many requirements must be fulfilled by states when they claim the act of self defence. Since 2006, North Korea proclaimed its capability to develop nuclear weapons based on self defence argument. The Security Council concluded that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapon program is a threat to international peace and security and condemned such acts with sanctions based on act 41 UN Charter. The purposes of this study are to examine whether the North Korea’s nuclear program as an act of self defence and the UN Security Council’s sanctions to North Korea are in line with the principle of self defence in international law. The result of this research concludes that North Korea’s nuclear program does not meet the requirements as stated in article 51 UN Charter and customary international law regarding self defence. North Korea can not prove that the United States’ threat is jeopardy, and has a wide and dangerous effect for North Korea. Regarding the Security Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, states must report his act of self defence to the Security Council immediately. As therefore, sanctions given by the Security Council are in line with the principle of self defence since North Korea can not fulfil the requested requirements of self defence. Keywords: Act 51 UN Charter, Korean Nuclear Development, Principle of self defence   Abstrak Hak untuk menerapkan self defence dimiliki oleh tiap negara untuk melindungi kedaulatannya dari serangan negara lain. Peraturan internasional mengenai self defence tidak membatasi jenis senjata yang dapat digunakan oleh negara, termasuk ancaman dan penggunaan senjata nuklir dalam melakukan tindakan self defence. Dalam prakteknya banyak syarat yang harus dipenuhi oleh negara-negara ketika akan mengklaim tindakan self defence. Sejak tahun 2006, Korea Utara mendeklarasikan kesiapannya dalam mengembangkan senjata nuklir dengan alasan self defence. Dewan Keamanan menganggap bahwa program pengembangan senjata nuklir Korea Utara mengancam perdamaian dan keamanan internasional dan berdasarkan Pasal 41 Piagam PBB, Dewan Keamanan memberikan sanksi kepada Korea Utara. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengkaji legalitas pengembangan senjata nuklir di Korea Utara atas tindakan yang diklaim negaranya sebagai self defence serta kesesuaian penerapan sanksi Dewan Keamanan PBB dengan prinsip self defence. Hasil dari penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa program senjata nuklir Korea Utara tidak memenuhi syarat yang terdapat dalam Pasal 51 Piagam PBB maupun hukum kebiasaan internasional terkait self defence. Korea Utara tidak bisa membuktikan bahwa ancaman Amerika Serikat bersifat genting dan nyata menimbulkan efek luas dan berbahaya bagi Korea Utara. Berdasarkan tugas utama Dewan Keamanan dalam menjaga kedamaian dan keamanan internasional, negara-negara harus melaporkan tindakan self defence  kepada Dewan Keamanan dengan segera. Berdasarkan uraian diatas, sanksi yang diberikan Dewan Keamanan tidak bertentangan dengan prinsip self defence karena Korea Utara tidak bisa memenuhi hal-hal yang disyaratkan untuk melakukan tindakan self defence. Kata Kunci: Pasal 51 Piagam PBB, Pengembangan Senjata Nuklir Korea Utara, Prinsip Pembelaan Diri

2013 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 1196-1208
Author(s):  
Klara Tothova Jordan

On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094 (2013), bolstering the scope of United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Resolution represents the international community’s latest attempt at applying diplomatic and economic pressure to the DPRK so as to curb its nuclear weapons program. The resolution is also a response to the DPRK’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013 and its subsequent threat to carry out preemptive nuclear strikes against the United States and South Korea. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council responded to these grave violations of its existing Resolutions—seen as clear threats to international peace and security—by building upon, strengthening, and expanding the scope of the sanctions regime against the DPRK.


2003 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Yoo

In his speech before the United Nations (UN) in September 2002, President George W. Bush characterized the possible use of force against Iraq as necessary to enforce existing Security Council resolutions and to eliminate a dangerous threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1441, which found Iraq to be in material breach of previous Security Council resolutions and threatened serious consequences for further intransigence. When Iraq refused to fully comply with these resolutions, the United States led an ad hoc “coalition of the willing” that invaded Iraq on March 19,2003, quickly defeated Iraq’s armed forces, and ended the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party. On May 1,2003, President Bush announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time of this writing, the United States has assumed the position of an occupying power that is responsible for rebuilding Iraq, as recognized by the Security Council in Resolution 1483.


Author(s):  
Ellen Jenny Ravndal

This chapter explores all aspects of Trygve Lie’s interaction with the Security Council, beginning with his appointment process and the negotiation of the relative domains of the Council and the Secretary-General. This was a time when the working methods of the UN system were rapidly evolving through political negotiation and responses to external crises. It examines Lie’s personality and character, how he viewed his own responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security as crises arose, the legal and political tools he developed and exercised, and his changing relationship with individual permanent members and the six elected members. In the emerging Cold War, Lie’s position in the Security Council would be determined in particular by his relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Taking initiative in response to external crises in Iran, Palestine, Berlin, and Korea, Lie succeeded in laying foundations for an expanded political role for the Secretary-General.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-517

The question of the threat to Thailand was discussed by the Security Council at its 673d and 674th meetings. After again explaining the reasons for his government's belief that the condition of tension in the general region in which Thailand was located would, if continued, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the Thai representative, Pote Sarasin, again requested that the Peace Observation Commission establish a sub-commission of from three to five members to dispatch observers to Thailand and to visit Thailand itself if it were deemed necessary. The Thai draft differed from earlier Thai proposals, however, in that the original mandate of the sub-commission applie only to the territory of Thailand; if the sub-commission felt that it could not adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit in states contiguous to Thailand, the Peace Observation Commission or the Security Council could issue the necessary instructions. Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support of the Thai draft. They denied, as had been alleged by the Soviet representative (Tsarapkin) at an earlier meeting, that Council consideration or action on this question would be detrimental to the success of the negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Chinese People's Republic, Soviet Union and other states in Geneva. While agreeing that it would be impropitious for the Council to consider directly the situation in Indochina as long as it was being discussed in Geneva, they argued that the question raised by Thailand was quite separate and that the Council had a duty to comply with the Thai request.


2019 ◽  
pp. 346-374
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter looks at the use of force and collective security. Today, the United Nations Charter embodies the indispensable principles of international law on the use of force. These include the prohibition on the unilateral use of force found in Article 2(4), and the recognition of the inherent right of all States to use force in self-defence found in Article 51. Finally, under Chapter VII, a collective security system centred upon the Security Council was established for the maintenance of international peace and security. A key debate over the scope of Article 2(4) is whether a new exception has been recognized which would allow the use of force motivated by humanitarian considerations. It is argued that these ‘humanitarian interventions’ would allow a State to use force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations when the target State is unwilling or unable to act.


Author(s):  
Christine Chinkin

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was not adopted in a vacuum, but rather can be read with a number of other programs within the Security Council (SC) and UN architecture. These include other thematic resolutions, as well as broader policy initiatives. Taken together, these diverse strands sought to shift the understanding of the SC’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security, away from a classic state-oriented approach to one that places people at its center. The adoption of Resolution 1325, along with these other developments, had implications for the making of international law (the place of civil society and experts within the international legal and institutional framework), for rethinking participation, and the meaning of security/protection. This chapter suggests that 2000 was a pivotal moment when a more human-oriented international law seemed a real possibility and before the turn back toward militarism and national security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.


1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L. H. McCormack

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that:Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.International lawyers are still arguing about the scope of the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Most of the arguments focus on the semantics of Article 51. Those who argue for a “restrictive view” of the provision emphasise the qualifying phrase “if an armed attack occurs”.


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