A Cooperative Species

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members

This book examines the cultural, biological and other processes that explain how humans evolved into an exceptionally cooperative species. It advances two propositions, the first of which deals with proximate motivations for prosocial behavior and the second is concerned with the distant evolutionary origins and ongoing perpetuation of these cooperative dispositions. It argues that cooperation arose because it was highly beneficial to the members of groups that practiced it, and humans were able to construct social institutions that minimized the disadvantages of those with social preferences in competition with fellow group members, while heightening the group-level advantages associated with the high levels of cooperation that these social preferences allowed. The book explains why altruistic social preferences supporting human cooperation outcompeted unmitigated and amoral self-interest.

scholarly journals Emergent Prosocial Behavior During Dynamic Human Group Formation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Badman ◽  
Masahiko Haruno ◽  
Rei Akaishi
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Group Formation ◽  
Experimental Session ◽  
Cooperative Groups ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Group Interest ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Tit For Tat

For scientists, policy makers, and the general population, there is increasing interest in how humans form cooperative groups. However, how group-oriented behavior emerges during the dynamic process of group formation is still unknown. We hypothesize that humans will exhibit emergent prosocial behavior as their immediate group size increases. Using a network-embedded-dyad prisoner dilemma task, with periodic opportunities to retain or remove group members, we find subjects consistently follow a well-performing reciprocal base policy (tit-for-tat-like) across the experimental session. However, subjects’ strategies also became more forgiving and less exploitative as group size increased, with a default preference shift to cooperation. Thus, human cooperation may emerge from a desire to create and maintain larger and more cooperative groups, and multiscale strategy that considers both self-interest and group-interest.

scholarly journals The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups

2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1687) ◽  
pp. 20150097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joan B. Silk ◽  
Bailey R. House
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Breeding ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Primate Species ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Selective Pressures ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cooperatively Breeding ◽  
Animal Societies

In this paper, we consider three hypotheses to account for the evolution of the extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and altruistic social preferences within human societies. One hypothesis is that human cooperation is built on the same evolutionary foundations as cooperation in other animal societies, and that fundamental elements of the social preferences that shape our species' cooperative behaviour are also shared with other closely related primates. Another hypothesis is that selective pressures favouring cooperative breeding have shaped the capacity for cooperation and the development of social preferences, and produced a common set of behavioural dispositions and social preferences in cooperatively breeding primates and humans. The third hypothesis is that humans have evolved derived capacities for collaboration, group-level cooperation and altruistic social preferences that are linked to our capacity for culture. We draw on naturalistic data to assess differences in the form, scope and scale of cooperation between humans and other primates, experimental data to evaluate the nature of social preferences across primate species, and comparative analyses to evaluate the evolutionary origins of cooperative breeding and related forms of behaviour.

A Cooperative Species

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Cooperative Groups ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Shame And Guilt ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ethnographic Data

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.

The Epistemology of Groups

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Group Level ◽  
Social Significance ◽  
Individual Group ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Normative Requirements ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Belief Justification ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Trump Administration

Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.

Pluralistic Ignorance Research in Psychology: A Scoping Review of Topic and Method Variation and Directions for Future Research

2021 ◽  
pp. 108926802199516
Author(s):  
Rikki H. Sargent ◽  
Leonard S. Newman
Keyword(s):  
Scoping Review ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Pluralistic Ignorance ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Group Members

Pluralistic ignorance occurs when group members mistakenly believe others’ cognitions and/or behaviors are systematically different from their own. More than 20 years have passed since the last review of pluralistic ignorance from a psychological framework, with more than 60 empirical articles assessing pluralistic ignorance published since then. Previous reviews took an almost entirely conceptual approach with minimal review of methodology, making existing reviews outdated and limited in the extent to which they can provide guidelines for researchers. The goal of this review is to evaluate and integrate the literature on pluralistic ignorance, clarify important conceptual issues, identify inconsistencies in the literature, and provide guidance for future research. We provide a comprehensive definition for the phenomenon, with a focus on its status as a group-level phenomenon. We highlight three areas of variation in particular in the current scoping review: variation in topics assessed, variation in measurement, and (especially) variation in methods for assessing the implications of individual-level misperceptions that, in aggregate, lead to pluralistic ignorance. By filling these gaps in the literature, we ultimately hope to motivate further analysis of the phenomenon.

scholarly journals On the Stability of Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict: A Lab-in-the-Field Panel Study

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199408
Author(s):  
Robert Böhm ◽  
Jürgen Fleiß ◽  
Robert Rybnicek
Keyword(s):  
Field Study ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Panel Study ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Considerable Heterogeneity ◽  
Specific Preference ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Stability

Despite the omnipresence of inter-group conflicts, little is known about the heterogeneity and stability of individuals’ social preferences toward in-group and out-group members. To identify the prevalence and stability of social preferences in inter-group conflict, we gather quota-representative, incentivized data from a lab-in-the-field study during the heated 2016 Austrian presidential election. We assess social preferences toward in-group and out-group members one week before, one week after, and three months after the election. We find considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ group-(in)dependent social preferences. Utilizing various econometric strategies, we find largely stable social preferences over the course of conflict. Yet, there is some indication of variation, particularly when the conflict becomes less salient. Variation is larger in social preferences toward in-group members and among specific preference types. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings and outline potential avenues for future research.

scholarly journals Systemic domination, social institutions and the coalition problem

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 382-402
Author(s):  
Hallvard Sandven
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Critical Potential ◽  
Philip Pettit ◽  
The Social ◽  
Constant State ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Relevant Domain

This article argues for a systemic conception of freedom as non-domination. It does so by engaging with the debate on the so-called coalition problem. The coalition problem arises because non-domination holds that groups can be agents of (dominating) power, while also insisting that freedom be robust. Consequently, it seems to entail that everyone is in a constant state of domination at the hands of potential groups. However, the problem can be dissolved by rejecting a ‘strict possibility’ standard for interpreting non-domination’s robustness requirement. Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit propose to restrict the relevant domain of possible worlds by reference to two epistemic conditions pertaining to potential group members. I argue that this strategy unduly limits non-domination’s critical potential. I then argue that a suitably systemic conception of domination avoids this problem. By placing explanatory emphasis on social institutions, and how these bear on the feasibility of individual and collective action, a systemic conception of non-domination avoids the coalition problem in a way that retains its critical potential. The article clarifies the relationship between the rule of law and the social norms and objects to the claim that non-domination is bound to deem the latter irrelevant from the point of view of freedom.

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