International Dispute Settlement

Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter

This chapter looks at the seventeen international courts (ICs) with the formal jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes pertaining to a broad range of issues. Fourteen of these ICs have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between state parties; thirteen have jurisdiction regarding disputes involving nonstate actors (international institutional actors or private litigants). Quite often the dispute settlement role primarily binds others to follow the terms of the legal agreement, and quite often the IC has also been delegated other roles. Indeed, all but three of the ICs with a formal dispute settlement jurisdiction also have been delegated either enforcement, administrative, or constitutional review roles. These facts help explain why more often than not ICs have compulsory jurisdiction for their dispute settlement role.

Author(s):  
Chester Brown

This chapter gives a short introduction to the history of international dispute settlement by third-party adjudication. It notes that there is a gap in the existing literature, being an examination of procedure and remedies before different international courts, and an answer to the question of whether the same procedural rules obtain, and the same remedies are available, before different international judicial bodies. It presents the book's central thesis — that international courts often adopt common approaches to questions of procedure and remedies, which leads to increasing commonality in the case law of international courts. It then explains that the term ‘common law of international adjudication’ refers to the emergence of an increasingly homogeneous body of rules applied by international courts and tribunals relating to procedure and remedies. It then defines the terms ‘procedure’ and ‘remedies’. It also covers certain selected aspects of international adjudication, and reviews the jurisprudence of certain selected international courts and tribunals.


Author(s):  
Chester Brown

This concluding chapter notes that the book has asked whether international courts, in interpreting and applying their powers over procedure and remedies, have considered and sought to adopt the practices of other international courts. The book examined the sources of procedural and remedial competences of the principal international courts, and analysed the tools available to international courts to engage in cross-fertilization on issues relating to procedure and remedies. It then examined the degree of common practice with respect to several aspects of international adjudication: rules of evidence, the power to grant provisional measures, the power to interpret and revise judgments, and the remedies available in international adjudication. It then proposed various factors which explain the emergence of common practices, and noted limitations to its further development. Finally, it reviewed the practical and theoretical implications of the common law of international adjudication, concluding that it serves as a solid foundation for the further development of a harmonious system of international dispute settlement.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schultz ◽  
Niccolo Ridi

Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 50 : No. 3 , Article 5.This study seeks to clarify the importance, current and potential, of the use of comity by international courts and tribunals. Our findings support the idea that comity might be an emerging principle of procedural law, though agreement on its exact meaning— or unequivocal choices among its many connotations— still tends to be uncommon. We submit that, as long as other solutions are not in place, the principle can be successfully employed to assist international courts and tribunals in mediating jurisdictional conflicts between themselves by balancing coordination efforts and the demands of justice in the individual cases.Comity may serve as a meta-principle of coordination between international judicial bodies, to be employed in the pursuit of the common interest to an efficient and fair system of international dispute settlement. There are strong reasons militating in favour of this proposition: international tribunals, by and large, possess the powers necessary to exercise it; international judges and arbitrators know how to use it; and its long history of applications at the domestic level suggests that it can be employed successfully for a variety of purposes.We also submit the hunch that comity may most likely be employed as a central principle for further aspects of the coordination of international adjudication, for instance informing the sound use of analogical reasoning and precedent-borrowing process. Further study will be required to assess the potential of comity in this context. We have, so far, restricted ourselves to a simpler and more crucial task, seeking to resituate the principle of comity as one on which to rely for the resolution of different types of conflicts between international jurisdictions, and to question the traditional assumption that it is just an unhelpful complication: its history and rediscovery suggest otherwise.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 131-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Dyevre

AbstractIn deciding whether to rule against a state party, international courts regularly confront a compliance dilemma: declare the state in breach of the international regime but with the risk that it will defy the court’s authority; or defer to the state but at the price of acquiescing to an unjust or undesirable outcome. Specifically, international adjudicators must solve this dilemma in a context of uncertainty, that is, without knowing with exactitude whether or not the state will prefer complying with an adverse ruling over overt defiance. I use a simple strategic model to cast light on this aspect of the compliance dilemma. Building off from the model’s insights, I then discuss the practices, doctrinal tactics and institutional mechanisms apt to reduce uncertainty and minimize state defiance. I highlight, in particular, the advantages of defiance avoidance mechanisms that help create informational feedback loops like test-the-water dicta and double-tier review. I illustrate how these mechanisms have been deployed by two of the world’s most powerful international courts, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, I consider the limitations of these mechanisms along with the possibility for other international dispute settlement bodies to replicate them.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 394-398
Author(s):  
Nicole De Silva

In “Judicialization of the Sea: Bargaining in the Shadow of UNCLOS,” Sara Mitchell and Andrew Owsiak make a valuable contribution to an expanding body of scholarship that considers whether and how international courts have out-of-court “shadow effects.” The authors argue that, in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime, the threat of binding international dispute settlement (IDS)—which entails high costs for states—encourages rational potential litigants to settle out of court through other peaceful and less costly IDS mechanisms. In this essay, I challenge the narrow focus of Mitchell and Owsiak's analysis, considering the diverse aims and processes of judicialized international cooperation in two key ways. First, the authors’ focus on peaceful IDS as the sole outcome of interest overlooks other important cooperation goals driving judicialization and delegation to international courts. An emphasis on out-of-court IDS, even when achieved peacefully, can actually undermine other objectives for judicialized international cooperation, including the development of international law and greater compliance with international law. Second, Mitchell and Oswiak's theoretical mechanism assumes that an international court contributes to its out-of-court influence through its case law, but this discounts how international courts can engage in a range of out-of-court, non-adjudicative activities that can affect potential litigants’ cost-benefit analyses regarding judicialized versus non-judicialized IDS. Indicating its preference for increasing its “direct effects” through adjudicating disputes, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has developed capacity-building and training programs to encourage judicialized IDS under UNCLOS and states’ litigation at the ITLOS. Overall, I highlight how there is a broad range of actors and processes underpinning international courts’ out-of-court effects, and how these actors and processes can work towards multiple, at times conflicting, aims for judicialized international cooperation.


Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter

This chapter examines thirteen international courts (ICs) with administrative review jurisdiction and explains how delegation of administrative review authority is associated with systems where international and/or domestic administrative actors apply international regulatory rules. Whereas international dispute settlement involves a broad range of issues, administrative review tends to be concerned with economic aspects of international agreements. Eleven ICs have jurisdiction to review administrative acts of supranational administrators; eight have jurisdiction to review national implementation of international administrative rules. All ICs with designated administrative review roles have compulsory jurisdiction associated with this role and allow private actors to initiate litigation so that the subjects of administrative decision making can pursue a legal remedy. Twelve ICs also allow national judges to refer to the IC cases where community rules are at issue.


Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter

In 1989, when the Cold War ended, there were six permanent international courts. Today there are more than two dozen that have collectively issued over thirty-seven thousand binding legal rulings. This book charts the developments and trends in the creation and role of international courts, and explains how the delegation of authority to international judicial institutions influences global and domestic politics. The book presents an in-depth look at the scope and powers of international courts operating around the world. Focusing on dispute resolution, enforcement, administrative review, and constitutional review, the book argues that international courts alter politics by providing legal, symbolic, and leverage resources that shift the political balance in favor of domestic and international actors who prefer policies more consistent with international law objectives. International courts name violations of the law and perhaps specify remedies. The book explains how this limited power—the power to speak the law—translates into political influence, and it considers eighteen case studies, showing how international courts change state behavior. The case studies, spanning issue areas and regions of the world, collectively elucidate the political factors that often intervene to limit whether or not international courts are invoked and whether international judges dare to demand significant changes in state practices.


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