scholarly journals The military coup in Turkey on May 27, 1960: background, drivers and it consequences

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-209
Author(s):  
Malika Sharipovna Tovsultanova ◽  
Rustam Alkhazurovich Tovsultanov ◽  
Lilia Nadipovna Galimova
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Charismatic Leader ◽  
National Unity ◽  
High Inflation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

In the 1950s, the Democratic Party came to power in Turkey, relying on the provincial bourgeoisie and clericals. The charismatic leader of democrats Adnan Menderes became the prime-minister. The Democratic government pursued an active foreign and domestic policy. In particular, abandoning its traditional neutrality, Turkey joined NATO and CenTO military blocs. Concessions were made to religious circles. The government also carried out large-scale reforms, for which the society was not ready, due to which an economic crisis erupted in the country, the most characteristic manifestation of which was high inflation. By introducing repressive laws against dissidents, attempts to isolate the opposition, in particular the leaders of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the Democrats pushed the latter to search for allies in the army. In the ranks of the latter, under the influence of Western agents and the dissatisfaction of the officers themselves with the situation in the country, the idea of a military coup came about on May 27, 1960. As a result of the coup, the National Unity Committee came to power, consisting of representatives of the generals and leaders of the Republican Peoples Party. In 1961, a new constitution was adopted at a referendum, reforming the system of legislative power in the country, after which power again passed to civilian political institutions. The leader of the military who carried out the coup, General Jemal Grsel, became the prime minister, while the chairman of the Republican Peoples Party Ismet İnnbecame became the president of Turkey.

The 1964 Military Coup in Brazil

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Roberto Martins Filho
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Military Forces ◽  
The Government ◽  
Getulio Vargas ◽  
The Military

The coup that took place in Brazil on March 31, 1964 can be understood as a typical Cold War event. Supported by civilians, the action was carried out by the armed forces. Its origins hark back to the failed military revolt, headed by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in November of 1935, stirring up strong anticommunist sentiments. The Estado Novo coup, which occurred two years later, was supported by the army (war) and navy ministers. It marked the beginnings of the dictatorial phase of Getúlio Vargas, who had been in power since 1930. At the end of the Second World War, officers who had taken part in the struggle against Nazism in Italy returned to Brazil and overthrew the dictatorial Vargas regime, who nonetheless returned to power through the 1950 presidential elections. In 1954, under pressure from right-wing military forces, he committed suicide, thereby frustrating existing plans for another coup d’état. The Superior War School (ESG), created in 1949, had become both the birthplace of the ideology of National Security and stage where the French doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire was welcomed. During the 1950s, the military came to be divided into pro-American and nationalist factions. The alliance between the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the centrist Social Democratic Party (PSD), which had elected Vargas earlier, now enabled Juscelino Kubitschek’s victory in the 1955 elections, disappointing the conservatives of the National Democratic Union (UDN) and its military allies. The latter were briefly encouraged when the 1960 presidential election put Jânio Quadros at the head of the executive. In August 1961, when Quadros resigned, his military ministers tried to use force to keep Vice-President João Goulart, Vargas’s political heir at the head of the PTB, from taking office. The coup was frustrated by the resistance of the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Yet the Goulart administration was marked by instability, in the midst of intense social struggles and by a sharp economic crisis. The outcome of this drama began to take shape in March 1963, when the government took a leftwards turn. A massive demonstration in downtown Rio de Janeiro on March 13 served as an alert, and the March 25 sailors’ revolt as the match in the powder keg. On March 31, military forces carried out the infamous coup. The Goulart administration collapsed. Social movements were left waiting for orders to resist that never came.

Brazil's Fragile Democracy

Worldview ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Marc Levinson
Keyword(s):  
Military Coup ◽  
National Unity ◽  
President Elect ◽  
New Republic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military

The events surrounding the tragic illness and death of President-elect Tancredo Neves have led some observers to ascribe a new political maturity to Brazil. Nevis, the grandfatherly figure who was to become the first civilian president most Brazilians had ever known, never took the oath of office. Instead, it fell to an unlikely and unpredictable politician named José Sarney to break the string of generals who have ruled the country since a bloodless military coup in 1964. During the five weeks of Neves's lingering intestinal ailment, Sarney ruled as acting president with the collaboration of the country's entire political and civilian leadership. Now, without a figure of national unity to rely upon, Sarney—a former head of the military governments's party, who only last summer became a convert to the democratic opposition—holds in his hands the fate of the government that Brazilians have labeled hopefully the New Republic.

scholarly journals The Military-Political Alliance and Diplomatic Cooperation of the UPR and the WUPR

2019 ◽  
pp. 78-90
Author(s):  
Ihor Datskiv
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
National Unity ◽  
The West ◽  
Political Union ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

The article deals with the relationship between the West Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic during the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1921. Within this framework, the military-political union and the interaction in the diplomatic sphere between the UPR and the WUPR are examined. It is noted that the question of the Union of the WUPR with Dnipro Ukraine arose due to the large-scale aggression of Poland in the West and the offensive of the Bolsheviks from the East. However, it was envisaged that the WUPR would be granted broad autonomy with its own army and government. The WUPR received considerable military and material aid from the UPR, which contributed to the war with a much stronger enemy. It is argued that after the union was created, there was a need for harmonization and co-ordination of foreign policy of the states and their foreign affairs agencies. As a result, those institutions acquired all-Ukrainian status. However, this did not affect WUPR missions in the countries that emerged in the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, namely Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Other diplomatic missions become common for the UPR and the WUPR. The article states that over time certain controversies emerged as for the vision of foreign policy priorities of the WUPR and the UPR. The government and military leadership of the WUPR began to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. One of the reasons is the lack of power of the WUPR armed forces and the Bolshevik sympathy towards them. Besides, the increasing number of Galician and Dnipro Ukraine politicians and diplomats offered Y. Petrushevych to change his foreign policy orientation, distance himself from S. Petliura and be guided solely by his own interests. In turn, S. Petliura forged an agreement on behalf of the UPR on the recognition of Eastern Galicia as part of Poland and the rejection of previous acts of national unity. The article also deals with the process of establishing the military cooperation of the WUPR with the Bolsheviks and the agreements inter se. Keywords: WUPR, UPR, military-political alliance, diplomacy, foreign policy, Bolsheviks.

Changes in Income Distribution in Brazil

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodolfo Hoffmann
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Household Income ◽  
Gini Index ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Transfer Programs ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Very High

Income inequality in Brazil, already high, increased after the military coup of 1964 and remained very high even after democratization in the 1980s. It decreased substantially in the period 2001–2014, after inflation was controlled. The Gini index of the per capita household income dropped from 0.594 in 2001 to 0.513 in 2014. The determinants of this decline in inequality are analyzed considering the components of that income and how each one affected changes in inequality, showing the impact of changes in the remuneration of private sector employees and in pensions paid by the government, as well as federal transfer programs. Changes in education lie behind the first of these effects, and the increase of the minimum wage reinforced all three. The economic crises after 2014 interrupted the process of decline, and among economically active persons, inequality even increased from 2014 to 2015. Measures to further reduce inequality are suggested.

scholarly journals The anniversary of the military coup attempt in Turkey, July 15–16, 2016. The evolution of a political system

2017 ◽  
pp. 63-68
Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Coup Attempt

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.

scholarly journals Arab Spring Failure: A Case Study of Egypt and Syria

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
Raid Khan ◽  
Amna Mahmood ◽  
Asif Salim
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Arab Spring ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Norms ◽  
Rule Out

The Arab Spring was assumed to reform the prevailing regime pattern and to bring socio-economic reforms. However, it failed to get its intended outcomes at large. The objectives of the revolution that are to bring a positive transformation in the social, economic, and political domains were not attained effectively and was considered a failed revolution in the case of Egypt and Syria. The present paper focuses on exploring the reasons and factors behind its failure in the particular context of Egypt and Syria. Although Egypt observed regime transition from dictatorship to democracy, yet within one and a half year, a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammad Morsi, and the military regime was reinstalled. In the case of Syria, since 2011, a civil war is going on where Bashar-ul-Asad still holds dictatorial powers. The study reveals that the lack of stable political institutions, weak democratic norms, and the absence of a vibrant civil society paved the way for state authorities to rule out the attempts of protestors. Excluding a few of the countries, the rest of the Middle Eastern countries are still ruled by the powerful elites. The successes of the Arab Spring are still to be awaited.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

Does Membership Matter?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Auerswald ◽  
Stephen M. Saideman
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
The Military

This chapter looks at two countries, Australia and New Zealand, that are partners with but not members of NATO. Australia and New Zealand have British-style political institutions, with the key decisions made by the prime minister and his or her minister of defense. The chapter then assesses whether membership in NATO makes a difference. It argues that non-membership can actually be a shield that countries use to deflect harder choices and more responsibilities. Otherwise, the domestic dynamics work like they do in Great Britain or Canada, demonstrating that the military constraints imposed by nations are driven far more by domestic politics than by NATO institutions.

Slovenia will remain polarised, whatever Jansa’s fate

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
European Council ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Council Presidency ◽  
The Eu

Significance The government led by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) is under mounting pressure as Slovenia prepares to take over the European Council presidency. This is due mainly to hostility in parliament and society to Prime Minister Janez Jansa, who promotes a popular but divisive form of national conservatism. Impacts A successful no-confidence vote in the government followed by early elections would complicate Slovenia’s handling of its EU presidency. The fall of the current government and its replacement by the centre-left would improve Slovenia’s relations with the EU and United States. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban would lose an ally at EU level if Jansa lost office.

Presidential Term Limits as a Credible-Commitment Mechanism

2019 ◽  
pp. 123-140
Author(s):  
Octavio Amorim Neto ◽  
Igor P. Acácio
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Political Order ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Chief Executives ◽  
Regime Stability ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Contra the conventional wisdom that term limits are meaningless in dictatorships, Brazil’s military regime developed term-limits for its chief executives and managed a durable political order. This chapter argue that term limits moderated intra-elite conflicts, thus contributing to regime stability. Term limits were key to reconcile two warring factions within the armed forces. The authors see term limits as a credible-commitment mechanism. Three elements are jointly sufficient to explain the adoption of term limits: (1) the armed forces’ decision in 1964 to part ways with the decades-old pattern of episodic, short political interventions and stay in office for the long haul; (2) a legalist tradition that led the new regime to keep a façade of constitutionalism through a myriad of political institutions; and (3) the ideological and political cleavages within the armed forces. We corroborate our arguments using a new dataset of tension events between the military and the government in 1946–85.

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