The Analytics of Human Sociality

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Signal Quality ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Average Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
High Degree

The folk theorem requires that each action taken by each player carry a signal that is conveyed to the other players. A signal is imperfect if all players receive the same signal; the signal is perfect if it accurately reports the player's action. The question of the signal quality required to obtain efficient cooperation is especially critical when the size of the game is considered. Generally, the folk theorem does not even mention the number of players, but in most situations in real life, the larger the number of players participating in a cooperative endeavor, the lower the average quality of the cooperation vs. defection signal because generally a player observes only a small number of other players with a high degree of accuracy, however large the group involved. This chapter explores this issue and illustrates the problem by applying the Fudenberg et al. (1994) framework to the Public Goods Game, which in many respects is representative of contexts for cooperation in humans.

scholarly journals An experimental look at trust, bargaining, and public goods in fishing communities

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian A. Rojas ◽  
Joshua Cinner ◽  
Jacqueline Lau ◽  
Cristina Ruano-Chamorro ◽  
Francisco J. Contreras-Drey ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Income Source ◽  
The Public ◽  
Socioeconomic Characteristics ◽  
Experimental Economic ◽  
Bargaining Behavior ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Pro Social Behavior

AbstractPro-social behavior is crucial to the sustainable governance of common-pool resources such as fisheries. Here, we investigate how key socioeconomic characteristics influence fishers’ pro-social and bargaining behavior in three types of experimental economic games (public goods, trust, and trade) conducted in fishing associations in Chile. Our games revealed high levels of cooperation in the public goods game, a high degree of trust, and that sellers rather than buyers had more bargaining power, yet these results were strongly influenced by participants’ socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, gender, having a secondary income source, age, and being the main income provider for the household all had a relationship to multiple game outcomes. Our results highlight that engagement in pro-social behaviors such as trust and cooperation can be influenced by people’s socioeconomic context.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Nodes with the highest control power play an important role at the final level of cooperation in directed networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Ebrahimi ◽  
Marzieh Yousefi ◽  
Farhad Shahbazi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Sheikh Beig Goharrizi ◽  
Ali Masoudi-Nejad
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Final Level ◽  
Input Signals ◽  
Tumoral Cells ◽  
Power Play

AbstractControllability of complex networks aims to seek the lowest number of nodes (the driver nodes) that can control all the nodes by receiving the input signals. The concept of control centrality is used to determine the power of each node to control the network. The more a node controls the nodes through connections in the network, the more it has the power to control. Although the cooperative and free-rider strategies and the final level of cooperation in a population are considered and studied in the public goods game. However, it is yet to determine a solution to indicate the effectiveness of each member in changing the strategies of the other members. In a network, the choice of nodes effective in changing the other nodes’ strategies, as free-riders, will lead to lower cooperation and vice versa. This paper uses simulated and real networks to investigate that the nodes with the highest control power are more effective than the hubs, local, and random nodes in changing the strategies of the other nodes and the final level of cooperation. Results indicate that the nodes with the highest control power as free-riders, compared to the other sets being under consideration, can lead to a lower level of cooperation and are, therefore, more effective in changing the strategies of the other nodes. The obtained results can be considered in the treatment of cancer. So that, destroying the tumoral cells with the highest control power should be a priority as these cells have a higher capability to change the strategies of the other cells from cooperators to free-riders (healthy to tumoral).

scholarly journals Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pair Interaction ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Point Interactions ◽  
Social Games ◽  
The Public ◽  
Specific Parameter ◽  
Group Members

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.

scholarly journals Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e1008217
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fixation Probability ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Excellent Performance ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Evolutionary Simulation ◽  
Evolutionary Robustness ◽  
Full Cooperation

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.

scholarly journals Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Equity And Efficiency

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

Team competition and the public goods game

2007 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan H.W. Tan ◽  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public
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