Locke on Being Self to My Self

Present Moment ◽

Intuitive Knowledge ◽

The Past ◽

John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what “I” refers to. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and accountable for their actions. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that he invokes in his version of the cogito. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn.

On the L 2-convergence of a superadditive bisexual Galton-Watson branching process

Journal of Applied Probability ◽

10.1017/s0021900200101251 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 34 (03) ◽

pp. 575-582 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

M. González ◽

M. Molina

Keyword(s):

Branching Process ◽

Final Section ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

In this paper the L 2-convergence of a superadditive bisexual Galton–Watson branching process is studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of the suitably normed process are given. In the final section, a result about one of the most important bisexual models is proved.

Locke's Theory of Personal Identity

Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0031819100048427 ◽

1979 ◽

Vol 54 (208) ◽

pp. 173-185 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Paul Helm

Keyword(s):

Personal Identity ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Transitive Relation ◽

Bodily Continuity ◽

It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity ‘remember’ should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness.

Personal Identity

10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0010 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Galen Strawson

Keyword(s):

Personal Identity ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Human Being ◽

Individual Substance ◽

Past Time ◽

The Way

This chapter examines John Locke's idea of personal identity by focusing on the canonical personal identity question: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of the truth of the claim that a person considered now at time t₂, whom we may call [P], is the same person as a person considered at a different past time t₁, whom we may call [Pₓ]? What has to be true if it is to be true that [Pₓ] is the same person as [P]? The canonical question assumes that “person” denotes a thing or object or substance that is a standard temporal continuant in the way that a human being or person1 is (or an immaterial soul, on most conceptions of what an immaterial soul is). The chapter considers how Locke's person differs both from human being (man) and from (individual) substance, material or immaterial, on the same ground, as well as his concept of the field of consciousness in relation to personhood.

Personal Identity and Science

Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia ◽

10.18270/rcfc.v19i39.3027 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 19 (39) ◽

pp. 191-220

Author(s):

Mariana Córdoba ◽

María Marta Quintana

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Science ◽

Personal Identity ◽

Scientific Knowledge ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Thought Experiments ◽

Philosophical Problem ◽

Genetic Approach ◽

Pluralistic Perspective

The philosophical problem of personal identity –the issue of finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for a past or future being to be a certain present being– has been treated by analytical metaphysics mostly. In this framework, plenty of references to thought experiments can be found, but they exhibit no connection to practical problems and scientific outcomes. Our purpose is to involve philosophy of science in that debate, since a genetic approach regarding identity can be considered supported by contemporary scientific knowledge. In order to do that, we will focus on the Argentinian case of the approximately 500 children who were appropriated during the most recent dictatorship (1976-1983). The appropriations deprived them, precisely, of their identities, but some of them managed to be recovered thanks to Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (apm) and genetics. Our final purpose is to argue that a pluralistic perspective in philosophy of science, according to which values contribute to the very constitution of ontology science aims to describe and explain, will allow us to defend apm strategy but reject, at the same time, a reductive conception of identity.

Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.99.4.1576 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 99 (4) ◽

pp. 1576-1587 ◽

Cited By ~ 29

Author(s):

Alex Gershkov ◽

Benny Moldovanu

Keyword(s):

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Allocation Problem ◽

Static Case ◽

Efficient Allocation ◽

Dynamic Efficiency ◽

Basic Model ◽

Informational Externalities ◽

We study an allocation problem where a set of objects needs to be allocated to agents arriving over time. The basic model is of the private, independent values type. The dynamically efficient allocation is implementable if the distribution of agents' values is known. Whereas lack of knowledge about the distribution is inconsequential in the static case, endogenous informational externalities arise if the designer gradually learns about the distribution by observing present values. These externalities may prevent the implementation of the dynamically efficient allocation. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficient allocation to be implementable. (JEL D11, D82)

James, Intentionality, and Analysis

The Oxford Handbook of William James ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199395699.013.13 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Henry Jackman

Keyword(s):

William James ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

The Core ◽

The Past ◽

Knowing That ◽

Traditional Account ◽

The World ◽

William James was always gripped by the problem of intentionality (or “knowing”), that is, of how our thoughts come to be about the world. Nevertheless, coming up with a sympathetic reading of James’s account requires appreciating that James’s approach to analyzing a phenomenon is very different from that which most contemporary philosophers have found natural. In particular, rather than trying to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a thought’s being about an object, James presented an account of intentionality that focused on certain core cases (particularly those where we actually see or handle the objects of our thoughts), and explained the extension of our “knowing” talk to other cases (objects and events in the past, unobservables, etc.) in terms of various pragmatically relevant relations that can be found between those cases and the “core.” Once this account of intentionality is in place, a number of features of James’s approach to truth come in to clearer focus, and can seem less problematic than they would if one presupposed a more traditional account of intentionality and analysis.

Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055406062265 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 100 (3) ◽

pp. 403-417 ◽

Cited By ~ 33

Author(s):

JAMES ADAMS ◽

SAMUEL MERRILL

Keyword(s):

Spatial Model ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Third Parties ◽

Third Party ◽

Explicit Formulas ◽

The Third ◽

The Third Party ◽

Plurality-based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small, centrist, third parties. We modify the standard two-party spatial model of policy-seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party, and we show that the presence of such a party—even if it has no chance of winning—motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party. We derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three-party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of that equilibrium. We show that, over time, the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in thesamedirection relative to each other but in theoppositedirection relative to the minor party. The predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar Britain.

On the L2-convergence of a superadditive bisexual Galton-Watson branching process

Journal of Applied Probability ◽

10.2307/3215085 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 34 (3) ◽

pp. 575-582 ◽

Cited By ~ 19

Author(s):

M. González ◽

M. Molina

Keyword(s):

Branching Process ◽

Final Section ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

In this paper the L2-convergence of a superadditive bisexual Galton–Watson branching process is studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of the suitably normed process are given. In the final section, a result about one of the most important bisexual models is proved.

Some Reconsiderations of Simon's City-Size Distribution Model

Environment and Planning A Economy and Space ◽

10.1068/a091043 ◽

1977 ◽

Vol 9 (9) ◽

pp. 1043-1053 ◽

Cited By ~ 11

Author(s):

A Okabe

Keyword(s):

Steady State ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

City Size ◽

Distribution Model ◽

Type Model ◽

Size Distributions ◽

City Size Distribution ◽

In conjunction with the empirical findings that the form of city-size distributions is stable over time, this paper reexamines Simon's (1955) model and provides a better understanding of that model. First, a Simon-type model is proposed which is a generalization of Simon's model. Second, Simon's model is reexamined with respect to the ‘steady state’. Third, in the context of the Simon-type model, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the ‘steady state’ with the Yule (1924) city-size distributions are investigated. Last, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the ‘asymptotically steady state’ are obtained.

On rings of sets

Journal of the Australian Mathematical Society ◽

10.1017/s1446788700006546 ◽

1968 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 723-730 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

T. P. Speed

Keyword(s):

Topological Space ◽

Sufficient Conditions ◽

Closed Sets ◽

The Past ◽

Complete Ring ◽

Irreducible Elements ◽

In the past a number of papers have appeared which give representations of abstract lattices as rings of sets of various kinds. We refer particularly to authors who have given necessary and sufficient conditions for an abstract lattice to be lattice isomorphic to a complete ring of sets, to the lattice of all closed sets of a topological space, or to the lattice of all open sets of a topological space. Most papers on these subjects give the conditions in terms of special elements of the lattice. We thus have completely join-irreducible elements — G. N. Raney [7]; join prime, completely join prime, and supercompact elements — V. K. Balachandran [1], [2]; N-sub-irreducible elements — J. R. Büchi [5]; and lattice bisectors — P. D. Finch [6]. Also meet-irreducible and completely meet-irreducible dual ideals play a part in some representations of G. Birkhoff & 0. Frink [4].