Beginnings

Author(s):  
Sarah Stroumsa

This chapter discusses the earliest manifestations of systematic philosophy in al-Andalus, as well as their religious and political context. The second half of the tenth century was a watershed in Andalusian intellectual history. The story of this turning point is twofold. The first part relates to the introduction of sciences to al-Andalus, while the second relates to the censorship of philosophical and scientific books. The censorship of books was accompanied by the persecution of their readers, which drastically limited, and sometimes paralyzed, the Muslim practice of philosophy as it was prevalent at the time: Neoplatonic as well as mystical philosophy. Yet these restrictions were applicable to Muslims alone. Jewish thinkers, inspired by the same suspect sources, continued to develop the same sort of forbidden philosophy. Consequently, it is these Jewish thinkers who are prominent in the history of philosophy in al-Andalus in the eleventh century; and it is also they who served as custodians of the forbidden lore until better times. The chapter also studies Ibn Masarra, who is commonly considered to have been the first independent Andalusī Muslim thinker of local extraction.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 222-244
Author(s):  
Marina N. Volf

The views of M. Mandelbaum on the historiography of philosophy have undergone a certain evolution. The paper shows the epistemological foundations of Mandelbaum’s historical and philosophical position. From the standpoint of critical realism and its application to social sciences Mandelbaum shows the advantages and disadvantages of the monistic or holistic approaches, partial monisms and pluralism. He considers A. O. Lovejoy's history of ideas to be the most reasonable pluralistic conception, although its use as a historical and philosophical methodology is limited. Intellectual history, which replaced it, should be called a partial monism, however, according to Mandelbaum, it gets a number of advantages if it begins to use a pluralistic methodology. In this version of methodology, the history of philosophy and intellectual history can be identified. The paper also presents some objections of analytic philosophers against this identification.


2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 245-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Barceló ◽  
Anja Heidenreich

This article presents a study of the expansion of Islamic lusterware across the Mediterranean before its production was fully consolidated in al-Andalus between the end of the twelfth and the thirteenth century. A number of examples are presented here that indicate a flourishing trade around the Mediterranean as early as the tenth century, including pottery as well as other luxury goods. A survey of lusterware found on the Iberian Peninsula has yielded relevant information on the complex technical history of local luster production. We present seven Andalusi luster fragments from the eleventh century that feature decoration on both sides, with one piece bearing epigraphic inscriptions naming two of the Abbadid rulers of Seville, al-Muʿtaḍid and al-Muʿtamid. Discovered in Spain (Seville and Palma del Rio) and Portugal (Silves and Coimbra), these fragments indicate the existence of a ceramic production center in Seville and another at the Abbadid palace during the second half of the eleventh century. These pieces indicate the direct and marked influence that the various centers of luxury luster production in the Islamic East and West exerted on one another, a phenomenon not uncommon in the history of Islamic pottery.



Author(s):  
L. Marlow

First in a series of chapters devoted to the religious-political context of Naṣīḥat al-mulūk, this chapter explores the confessional composition of the Samanid domains and the varied discourses related to religious cultures and the communities associated with them. Noting the region’s history of religious multiplicity, the chapter traces the inclusive approach to religious diversity evident in tenth-century encyclopaedic writings, as well as the contemporaneous production of a literature of refutation, directed against Muslim and non-Muslim groups. His mentality shaped by these factors, Pseudo-Māwardī emphasises the king’s need to develop skill in religious argumentation, particularly against heretics, whom he depicts as agents of political as well as religious dissent. After discussing paradigms of heterodoxy, the chapter ends with an account of the Ismāʿīlī mission active in the Samanid domains and its success in winning the support of the Amir Naṣr b. Aḥmad, during whose reign Naṣīḥat al-mulūk is likely to have been written, and whose conversion to Ismāʿīlism perhaps played a significant role in occasioning its composition.


1990 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 203-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Calvin G. Normore

Philosophy is not history, not even intellectual history. The history of philosophy is history, a branch of intellectual history. Yet it is widely believed, by philosophers and historians of philosophy alike, that the study of the history of philosophy is an important part of the study of philosophy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgio Baruchello

It is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the exact time when the pejoration of “prejudice” occurred. Nor can “prejudice” be understood once and for all as being exclusively a poorly formed opinion, an unreasonable belief, a false judgement, a sentiment, an assumption dictated or corrupted by sentiment, a bad behaviour, or an admixture of them, at least as far as intellectual history is concerned. Though assuming only one particular meaning of the term ab initio may be very convenient, speakers, erudite ones included, have been using “prejudice” in many ways, the variety of which linguists and other researchers at large cannot but acknowledge and report to varying degrees. Unlike artificial technical terms—e.g. the classical legal interpretation of “praejudicium”—and like all important concepts of our natural languages—e.g. love, justice, beauty, education—“prejudice” too is polysemic, ambiguous, living, contestable and contested. Within the history of philosophy, moreover, it is even possible to find positive appraisals of the term itself and the present short text lists and comments on many of them.


2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-24
Author(s):  
Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann

Abstract The essay – an elaborated version of my academic farewell speech [Abschiedsvorlesung] – discusses three theses: 1. Histories and history as well as history of philosophy and philosophy of history can only be staged as narratives. “True” stories enact the past and deliver schemes for anticipating the future; insofar history and future constitute the semantics of the present. 2. “Systematic” philosophy analyses the temporal narratives which store the historical experiences and eliminates their temporality in a process of transforming narratives into arguments. The most important step in this transformation consists in isolating the key notions of the narratives and in arranging these key notions in a “timeless” systematic order. 3. History of philosophy and philosophy of history restage, however, the temporal narrative, which systematic philosophy wants to eliminate from philosophy. This operation produces an unsolvable paradox where the claim of timeless truth and that of unescapable temporality are both valid. It throws up questions such as: how can it be possible for philosophical truths to lose their credit? Do timeless truths exist, and if so what do they mean? Do these paradoxes lead to schadenfreude on the part of the historian of philosophy, who knew it all along, or should one see these unsolvable complexities as a chance to enjoy the richness of possibilities which history unfolds? The essay chooses the second alternative.


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