“On My Own”?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige
Keyword(s):  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Ex Ante

This chapter gives a brief background of how executive orders have been used by US presidents. As a way of implementing statute in ways that hew to presidential preference, executive orders have been utilized from the Washington administration forward as an implication of the constitutional “executive power” vested in the president. Any issued order reflects presidential preferences, more or less purely enacted into action. The chapter seeks to unpack this view substantively and theoretically. Presidential action can be bound not just by legislators or judges but also by actors within the executive branch itself. The ultimate form of a given executive order may reflect agency needs, or the outcome of intrabranch negotiation, rather than pure ex ante presidential preferences.

By Executive Order

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rudalevige
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Presidential Power ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Personal Power ◽  
Executive Orders

The president of the United States is commonly thought to wield extraordinary personal power through the issuance of executive orders. In fact, the vast majority of such orders are proposed by federal agencies and shaped by negotiations that span the executive branch. This book provides the first comprehensive look at how presidential directives are written — and by whom. The book examines more than five hundred executive orders from the 1930s to today — as well as more than two hundred others negotiated but never issued — shedding vital new light on the multilateral process of drafting supposedly unilateral directives. The book draws on a wealth of archival evidence from the Office of Management and Budget and presidential libraries as well as original interviews to show how the crafting of orders requires widespread consultation and compromise with a formidable bureaucracy. It explains the key role of management in the presidential skill set, detailing how bureaucratic resistance can stall and even prevent actions the chief executive desires, and how presidents must bargain with the bureaucracy even when they seek to act unilaterally. Challenging popular conceptions about the scope of presidential power, the book reveals how the executive branch holds the power to both enact and constrain the president's will.

Eisenhower’s executive privilege and the public interest

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-84
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Government Information ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
White House ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Creation

This chapter delves into the depths of one of the most important developments within modern American politics, the creation and institutionalization of executive privilege. In facing a fervent Congress in the grips of McCarthyism, Eisenhower issued a letter denying testimony to the Senate for the Army-McCarthy hearings. His letter included a memo from Attorney General Brownell that claimed the president had an inherent constitutional privilege to deny information to Congress or the public if it was in the public interest and for national security. This action institutionalized the Cold War Paradigm in the executive branch and created an extra-constitutional power for the president. Eisenhower issued several executive orders concerning classification and public dissemination of government information, along with the creation of the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Commerce Department to oversee these policies. Eisenhower claimed historic precedent to justify his inherent constitutional power, regardless, it showed a learned response that changed executive power. Congress would respond in 1955 by creating the Special Subcommittee on Government Information chaired by Rep. John Moss, given jurisdiction for oversight on all executive branch information policies and practices. With the issue of freedom of information institutionalized in Congress, a 12-year legislative power struggle would unfold between Congress and the White House ending with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.

The Limits of Presidential Influence: Two Environmental Directives and What They Mean for Executive Power

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua B. Kennedy
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Issues ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Federal Agencies ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Order Process ◽  
Regulatory Issues ◽  
History Of ◽  
Presidential Influence

Abstract:The executive order process can be a long and complicated one, as directives may wind their way through various agencies before finding their way onto the president’s desk. Even after these orders have been issued, federal agencies will have a wide degree of latitude under certain conditions as it pertains to implementing them. In this article, I study the history of three separate presidential directives, two dealing specifically with environmental issues and one with general regulatory issues, in order to provide a picture of the process from inception to implementation. I consider three cases and explore the factors that drive presidents in choosing when or whether to issue an order and those that drive federal agencies to react as they do. This article encourages scholars to reconsider what they consider “unilateral,” pointing to the instances in which presidents must engage in bargaining within the executive branch they ostensibly head.

scholarly journals Use of Executive Orders in Nigeria by the Executive Branch of Government in Time of Emergency

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 669-678
Author(s):  
Oluwapelumi Odunayo Osadola ◽  
Phebe Oluwatoni Ojo
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The Other ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Fourth Republic

Executive Orders are not invoked as a matter of course by the President or Governors heading the Executive Cabinet. These orders are exercisable when heads of the executive branch of government see for their needfulness and for smooth running of their governmental programmes or policies. Every Executive order must carry the force of law for it to be valid or to be duly recognised by the other branches of government which if not, the latter may question its constitutionality. The advantages of executive orders are very innumerable to mention however it has been said that the use of executive orders have assaulted the concept of separation of powers which is embedded in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended)as adopted from the United States of America. This paper focuses on the meaning and historical antecedent of executive orders in Nigeria, legal regime or statutory provisions of executive orders in Nigeria, executive orders versus doctrine of separation of power, challenges of executive orders under the 1999 constitution (as amended), praxis of executive orders under the Nigeria fourth republic and lastly is the conclusion and recommendations made thereto. To achieve these, the writers will make use of relevant materials at their disposal.

scholarly journals Medidas Provisórias, Constituições Estaduais e Federação

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Álvaro Bettanin Carrasco
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Symmetry Principle ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Current Role ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
De Se

Sumário: Introdução. 1. O Estado Federal – Ordem Jurídica Total e Ordens Jurídicas Parciais. 2. A Posição do Supremo Tribunal Federal. 3. Análise dos Precedentes. Considerações Finais. Referências. Resumo: O presente trabalho trata de investigar a possibilidade de se prever, nas constituições dos estados da República Federativa do Brasil, autorização para que os respectivos governantes editem medidas provisórias. Aborda, ainda que de modo sucinto, as características de uma Federação, assim como analisa alguns precedentes do Supremo Tribunal Federal acerca da questão. Considerando-se o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, e também o papel atual do Poder Executivo, não se encontra proibição à previsão, nas constituições dos estados federados, de medidas provisórias, conforme já decidiu, inclusive, a mais alta Corte do País. Entretanto, a necessidade de se observar o princípio da simetria parece enfraquecer a ideia de Federação, à semelhança do que já se verificou na ordem constitucional anterior. Palavras-chave: Medidas Provisórias; Constituições dos Estados Federados; Poder Executivo; Federação; Princípio da Simetria. Abstract: The present paper investigates the possibility of setting in the states constitutions of the Federative Republic of Brazil the authorization for respective governors to enact provisional executive orders. It approaches, even though briefly, the features of a Federation, as well as it analyses some precedents of the Brazilian Supreme Court on this matter. Considering Brazilian legal system and also the current role of Executive Branch, it is not found prohibition of setting, in the States Constitutions, Provisional Executive Order, in accordance with what has already decided the national highest Court. However, the need to comply with the federal symmetry principle seems to weaken the idea of Federation, similar to what has been verified in the previous constitutional order. Keywords: Provisional Executive Orders; States Constitutions; Executive Branch; Federation; Federal Symmetry Principle.

scholarly journals A regulação executiva da moeda: a variedade institucional da regulação monetária brasileira na Nova República

2020 ◽  
Vol 279 (2) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Mario Gomes Schapiro
Keyword(s):  
Financial System ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Regulatory State ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
New Republic ◽  
Central Claim

<p>The presidential dominance in monetary regulation: the institutional variety of brazilian monetary regulation throughout the New Republic</p><p> </p><p>RESUMO</p><p>O objetivo do trabalho é, a partir da literatura sobre “estado regulador”, caracterizar a variedade regulatória brasileira que se constituiu no sistema financeiro, entre 1988 e 2018. O principal argumento deste artigo é que, no sistema financeiro brasileiro, o Poder Executivo (e não o Congresso) foi o principal da delegação regulatória. Além disso, o Executivo, por meio do Conselho Monetário Nacional, empregou predominantemente mecanismos administrativos ex post para governar a máquina regulatória. Em outras palavras, no lugar de uma delegação ex ante por meio da legislação, o Executivo contou com ferramentas discricionárias para moldar as atividades regulatórias. Esse arranjo ocorreu dentro da cadeia de comando e controle do Poder Executivo, com pouca participação do Congresso. O artigo descreve essa variedade regulatória como regulação executiva da moeda.</p><p> </p><p>ABSTRACT</p><p>Drawing on the literature on “regulatory state”, this paper aims at characterizing the variety of regulatory state that shaped the Brazilian financial system, between 1988 and 2018. The central claim of this paper is that, at the Brazilian financial system, the Executive branch (and not the Congress) was the principal. Moreover, the Executive, through the National Monetary Council, employed ex-post administrative mechanisms predominantly to govern the regulatory machine. In other words, instead of ex-ante delegation via legislation, the Executive relied on discretionary tools to shape regulatory activities. This arrangement took place within the command and control’s chain of the Executive Power, having little participation of the Congress. The article describes this regulatory variety as the presidential dominance in monetary regulation.</p>

Presidential Privilege and the Freedom of Information Act

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Freedom Of Information Act ◽  
Contemporary Politics ◽  
Government Secrecy

Executive privilege (EP) as a political tool has created a grey area of constitutional power between the legislative and executive branches. By focusing on the post-WWII political usage of executive privilege, this research utilizes a social learning perspective to examine the power dynamics between Congress and the president when it comes to government secrecy and public information. Social learning provides the framework to understand how the Cold War's creation of the modern American security state led to a paradigm shift in the executive branch. This shift altered the politics of the presidency and impacted relations with Congress through extensive use of EP and denial of congressional requests for information. When viewed through a social learning lens, the institutional politics surrounding the development of the Freedom of Information Act is intricately entwined with EP as a political power struggle of action-reaction between the executive and legislative branches. Using extensive archival research, this historical analysis examines the politics surrounding the modern use of executive privilege from Truman through Nixon as an action-reaction of checks on power from the president and Congress, where each learns and responds based on the others previous actions. The use of executive privilege led to the Freedom of Information Act showing how policy can serve as a congressional check on executive power, and how the politics surrounding this issue influence contemporary politics.

Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States: Changes between October 1, 1939, and April 11, 1940

1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 512-518
Author(s):  
L. F. Schmeckebier
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
National Government ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Reorganization Plan

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order or Reorganization Plans under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.A. Reorganization Plan No. III, under authority of the act of April 3, 1939 (53 Stat. L. 561), was transmitted to Congress on April 2, 1940; it will become effective 60 calendar days thereafter; a resolution disapproving the plan was adopted by the House of Representatives, but was rejected by the Senate. The changes made by this plan are as follows:Administrator of Civil Aëronautics. The designation of the Administrator of the Civil Aëronautics Authority is changed to Administrator of Civil Aëronautics.

scholarly journals Political control and policy-making uncertainty in executive orders: the implementation of environmental justice policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Provost ◽  
Brian J. Gerber
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Justice ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Political Control ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
Fire Alarm ◽  
Bureaucratic Responsiveness ◽  
The Impact

AbstractEnvironmental justice (EJ) has represented an important equity challenge in policymaking for decades. President Clinton’s executive order (EO) 12898 in 1994 represented a significant federal action, requiring agencies to account for EJ issues in new rulemakings. We examine the impact of EO 12898 within the larger question of how EO are implemented in complex policymaking. We argue that presidential preferences will affect bureaucratic responsiveness and fire alarm oversight. However, EJ policy complexity produces uncertainty leading to bureaucratic risk aversion, constraining presidential efforts to steer policy. We utilise an original data set of nearly 2,000 final federal agency rules citing EO 12898 and find significant variation in its utilisation across administrations. Uncertainty over the nature of the order has an important influence on bureaucratic responsiveness. Our findings are instructive for the twin influences of political control and policy-making uncertainty and raise useful questions for future EJ and policy implementation research.

Organization of the Executive Branch of the National Government of the United States: Changes between August 1, 1936, and May 31, 1937

1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-702
Author(s):  
L. F. Schmeckebier
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Advisory Committee ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
National Government ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Executive Order

As in previous lists, mention is here made only of units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order under general authority vested in him.Advisory Committee of the Coast Guard Academy. Created by Public No. 38, 75th Congress, approved April 16, 1937, to examine the course of instruction and to advise the Secretary of the Treasury in regard thereto. Committee will consist of five “persons of distinction in the field of education,” who shall be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and who shall serve without pay, but who shall be reimbursed for actual expenses of travel.

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