Nominalistic Preconditions of Secularism and Its Actual Significance for Russia and the West

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 37-45
Author(s):  
Vasiliy A.  Shchipkov

The problem of aggressive secularism in the form of fight against religion was acute throughout the 20th century, and not only in the Soviet Union, but also in capitalist countries, which drew the attention of A. Solzhenitsyn in the 1980s. This problem remains relevant also today, despite the fact that the USSR collapsed and the atheism ceased to be an open threat to religious consciousness. It is noted in the article that the theory of secularization is being revised by religious scholars and sociologists, while new models for the study of the secularity are proposed. The author of the article develops and comments on one of such models connecting the emergence of secularism with the late medieval scholasticism and the philosophy of nominalism.

2019 ◽  
pp. 139-150
Author(s):  
Kristina Vorontsova

Poland as a Great Borderland in a Post-Soviet World: Poetical Point of ViewThis paper seeks to examine the characteristics of the literary space of Poland, which occupied a middle position between the West and the USSR, with particular attention to the mechanisms of representation of Poland as a great borderland in light of the catastrophes of the 20th century. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, narratives have changed but the main concept of “Poland as a Great Borderland” still remains. While absorbing traditional elements, poetry in the post Soviet world uses new tools like “camp” to depict the liminality and carnival nature of the country. Alexander Anashevich’s poems are analysed as a vivid example of contemporary perceptions of this centuries-long intercultural practice. Польша как «большая граница» в постсоветском мире: поэтический взглядВ данной статье анализируются устойчивые характеристики художественного пространства Польши, которая занимала позицию медиатора между Западом и СССР. Особое внимание уделяется механизмам репрезентации Польши как пограничной территории в свете катастроф ХХ века. С распадом Советского Союза изменились нарративы, однако главный концепт «Польша как Большая граница» всё ещё остаётся неизменным. Ориентируясь на традиционные элементы, поэзия в постсоветском мире использует новые инструменты, такие как Камп, чтобы адекватно отражать лиминальную и карнавальную природу страны. Стихи Александра Анашевича в данном контексте анализируются как яркий пример современного понимания многовековых межкультурных практик. Polska jako „Wielkie Pogranicze” w przestrzeni postradzieckiej. Poetycki punkt widzenia.Artykuł ma na celu zbadanie cech przestrzeni kulturowej Polski, która swego czasu odbierana była jako ta, zajmująca pozycję mediatora pomiędzy Zachodem a ZSRR. W artykule przede wszystkim kładzie się nacisk na zbadanie mechanizmów reprezentacji Polski jako „Wielkiego Pogranicza” w świetle katastrof XX wieku. Od czasu rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego narracje uległy zmianie, ale koncepcja „Polski jako Wielkiego Pogranicza” nadal pozostaje aktualna. Choć poezja w przestrzeni postradzieckiej wciąż zwrócona jest przede wszystkim w stronę tradycyjnych dla niej form, to coraz częściej sięga ona po nowe estetyczne rozwiązania, takie jak np. Kamp, aby wskazać na liminalny i karnawałowy charakter polskiej przestrzeni kulturowej. Wiersze Aleksandra Anaszkiewicza są w artykule analizowane jako żywy przykład współczesnej percepcji tych wielowiekowych interkulturowych praktyk.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-53
Author(s):  
В. A. Shmelev

The article examines the historical prerequisites for the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, analyzes its main provisions, and its impact on the foreign and domestic policy of the independent Ukrainian state. The Ukrainian national idea was formed in the late 19th first half of the 20th century. It was based on three fundamental provisions: the Russian state is the enemy of Ukrainian independence and therefore in the interests of Ukraine its weakening, and even better disintegration; the Russian population in Ukraine is a very serious obstacle to the formation of an independent Ukrainian state, and therefore it should be assimilated; the independence of the Ukrainian state can be guaranteed only by close cooperation with European countries, which will help it in defending its independence in the confrontation with “Asian” Russia, as Ukraine is a European country, part of Europe. On the basis of these ideological provisions it was supposed to form a Ukrainian identity. As the article emphasizes, the national Ukrainian idea in this form contains a very large charge of conflict with Russia, inevitably leads to a clash of their geopolitical interests. The proclamation of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 meant the emergence of a second Russian state, whose population had to be transformed into a Ukrainian nation. The ruling political elite of the country with the support of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as the ideological basis for the construction of the Ukrainian nation state and the Ukrainian nation adopted the basic tenets of the Ukrainian national idea, which was formed in the first half of the 20th century and put them at the basis of its foreign and domestic policy. All Ukrainian Presidents, though with varying degrees of determination and consistency, implemented them. Kiev’s policy of strengthening the country’s independence implied independence from Russia, which is seen as the main threat to the national security of the young Ukrainian state. The article states that the presidential elections of 2019 and the defeat of P. Poroshenko showed that the majority of Ukrainian society does not accept such an identity. They need an identity on other principles, which in Ukraine have not yet developed and are not visible. So far, there are no political forces, political party, that could formulate them and put them in the basis of statehood and nation-building. The current President V. Zelensky in his policy is guided by old ideas and visions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the New Independent States, Russia did not immediately realize the scale of the challenges and threats to the country’s security from Ukraine. Sobering occurred under the influence of the “Orange Revolution”, when Kiev abandoned the policy of multivectors and began to pursue a pronounced pro-Western policy. At the same time, Moscow begins to realize that it will not be able to enter the community of democratic states on its own terms, and begins to position itself as an independent center of power, opposing the West. Strengthening its positions in this confrontation, it connects with the consolidation of the post-Soviet states around itself within the framework of integration projects, first EvrAzES, and then the EAEU. Moscow linked their successful implementation with Ukraine’s participation in their implementation, because it believed that without it these projects would not be effective. However, Kiev did not want to support these plans, focusing “on entering Europe”. According to the author, from that moment the foreign policy strategies of both countries began to differ in principle and the two countries from strategic partners turned into geopolitical rivals. The West supported Kiev in its pro-Western foreign policy, considering it as an element of deterrence of Russia’s great-power ambitions. Both Moscow and the West tried to drag Kiev to their side. The coup d’etat carried out by nationalist forces in Kiev in February 2014 seemed to mean the West’s victory in this peculiar tug-of-war. In response, Moscow annexed Crimea and supported the struggle of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR against the Kiev government. As a result, Ukraine has embarked on a tough confrontation with Russia, seeing it as an aggressor and an enemy. The author of the article comes to the conclusion, that overcoming the confrontation between them will take a lot of time and effort and for the foreseeable historical perspective the relations between them will be based on the principles of the zero-sum game. In these circumstances, there is no need to talk about partnership and cooperation, as it is a question of relations between two hostile States. The most that can be expected is to maintain a “cold peace” between them. But such a state can be achieved only if relations between Russia and the West are normalized, and a new Cold War is eliminated.


Author(s):  
Yuriy Makar

On December 22, 2017 the Ukrainian Diplomatic Service marked the 100thanniversary of its establishment and development. In dedication to such a momentous event, the Department of International Relations of Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University has published a book of IR Dept’s ardent activity since its establishment. It includes information both in Ukrainian and English on the backbone of the collective and their versatile activities, achievements and prospects for the future. The author delves into retracing the course of the history of Ukrainian Diplomacy formation and development. The author highlights the roots of its formation, reconsidering a long way of its development that coincided with the formation of basic elements of Ukrainian statehood that came into existence as a result of the war of national liberation – the Ukrainian Central Rada (the Central Council of Ukraine). Later, the Ukrainian or so-called State the Hetmanate was under study. The Directorat (Directory) of Ukraine, being a provisional collegiate revolutionary state committee of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, was given a thorough study. Of particular interest for the research are diplomatic activities of the West Ukrainian People`s Republic. Noteworthy, the author emphasizes on the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic’s foreign policy, forced by the Bolshevist Russia. A further important implication is both the challenges of the Ukrainian statehood establishing and Ukraine’s functioning as a state, first and foremost, stemmed from the immaturity and conscience-unawareness of the Ukrainian society, that, ultimately, has led to the fact, that throughout the twentieth century Ukraine as a statehood, being incorporated into the Soviet Union, could hardly be recognized as a sovereign state. Our research suggests that since the beginning of the Ukrainian Diplomacy establishment and its further evolution, it used to be unprecedentedly fabricated and forged. On a wider level, the research is devoted to centennial fight of Ukraine against Russian violence and aggression since the WWI, when in 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, started real Russian war against Ukraine. Apropos, in the about-a-year-negotiation run, Ukraine, eventually, failed to become sovereign. Remarkably, Ukraine finally gained its independence just in late twentieth century. Nowadays, Russia still regards Ukraine as a part of its own strategic orbit,waging out a carrot-and-stick battle. Keywords: The Ukrainian People’s Republic, the State of Ukraine, the Hetmanate, the Direcorat (Directory) of Ukraine, the West Ukrainian People`s Republic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, Ukraine, the Bolshevist Russia, the Russian Federation, Ukrainian diplomacy


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-156
Author(s):  
Irina Sirotkina

The period from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s in the Soviet Union was known as the “Thaw,” a political era that fostered hopes of restoring the rule of law and democracy to the country. In that period cybernetics came to symbolize both scientific progress and social change. The Soviet intelligentsia had survived the hardship of Stalinist repression and now regarded the new discipline, which brought together the natural sciences and the human sciences, as a pathway to building a freer and more equal society. After decades of domination by Pavlovian doctrine, a paradigm shift was under way in physiology and psychology. Cybernetics reinforced the new paradigm, which put forward ideas of purposive behavior and self-organization in living and non-living systems. The conditioned reflex and a simplistic one-to-one view of connections in the nervous system gave way to more sophisticated and complex models, which could be formalized mathematically. Previous models of control in living organisms were mostly hierarchical and included top-down control of peripheral movement by the motor centers. The new models supplemented this picture with feedback commands from the periphery to the center. By the time cybernetics had made its appearance in the Soviet Union, new models of control had already been formulated in physiology by Nikolay Bernstein (1896– 1966). He termed the feedback from afferent signals “sensorial corrections,” meaning that they play an important part in adapting central control to the changing situation at the periphery of movement. The new paradigm emphasized horizontal connections over vertical ones, and new models took hold based on less “totalitarian” and more “democratic” principles, such as the idea of automatic or autonomous functioning of intermediate centers, the mathematical concept of well-organized functions, the theory of “the collective behavior of automata,” etc. This line of research was carried out in the USSR as well as abroad by Bernstein’s students and followers who formed the Moscow School of Motor Control. The author argues that this preference for less hierarchical models was one expression of the Thaw’s trend toward liberalization of life within the USSR and greater involvement in international politics.


1989 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-111
Author(s):  
Amos A. Jordan ◽  
Richard L. Grant

Experiment ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-316
Author(s):  
Lorin Johnson ◽  
Donald Bradburn

In the 1970s and 1980s, Los Angeles audiences saw Soviet defectors Mikhail Baryshnikov, Alexander Godunov, Natalia Makarova, and Rudolf Nureyev in the prime of their careers at the Hollywood Bowl, The Dorothy Chandler Pavilion and the Greek Theater. Dance photographer Donald Dale Bradburn, a local Southern California dancer describes his behind-the-scenes access to these dancers in this interview. Perfectly positioned as Dance Magazine’s Southern California correspondent, Bradburn offers a candid appraisal of the Southern California appeal for such high-power Russian artists as well as their impact on the arts of Los Angeles. An intimate view of Russian dancers practicing their craft on Los Angeles stages, Bradburn’s interview is illustrated by fourteen of his photographs, published for the first time in this issue of Experiment.


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