ESTOPPEL IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: ASPECTS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
Substantive due process is commonly recognized as fundamental guarantee of a person’s access to justice. One of the main conditions guaranteeing observance of the due process is litigants’ comprehensive sets of procedural rights. Ways in which they can assert their rights should be exhaustively defined as well. The extent of thoroughness of regulation may be different but it may not be absent. In that respect estoppel as a legal principle, which lacks formal requirements in the law, is problematic. The sustainability of judgements which are reasoned by way of employing a broad undefined concept of estoppel is questioned. One of the biggest doubts discussed is the viability of an idea where promissory estoppel is used as a source of a general estoppel concept. It is argued that promissory estoppel being a specific English obligation law instrument cannot be used as a source of limiting procedural rights of litigants. As for estoppel by representation, it can be safely adopted because of its nature as a source of identifying principal issues of fact. It has nothing to do with establishing or banning any personal or procedural rights. But in order to safely implement this type of estoppel it has to be thoroughly considered as to how exactly this instrument of procedure will be married with the current court’s legal duties. It has to decide cases upon all and truly established issues of fact in question. The problem is not a trivial one as even in leading English legal texts it is recognized the contradiction between court’s inquisitorial duties and using of these types of estoppel.