Работа посвящена разработке эффективного механизма взаимодействия заповедников с туроператорами, который позволяет находить финансирование для приоритетных проектов, а также привлекать на рынок новых участников и создавать новые туристические продукты для потенциальных клиентов. Существующая схема распределения, препятствующая входу на рынок новичков, не позволяет раскрыть потенциал экологического и познавательного туризма. Предложенный механизм, главной составляющей которого является аукцион мест доступа, решает проблему неэффективности. В то же время, нерациональное поведение экономических агентов может нивелировать общественный выигрыш от аукциона. Пилотная серия экспериментов, проведенных как на студентах-экономистах, так и с участием представителей заповедника и туристических компаний, позволила оценить глубину возникающей неэффективности и скорость обучения участников. The paper dwells upon developing an effective mechanism of interaction between the reserved areas and tour operators which allows to raise funds for priority projects, to involve new participants into the market and to create new tourism products for potential clients. The existing scheme of access points arrangement, hampering the new entrants, doesn’t allow to realize the potential of ecological and educational tourism. The proposed mechanism, the principal element of which is the auction for the access points reservation, eliminates entry barriers, helps to redistribute quotas effectively, to raise money for the most important projects and investigations, and in general to solve the problem of inefficiency. In particular, the reserved areas always have portfolios of tourism, environmental and scientific projects. At the same time the lack of the budget funding doesn’t allow them to realize all of those projects. Besides, there is no reasonable experience of involving business into such issues solution. The proposed mechanism allows the reserved areas to get funds from tour operators even for noncommercial projects. The firms supporting any of the projects financially (one or several, wholly or partly) become the partners of the reserved area. This is of interest for the partners not only for the purposes of advertising themselves or for improving their reputation. Tour operators get the whole amount of the transferred money (and in some cases even some additional bonus) to their virtual accounts. They can spend these funds to buy permits for serving tourists on the top-requested routes. The reserved areas offer some access points to be arranged (in the future all of them) by the auction. If a tour operator would like to enter the market or increase the number of available permits, it makes bids in the format (p, q), i.e. the price and the corresponding number of tourists whom it is ready to serve at this price. The number of bids is unlimited. After the time expiration the access points are arranged by the multi-auction at the (n+1)-price (multi-version of the Vickrey auction). Access points are granted to the companies that have made the maximum bids. It is possible to establish (by the decreasing coefficients) priorities in favor of certain companies, for example, long-term partners of the reserved areas, local tour operators, etc. This, in particular, can reduce skepticism regarding the transition to a new model of interaction between tour operators and the reserved areas. At the same time any other companies also have the opportunity to enter the market and receive the desired permits. As for the important features of the auction format, determining its choice as the proposed mechanism, we can mention, that the auction shows the market price. This format allows to determine the real wish of the firm to pay for the tourism activities in the reserved areas. Indeed, it is at the Vickrey auction where each bidder could demonstrate its real demand. In addition, what is especially important for this format is a large number of permits and tour operators participating in the auction and that helps to solve the traditional issues of participants’ collusion and possible auctioneer opportunism. At the same time the agents irrational behavior can eliminate social effects of the auction. The pilot series of experiments performed involving students-economists as well as the representatives of the reserved areas and tourist companies allowed estimating the arising inefficiency and the learning rate. After updating the proposed mechanism is planned to be applied on the electronic platform of the recreational and tourist services developed at the FEFU together with the staff of the Kronotsky Biosphere Reserve. Upon successful testing, it can be adapted and applied in other protected areas.
Cyberinfrastructure for Joint Research in Qinghai Lake Nature Reserve
