Lessons from EU Peace Operations

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keohane
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Political Support ◽  
The Political ◽  
Peace Operations ◽  
European Security ◽  
International Crises ◽  
The Us ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Eu

In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) –since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations.

scholarly journals INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MECHANISM OF THE EU IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
European Defence Agency ◽  
Legal Mechanism ◽  
Institutional Mechanism ◽  
The Eu

The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.

scholarly journals The EU Battlegroups (EUBGs) – a successful story or a paper tiger?

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (68) ◽  
pp. 106-127
Author(s):  
Beatrica Šmaguc
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Added Value ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The World ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Eu

Abstract After decades of reliance upon NATO in security matters, the EU ought to develop security assets of its own in order to protect its interests and citizens. The Common Foreign and Security Policy as an expression of EU readiness and willingness to play a more significant role in security matters on the international stage led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, thus putting at the EU’s disposal civilian and military capabilities for dealing with the crisis spots around the world. The EUBG concept originated with the first member states’ pledges in November 2004 which gave added value to the EU in the security and defence area, at least on paper, while so far no EUBG has been deployed in the theatre of operations.

scholarly journals THE EU/CFSP AND NATO: POSSIBILITY OF A CO-EXISTENCE AS BROTHERS-IN-ARMS?

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-136
Author(s):  
Mete Kaan Kaynar ◽  
Gökhan AK
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Defense Policy ◽  
Parallel Structure ◽  
European Security ◽  
Defence System ◽  
German Army ◽  
The Us ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Eu

At the outset, Europe needed to develop its defense policy and structure in line with its foreign policy while the Union was evolving in institutional enlargement process during every other 10 years of time. The reason was not behind it, but in the façade of the Union building. Otherwise the Union would not be able to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs while the ‘security’ was gaining a key-role in the international politics and relations. Since there was a security vacuum in Europe after WW’, the US urged European states to create a sort of defence structure embedded to already-formed NATO or integrated with NATO, but including German Army in both cases. Decades had passed and in the late 1990s the European Security Defence Identity and Policy was formed up as a parallel structure to NATO systems. Eventually in the start of 2000s, the EU system turned into a Common Security and Defence Policy for member states only. This research tries to explore and analyze the effects, paradigms, prospects and coexistence possibilities of this two polar-defence-system in the Europe, that’s to say between NATO and the CFSP.

The EU and Its Member States, Other States, and International Organizations – The Common European Security and Defence Policy after Nice

2001 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-372
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Institutional Infrastructure ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
External Face ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Made In

AbstractThe author discusses the changes made in the Treaty of Nice concerning the EU's external face as well as the influential French Presidency report on the European Security and Defence Policy, with a view to analyzing the relations between the EU and its member states as well as those between the EU and various other organizations active in the same field. She concludes that the institutional infrastructure is reasonably well developed.

Bieżące trendy wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej

2014 ◽  
pp. 68-91
Author(s):  
Marek Brylonek
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
External Action ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Security ◽  
Management Procedures ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
High Level ◽  
Common Security

In 1999, soon after the European Union member states had decided to establish the European Security and Defence Policy, the processes of appointing adequate tools for its accomplishment also started. Decisions were made to create organs and institutions and to elaborate appropriate procedures which would enable fast and precise decision-making of planning and conduct in the field of security and defence. Since that time the European Union and its Security and Defence Policy have evolved in many aspects and are still evolving. Security researchers currently attempt to provide the answer to an important problem: what are the trends characterising changes in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. The author, basing on research and own experiences of work in the politico-strategic planning structures of the European External Action Service, analyses current trends in the Common Security and Defence Policy, especially regarding the evolution of the Union’s organs and institutions, crisis management procedures, implementation of comprehensive approach and tendencies in the newly-deployed missions. This material is a result of extensive discussions and consultations conducted within a broad international and interinstitutional crisis management environment. It is based on interviews with high-level subject-related personnel and the listed bibliography

scholarly journals EU Defence Cooperation after Brexit: What Role for the UK in the Future EU Defence Arrangements?

European View ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jolyon Howorth
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
European Security ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
Defence Cooperation ◽  
Cooperative Relationship ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Sticking Point ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Common Security

The UK has traditionally played an ambivalent role in European security and defence policymaking. With Brexit, the EU loses one of its two serious military players. On the other hand, it has been liberated from the constraints imposed by London on the Common Security and Defence Policy, and this has created a new dynamism behind the defence project. There has been comparatively little commentary on the defence implications of Brexit, and the UK has been less than forthcoming in making concrete proposals for an ongoing UK-EU partnership. Both sides assert that they wish to maintain a strong cooperative relationship after Brexit, but the outlines of such an arrangement remain very unclear. This article suggests that the UK will have more to lose than the EU from any failure to reach agreement, and that UK ambivalence about links between the Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO will prove to be a major sticking point.

scholarly journals CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT - THEIR ESSENCE, ROLE AND DETERMINANTS

2020 ◽  
pp. 4-37
Author(s):  
Kamil ZAJĄCZKOWSKI
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Management Model ◽  
The Political ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Political Dimension ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Common ◽  
International Identity

The aim of this article is to highlight the essence, the meaning and the role of EU civilian missions and military operations conducted under the umbrella of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The first two parts constitute an introduction which presents the institutional framework, scope and mandate of EU missions/operations as well as their nature. The subsequent parts constitute an attempt to answer the question of what distinguishes EU missions/operations and what their specificity is. In this context, the CSDP crisis management model is presented along with the significance of operations in building the EU's international identity and in strengthening the political dimension of European integration, especially in relation to security and defence policy. The main weaknesses and shortcomings of CSDP missions/operations have also been characterized. Thusly, eleven such weaknesses have been identified which, to a large extent, determine the shape, scope and nature of CSDP missions and operations carried out by the European Union

scholarly journals THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS

2016 ◽  
pp. 190-198
Author(s):  
M. S. Fedorov
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Security ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Common ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Common Security

The article deals with the system of EU's functional units responsible for conducting crisis management within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It analyses their structure and particular features. The author puts forward three main factors, which affected the shape of this system. First, it is the exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the veto-power of EU member states in this field. Second, the EU-US and the EU-NATO relations have also influenced the shape of the CSDP organizational structures. On the one hand, the Alliance has served as an example of a successful security organization for the European integration strategists. On the other, Washington has always sought to embed the European security and defense integration into NATO and to control it. Third, the CSDP institutional system embodies a specific approach towards crisis management, elaborated by the EU - a combination of both military and civil instruments of peacemaking (the so-called "civil-military synergy"). Thus, there are two chains of units within the CSDP, designed for planning and conducting military operations and civil missions respectively. Having analyzed political and operational units of the CSDP the author concludes that, overall, the created institutional system is well-suited to the ambitions of the EU in the field of crisis management. However, the EU member states cannot use the potential of this system to the full because of the political differences that divide them.

scholarly journals Budget of the EU and Common Agricultural Policy for 2014-2020 in the light of the polish interests

Management ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 473-487
Author(s):  
Andrzej Czyżewski ◽  
Sebastian Stępień
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Common Agricultural Policy ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
European Council ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Common ◽  
Polish Economy ◽  
The Eu

Summary The objective of the paper is to present the results of negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-2020, with particular emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy. Authors indicate the steps for establishing the budget, from the proposal of the European Commission presented in 2011, ending with the draft of UE budget agreed at the meeting of the European Council on February 2013 and the meeting of the AGRIFISH on March 2013 and then approved by the political agreement of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Council on June 2013. In this context, there will be an assessment of the new budget from the point of view of Polish economy and agriculture.

scholarly journals THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE CASE OF THE EULEX MISSION IN KOSOVO

2021 ◽  
pp. 199-218
Author(s):  
Bilbil Kastrati ◽  
Samo Uhan
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Management Mechanism ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Expectations Gap ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Common Security

Abstract. The article considers whether the EU’s CSDP missions are a suitable crisis management mechanism for post-conflict situations, along with the EU’s relevance in crisis management at all. For this purpose, the EU’s biggest CSDP civilian mission EULEX was chosen as a research case study. The research results reveal that EULEX has not implemented its mandate, not met the expectations of security consumers, not made any difference on the ground, and cannot be seen as an example the EU should rely on in its future missions. Further, EULEX shows that CSDP missions suffer from many shortfalls and the EU CFSP from a capability–expectations gap. The article concludes that the EULEX mission does not show the EU’s relevance in the crisis management of post-conflict situations.

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