Is the fact that other people believe in God a reason to believe? Remarks on the consensus gentium argument.

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Dobrzeniecki
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Second Line ◽  
Epistemic Trust ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Prima Facie Reason ◽  
Theistic Belief

According to The Consensus Gentium Argument from the premise: “Everyone believes that God exists” one can conclude that God does exist. In my paper I analyze two ways of defending the claim that somebody’s belief in God is a prima facie reason to believe. Kelly takes the fact of the commonness of the belief in God as a datum to explain and argues that the best explanation has to indicate the truthfulness of the theistic belief. Trinkaus Zagzebski grounds her defence on rationality of epistemic trust in others. In the paper I argue that the second line of reasoning is more promising and I propose its improved version.

The Return of the God Hypothesis

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Stephen C. Meyer ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Theistic Belief

Historian of science Frederic Bumham has stated that the "God hypothesis" is now more respectable hypothesis than at any time in the last one hundred years. This essay explores recent evidence from cosmology, physics, and biology, which provides epistemoiogical support, though not proof, for belief in God as conceived by a theistic worldview. It develops a notion of epistemoiogical support based upon explanatory power, rather than just deductive entailment. It also evaluates the explanatory power of theism and its main metaphysical competitors with respect to several classes of scientific evidence. The cmclusion follows that theism explains a wide ensemble of metaphysically-significant evidences more adequately and comprehensively than other major worldviews or metaphysical systems. Thus, unlike much recent scholarship that characterizes science as either conflicting with theistic belief or entirely neutral with respect to it, this essay concludes that scientific evidence actually supports such.

Advanced Topics: Induction

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Pollock
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Closure Properties ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Logical Operations ◽  
Prima Facie Reason

It is well known, since Goodman [1955], that principles of induction require a projectibility constraint. On the present account, such a constraint is inherited from the projectibility constraint on (A1)–(A3). It remains to be shown, however, that this derived constraint is the intuitively correct constraint. Let us define: (1.1) A concept B (or the corresponding property) is inductively projectible with respect to a concept A (or the corresponding property) iff ┌X is a set of A’s, and all the members of X are also B’s┐ is a prima facie reason for ┌A ⇒ B┐, and this prima facie reason would not be defeated by learning that there are non-B’s. A nomic generalization is projectible iff its consequent is inductively projectible with respect to its antecedent. What is needed is an argument to show that inductive projectibility is the same thing as projectibility. To make this plausible, I will argue that inductive projectibility has the same closure properties as those defended for projectibility in Chapter 3. Goodman introduced inductive projectibility with examples of nonprojectible concepts like grue and bleen, and the impression has remained that only a few peculiar concepts fail to be inductively projectible. That, however, is a mistake. It is not difficult to show that most concepts fail to be inductively projectible, inductive projectibility being the exception rather than the rule. This results from the fact that, just like projectibility, the set of inductively projectible concepts is not closed under most logical operations. In particular, I will argue below that although inductive projectibility is closed under conjunction, it is not closed under either disjunction or negation. That is, negations or disjunctions of inductively projectible concepts are not automatically inductively projectible. Just as for projectibility, we can argue fairly conclusively that inductive projectibility is closed under conjunction. More precisely, the following two principles hold: (1.2) If A and B are inductively projectible with respect to C, then (A&B) is inductively projectible with respect to C. (1.3) If A is inductively projectible with respect to both B and C, then A is inductively projectible with respect to (B&C).

Recapitulation

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Pollock
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Reasoning ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Conceptual Role ◽  
Present Book ◽  
Prima Facie Reason ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
Epistemological Framework

The purpose of this book is to clarify probability concepts and analyze the structure of probabilistic reasoning. The intent is to give an account that is precise enough to actually be useful in philosophy, decision theory, and statistics. An ultimate objective will be to implement the theory of probabilistic reasoning in a computer program that models human probabilistic reasoning. The result will be an AI system that is capable of doing sophisticated scientific reasoning. However, that takes us beyond the scope of the present book. The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief restatement of the main points of the theory of nomic probability and provide an assessment of its accomplishments. The theory of nomic probability has a parsimonious basis. This consists of two sets of principles. First, there are the epistemic principles (A3) and (D3):(A3) If F is projectible with respect to G and r > .5, then ┌prob(F/G) > r┐ is a prima facie reason for the conditional ┌Gc ⊃ Fc┐, the strength of the reason depending upon the value of r. (D3) If F is projectible with respect to H then ┌Hc & prob(F/G&H) < prob(F/G) ┐ is an undercutting defeater for rprob(F/G) > r┐ as a prima facie reason for ┌Gc ⊃ Fc┐. Second, there are some computational principles that generate a calculus of nomic probabilities. These principles jointly constitute the conceptual role of the concept of nomic probability and are the basic principles from which the entire theory of nomic probability follows. The epistemic principles presuppose a prior epistemological framework governing the interaction of prima facie reasons and defeaters. Certain aspects of that framework play an important role in the theory of nomic probability. For example, the principle of collective defeat is used recurrently throughout the book. The details of the epistemological framework are complicated, but they are not specific to the theory of probability. They are part of general epistemology. The computational principles are formulated in terms of what some will regard as an extravagant ontology of sets of possible objects and possible worlds. It is important to realize that this ontology need not be taken seriously.

Basic Theistic Belief

1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-464
Author(s):  
Bredo C. Johnsen
Keyword(s):  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Positive Argument ◽  
Theistic Belief

In several recent writings and in the 1980 Freemantle Lectures at Oxford, Alvin Plantinga has defended the idea that belief in God is ‘properly basic,’ by which he means that it is perfectly rational to hold such a belief without basing it on any other beliefs. The defense falls naturally into two broad parts: a positive argument for the rationality of such beliefs, and a rebuttal of the charge that if such a positive argument ‘succeeds,’ then a parallel argument will ‘succeed’ equally well in showing that belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic. (It is taken as obvious that ‘the Great Pumpkin objection,’ unrebutted, would constitute a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the positive argument had succeeded in proving anything at all.) In this essay I shall argue both that Plantinga has partially misconceived the objection, and that he has not succeeded, indeed cannot succeed, in rebutting it, for the objection does in fact constitute a reductio ad absurdum of his position. For the sake of ease of exposition, I shall first provide a bare sketch of the positive argument, though I shall discuss it directly only as it bears on the attempted reductio.

scholarly journals Intertemporal Disagreement and Empirical Slippery Slope Arguments

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS DOUGLAS
Keyword(s):  
Standard Form ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Slippery Slope Arguments ◽  
Slippery Slope Argument ◽  
Prima Facie Reason ◽  
The Future

One prevalent type of slippery slope argument has the following form: (1) by doing some initial act now, we will bring it about that we subsequently do some more extreme version of this act, and (2) we should not bring it about that we do this further act, therefore (3) we should not do the initial act. Such arguments are frequently regarded as mistaken, often on the grounds that they rely on speculative or insufficiently strong empirical premises. In this article I point out another location at which these arguments may go wrong: I argue that, in their standard form, the truth of their empirical premises constitutes evidence for the falsity of their normative premises. If we will, as predicted, do the further act in the future, this gives us at least a prima facie reason to believe that the performance of this further act would be good, and thus something we should try to bring about. I end by briefly assessing the dialectic implications of my argument. I delineate a subset of slippery slope arguments against which my objection may be decisive, consider how the proponents of such arguments may evade my objection by adding further premises, and examine the likely plausibility of these additional premises.

Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

scholarly journals Gestation and Parental Rights: Why is Good Enough Good Enough?

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsey Porter
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Parental Rights ◽  
Birth Mother ◽  
Biological Child ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Prima Facie Reason ◽  
The Right

In this paper I explore the question of whether gestation can ground parental rights. I consider Anca Gheaus’s (2012) claim that the labour and bonding of gestation give one the right to parent one’s biological child. I argue that, while Gheaus’s gestational account of parental rights is the most successful of such accounts in the literature, it is ultimately unsuccessful, because the concept ‘maternal-fetal bonding’ does not stand up to scrutiny. Gheaus argues that the labour expended in gestation generates parental rights. This is a standard, Lockean sort of a move in parental ethics—it usually relies on the claim that I have proprietary rights over the products of my labour. However, Gheaus argues that a standard labour account of parental rights could not generate parental rights over one’s own birth child via gestation without ownership, since the labour would merely afford one a right to enjoy the goods of parenthood. At best, then, labour alone would generate a right to a child. But, Gheaus argues, not only do gestational mothers expend labour in the course of the pregnancy; they also develop emotional ties to the fetus. They ‘bond’ with it. This, Gheaus argues, coupled with labour, gives the birth mother parental rights over her birth child. Fathers, on her account, acquire rights over their birth child by contributing labour—in the form of antenatal support—during the course of the pregnancy. I argue that because ‘bonding’ is not an appropriately morally salient phenomenon, Gheaus’s account does not work unless it relies on a proprietary claim, and this is prima facie reason to reject the account. Further, the fact that it only confers parental rights on fathers by proxy also gives us reason to reject the account. I then offer a brief sketch of a more promising, positive account of parental rights.

PROPERLY BASIC THEISTIC BELIEF: A SESAME STREET OBJECTION

Think ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (47) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Ken Nickel
Keyword(s):  
Sesame Street ◽  
Basic Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Theistic Belief ◽  
Basic Beliefs

Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga wants everyone to agree that while sceptics will always be with us, no one is irrational in accepting what only the stubborn sceptic denies. Plantinga claims no one should be considered irrational for accepting what the religious sceptic denies either. Rather, the claim goes, belief in God should be as uncontroversial as any other properly basic belief sensible people happily hold without absolute proof sufficient to silence the sceptic. The legitimacy of placing theistic belief alongside other properly basic beliefs is challenged by the Sesame Street Objection: ‘one of these things is not like the others’.

Feeling Is Believing: Inspiration Encourages Belief in God

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 723-737 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton R. Critcher ◽  
Chan Jean Lee
Keyword(s):  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Belief Systems ◽  
Experimental Methods ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Affective Experiences ◽  
Transcendent Experience ◽  
Theistic Belief

Even without direct evidence of God’s existence, about half of the world’s population believes in God. Although previous research has found that people arrive at such beliefs intuitively instead of analytically, relatively little research has aimed to understand what experiences encourage or legitimate theistic belief systems. Using cross-cultural correlational and experimental methods, we investigated whether the experience of inspiration encourages a belief in God. Participants who dispositionally experience more inspiration, were randomly assigned to relive or have an inspirational experience, or reported such experiences to be more inspirational all showed stronger belief in God. These effects were specific to inspiration (instead of adjacent affective experiences) and a belief in God (instead of other empirically unverifiable claims). Being inspired by someone or something (but not inspired to do something) offers a spiritually transcendent experience that elevates belief in God, in part because it makes people feel connected to something beyond themselves.

scholarly journals Belief-in and Belief in God

1992 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
John N. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Belief In God ◽  
Theistic Belief ◽  
Special Case

Of all the examples of ‘belief-in’, belief in God is both the most mysterious and the most challenging. Indeed whether and how an apologist can make a case for the intellectual respectability of theistic belief, depends upon the nature of this ‘belief-in’. I shall attempt to elucidate this matter by an analysis of the relation of ‘belief-in’ to ‘belief-that’ and by treating belief in God as a special case of ‘belief-in’.

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