scholarly journals POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP FATIGUE IN AFRICA. A THEORETICAL APPRAISAL.

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1139-1145
Author(s):  
Christian Akani
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Human Development ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Analytical Method ◽  
The Political ◽  
Popular Participation ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Inclusive Governance ◽  
The Right

Colonialism cannot be forgotten in Africa because of the disorientation and dissonance it enforced. This scenario paved way  for unbridled expropriation  of human and material resources. But, by the beginning of the 1940s African  nationalists  rejected the colonial political economy, and  demanded for self governance.  The aftermath of their demand engendered a wind of change which swept most African states to statehood in the 1960s. Regrettably, five decades after independence, the continent is still experiencing a free fall  in all human development sectors. Those who inherited political power, rather than ensuring inclusive governance have imposed pain and terror on their people . With an analytical , method the paper argues that politics is squarely responsible for the leadership fatigue in the continent. It concludes that for Africa to have the right leaders they desire, the political institutions must guarantee popular participation.

scholarly journals The political economy of agri-environmental measures: An empirical assessment at the eu regional level

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 71-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danilo Bertoni ◽  
Alessandro Olper
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Econometric Model ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Economic Determinants ◽  
Positive Externalities ◽  
Environmental Measures ◽  
The Eu

The paper deals with the political and economic determinants of EU agri-environmental measures (AEMs) applied by 59 regional/country units, during the 2001-2004 period. Five different groups of determinants, spanning from positive and negative externalities, to political institutions, are highlighted and tested using an econometric model. Main results show that AEMs implementation is mostly affected by the strength of the farm lobby, and the demand for positive externalities. At the same time it emerges a prominent role played by political institutions. On the contrary, AEMs do not seem implemented by the willingness to address negative externalities.

13. The Political Economy of Development

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Human Development ◽  
Development Strategies ◽  
The Political ◽  
World War ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
The World ◽  
Political Economy Of Development ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter focuses on the political economy of development. It first considers the different (and competing) ways of thinking about development that have emerged since the end of World War II, laying emphasis on modernization, structuralist, and underdevelopment theories, neo-liberalism and neo-statism, and ‘human development’, gender, and environmental theories. The chapter proceeds by exploring how particular understandings of development have given rise to particular kinds of development strategies at both the national and global levels. It then examines the relationship between globalization and development, in both empirical and theoretical terms. It also describes how conditions of ‘mal-development’ — or development failures — both arise from and are reinforced by globalization processes and the ways in which the world economy is governed.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 519-541
Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Public ◽  
Generic Models ◽  
Redistribution Policy ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

C. K. Rowley, The Right to Justice – The Political Economy of Legal Services in the United States

1992 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-196
Author(s):  
Domenico da Empoli
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legal Services ◽  
The Right ◽  
Edward Elgar

Abstract C. K. Rowley, The Right to Justice - The Political Economy of Legal Services in the United States, The Locke Institute, Brookfield, Edward Elgar, 1992, pp. 413, US$ 49,00.

scholarly journals Privatisation and Public Sector Reform: The Political Economy of State Intervention

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4II) ◽  
pp. 647-659
Author(s):  
Jomo K.S.
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Development Economics ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
East European ◽  
Equity And Efficiency ◽  
Dominant Ideologies ◽  
The Right

The dominant ideas in development economics have changed considerably over the four decades of its existence. Similarly, the influence of theory on policymaking has also changed, not only with new ideas, but more importantly, with the ideological preferences of those with power and influence, especially at the international level. During the eighties, development economics-which has emphasised market failures and other welfare reasons for judicious state intervention to ensure greater equity and efficiency-was under siege from the intellectual assault of market neo-conservatives in control of the major international economic institutions such· as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and supported by the dominant ideologies of Thatcherism and Reaganomics at the global level. Political economy, rejected in the seventies as an unsophisticated nineteenth century approach appropriated by the political Left, re-emerged in the hands of the Right as the main weapon in this assault. The collapse of the Soviet Union and allied East European regimes and the marketisation of the remaining economies still claiming to be in the socialist camp only seemed to prove the worst claims of the generally politically conservative economic liberals of the late twentieth century.

scholarly journals Re-imagining Petitioning in Spain (1808–1823)

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diego Palacios Cerezales
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Political Culture ◽  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
The Political ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
Age Of Revolution ◽  
Popular Participation ◽  
Public Issues ◽  
Historical Trajectory ◽  
The Right

This article examines collective petitioning in metropolitan Spain during the Age of Revolution, focusing on the practices and discourses that framed petitioning as a meaningful form of action. There was a deeply rooted tradition of petitioning in old regime Spain, which was part of the ordinary bureaucratic workings of the crown and also provided a legitimizing framework for rioting in specific contexts. The collective experimentation in popular participation after the 1808 Napoleonic invasion transformed petitioning. Petitioning was first reconceptualized in accordance with the emerging language of rights and popular sovereignty. Activists and commentators had some awareness of the use of public petitioning in Britain, and once the representative Cortes met in Cadiz in 1810, public petition drives on public issues became part of the political culture. At the same time, the need to legitimate unconventional forms of action in the context of a crisis in the state converted petitioning into an all-embracing right. The right to petition, not only encompassed signed protest texts but also legitimated the old tradition of petitioning by riot and further was used to justify provincial rebellions, juntas, and military pronunciamientos. In comparative terms, this article highlights the elasticity of the language of petitioning during the Age of Revolution and cautions against narrowly associating it with one particular form of collective action or historical trajectory.

scholarly journals Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part II

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 543-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
TORUN DEWAN ◽  
KENNETH A SHEPSLE
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
The Political ◽  
Arbitrage Opportunities ◽  
Economics Journals ◽  
Economic Perspectives

In recent years some of the best theoretical work on the political economy of political institutions and processes has begun surfacing outside the political science mainstream in high quality economics journals. This two-part article surveys these contributions from a recent five-year period. In Part I, the focus was on elections, voting and information aggregation, followed by treatments of parties, candidates and coalitions. In Part II, papers on economic performance and redistribution, constitutional design, and incentives, institutions and the quality of political elites are discussed. Part II concludes with a discussion of the methodological bases common to economics and political science, the way economists have used political science research, and some new themes and arbitrage opportunities.

The Political Economy of Policy Volatility in Latin America

2014 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Resource Rents ◽  
Natural Resource Rents

AbstractWhy are some Latin American states plagued by persistent policy volatility while the policies of others remain relatively stable? This article explores the political economy of natural resource rents and policy volatility across Latin America. It argues that, all else equal, resource rents will create incentives for political leaders, which will result in repeated episodes of policy volatility. This effect, however, will depend on the structure of political institutions. Where political institutions fail to provide a forum for intertemporal exchange among political actors, natural resource rents will result in increased levels of policy volatility. Alternatively, where political institutions facilitate agreement among actors, resource rents will be conducive to policy stability. This argument is tested on a measure of policy volatility for 18 Latin American economies between 1993 and 2008. The statistical tests provide support for the argument.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document