Negative Aftereffect Arising from Prolonged Viewing of Induced Movement-in-Depth

1984 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. H. Reinhardt-Rutland

Prolonged induced movement-in-depth in a static circle was elicited by a spiral stimulus. Afterwards an aftereffect was observed in the circle. The aftereffect was towards the subject after induced movement away from the subject, and away from the subject after induced movement towards the subject longer aftereffect was observed with a circle central to the inducing stimulus than with a circle peripheral to the inducing stimulus. In contrast to some other psychophysical effects, no clear-cut directional asymmetry was observed.

1971 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. H. Daw

‘Suppose a man becomes ill, gets worse and dies. His death is instantaneous but the cause of his death—deterioration of health—may have been progressing for some time. Death takes place because his health has deteriorated beyond a certain limit.’ So wrote C. D. Rich (1940) in introducing his ‘General theory of mortality’ which can also be regarded as a theory of sickness, although Rich does not develop this aspect of it. The point in the gradual deterioration of health at which death takes place is unmistakable but the point at which sickness begins is hazy and ill defined, as also is the point at which recovery from sickness takes place when health is improving. As Stocks (1949) says ‘The distinction between the living and the dead is clear cut, but no such frontier line between sickness and health can be said to exist except in the case of acute illness caused immediately and directly by an external agent. There is a zone between the two states in which the decision whether the subject is sick or not depends on definitions or standards of good health and also on who decides.’


1960 ◽  
Vol 106 (444) ◽  
pp. 852-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. J. Eysenck ◽  
J. A. Easterbrook
Keyword(s):  

In the previous paper we have given a brief discussion of the reasons why figural after-effects are of interest in the study of personality and why stimulant and depressant drugs would be expected to have certain effects upon them (Eysenck and Easterbrook, 1960a). In this paper we describe an experiment using kinaesthetic figural after-effects rather than visual ones. By and large results with kinaesthetic figural after-effects have been more clear-cut and definite in relating these after-effects to personality; several studies have shown extraverts to have greater figural after-effects than introverts (Eysenck, 1957). Furthermore there is at least one study demonstrating that stimulant and depressant drugs have the predicted results upon kinaesthetic figural aftereffects (Poser, 1958). The reasons for this may be that whereas for visual experiments it is difficult to check on the subject's ability to maintain fixation, nothing comparable is required in experiments on kinaesthetic figural aftereffects. Furthermore any departure from instruction on the part of the subject can easily be checked by the experimenter. For these reasons kinaesthetic tests have very definite advantages over visual ones.


2020 ◽  
pp. 24-53
Author(s):  
I. E. Andriianov

Kant does not provide clear-cut definitions of apperception, consciousness, and self-consciousness and everywhere uses these terms as synonyms, which creates the problem of the relationship between these faculties. The importance of this problem stems from the colossal significance of each of the above-mentioned faculties which are intimately connected with Kant’s formulation of the key tasks of transcendental philosophy. The prime task is to discover the categories of understanding and to prove the legitimacy of their use, a task that is further complicated by the difference between the editions of the Critique of Pure Reason in terms of the argumentation in the section on the deduction of categories and Kant’s concept of apperception. Accordingly, the author seeks to clarify the purpose of each of the above-mentioned faculties and to establish their inter-relationship. To this end the author analyses the functional roles of consciousness, self-consciousness and apperception in solving the main tasks of the first Critique. It turns out that consciousness is a reflexive cognitive capacity which provides access to representations in our soul and allows us to distinguish them and to connect them. Self-consciousness is the mode of the functioning of consciousness which makes it possible to study three objects of consciousness: internal and external representations of the subject, the synthetic activity of understanding and our soul. Apperception is the Latin synonym of the concept of Selbstbewußtsein and is aimed at studying the unity of our representations. Because Kant distinguishes multiple kinds of unity, there are different names for apperception. Kant uses the concept of Apperzeption as a synonym of self-consciousness because his concept of consciousness follows the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 760-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingar Brinck

The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.


1937 ◽  
Vol 83 (343) ◽  
pp. 156-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desmond Curran

The title of this paper will suggest a number of problems which are still the subject of considerable controversy.Thus, some authorities appear to uphold the general proposition that there is a fundamental and clear-cut distinction between all neuroses (or psychoneuroses) on the one hand, and all psychoses on the other.


1958 ◽  
Vol 148 (932) ◽  
pp. 340-352 ◽  

In most cases of enzymic induction (‘adaptation’) the specifically increased rate of enzyme production evoked by the presence of the inducer in the external environment returns to normal immediately the inducer is removed. However, the situation is not always so clear-cut. The changes in the cell underlying the phenomenon of enzyme induction have long been known to be—from a genetical standpoint—transitory. But the mechanism of enzymic reversion (‘de-adaptation’) has not yet been the subject of much systematic study. Most cell characters presumably have an underlying enzymic basis, and in most cases enzyme induction, even if under some sort of nuclear genetic control which determines its scope, appears to be almost certainly a cytoplasmic function. It therefore seems likely that a study of the specific gain and loss of enzymic function that occurs during enzymic adaptation or de-adaptation will prove to have some bearing on the problems of growth, variation and differentiation under conditions where the genetic background may be supposed to remain constant.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-296
Author(s):  
Anna Cichosz

Abstract This study shows that Old English conjunct clauses, i.e. main declarative clauses introduced by the coordinating conjunctions and and ac, resemble non-conjunct main clauses as far as the V-2 rule is concerned. Most importantly, this study reveals that the mechanism of SV inversion observed in OE conjunct clauses works according to all the principles defined for non-conjunct main clauses. The only difference, driven by the main discourse function of conjunct clauses, is that the clause-initial element in these clauses is usually the subject. However, if the subject is preceded by some other fronted constituent (e.g. an object, a complement, an adverb or a prepositional phrase), SV inversion is typical with nominal subjects, while personal pronoun subjects are only inverted if the clause-initial constituent belongs to a limited set of adverbs, i.e. þa and þonne (‘then’). In this way, this study reveals that the difference between Old English conjunct and non-conjunct main clauses is not as clear-cut as has traditionally been suggested.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Río-Rey

The clear-cut distinction between free adjuncts and absolutes based on the presence in absolutes of an overt subject different from the subject of the matrix clause, as opposed to the covert subject – controlled by the subject of the matrix clause – of free adjuncts, does not always hold. While it is generally agreed that unrelated free adjuncts are fairly frequent in Present-day English (PE), absolutes whose subject is identical to that of the matrix clause are regarded as obsolete (Jespersen, 1909–49; Kortmann, 1991; Söderlind, 1958; Visser, 1963–73). However, no statistical evidence has been provided on this topic for earlier stages of the history of English. This article quantitatively assesses whether the various degrees of relatedness observed in Early Modern English (EModE) coincide with those attested for PE, and concludes that the boundaries between free adjuncts and absolutes were considerably fuzzier in EModE, a phenomenon to which punctuation decisively contributed.


There has recently been some discussion as to the appropriate formula connecting the refractive index μ of a medium with its atomic characters, in particular of whether it is the Sellmeyer formula S = μ 2 — 1 (1) or the Lorentz formula L = 3 (μ 2 — 1)/u 2 + 2 (2) that is related to them. It has long been accepted that for many substances, in particular for transparent liquids, the L formula is correct, but there are other substances which as certainly demand a formula in S. The distinction is by no means trivial, and it proves a surprisingly subtle matter to find the proper discrimination on theoretical grounds. It will probably come as a surprise to most who have not studied the subject in detail (as it did at first to the present writer) that a question of principle of this kind should still be unsettled, when the main work on it was done more than fifty years ago, for it is not as though it were an obscure point outside the general field or interest of physicists, and, moreover, there has never been any doubt as to the soundness of the basic principles from which one must start. The present paper really falls into two parts. From 7 onwards there is presented what appears a satisfactory method of discussing the subjects. It is free from the central difficulty, the consideration of the internal electric fields in matter, and supplies sufficient (though perhaps not necessary) conditions for discriminating between substances requiring the two types of formula, and it gives the rule for a mixture of the two kinds of substances, a result I believe to be new. But it was not possible to be content with these developments without a discussion of the older methods, for the subjects has been incorporated in the text-books, and there will be many who have regarded it as a settled question. Therefore it seemed proper to devote some space to the much more formidable task of criticizing these older methods. The chief difficulty of the subject has been that it is only too easy to find arguments, quite as convincing as many of those always accepted in theoretical physics, which lead to either of the two contradictory formulæ. It is quite easy to see weaknesses in these arguments, but it is as easy to see them in the right ones as in the wrong. Now it is probable that for many purposes we shall have to continue to use such rather inadequate arguments, and so it seemed worth while to see whether the discrepancies could be cleared up without a radical change in the method of approach. This is the subject of 3—6, and though the great difficulty in getting clear-cut arguments suggests most of all the need for a wholly different approach to the question, yet such arguments, in a general way and without any precise criteria, do show that a medium with free electrons should obey the S formula and one with isolated atoms the L. It has proved extraordinary difficult to avoid fallacies in this part of the work, and it is possible that it still contains some; if so, the fact is to be taken chiefly as confirmation of the necessity of having methods free from such troublesome subtlety.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-221
Author(s):  
Ludmila Veselovská

AbstractThis study deals with subject predicate agreement in Czech and the structure of a null subject. First, it introduces the concept of Null Subject Languages as it has been used in a generative framework. Then it shows the complex feature content of the Czech subject-predicate agreement morphology, arguing that the data repeatedly signal a division of the agreement features into two clear cut feature sets and two distinct agreement domains: (a) the lower, lexical domain inside vP containing the nominal n[±φ] feature set (Gender and N-Number), and (b) the higher, functional domain on the T head, which contains the functional D[±φ] feature set (Person and D-Number). The study relates the analysis to the present day microparametric concept of a Null Subject Parameter as in, e. g., the studies in Biberauer (2010), accepting the hypothesis of the checking of the subject-predicate agreement with two levels of predicate (separate heads v and T). It proposes that with pronominal subjects, the φ feature values can be re-set with respect to the speech act information located in the Aboutness Topic. Given the several levels of agreement, each of which can be licensed by a zero morpheme, the study proposes that pro is a complex entity consisting of two separate parts, each endowed with a distinct set of φ features.


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