The Liquidity Trap, Democracy and Central Bank Independence

2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-29
Author(s):  
Lucian Croitoru
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
Other Hand

Abstract In the wake of the financial crisis, central banks in developed countries performed unconventional operations that are fiscal in nature. On one hand, we support the view that such operations, which are not fully democratic, might lead to loss of central bank operational independence and discuss some difficulties that central banks might face when reversing quantitative easing. On the other hand, we show that, in the middle of a financial crisis, such operations are best performed by central banks. To avoid this potential conflict, the society needs to identify the best means by which the responsibility for quasi-fiscal operations implemented by the central bank is transferred to a democratic structure

Monetary Theory: Overview and Liquidity Extensions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Calvo
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Price Level ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Linear Constraints ◽  
Relative Price ◽  
Monetary Theory ◽  
Quantitative Easing ◽  
Liquidity Shock ◽  
New Crop

The chapter points out some deficiencies of the mainstream model utilized by many central banks. It also reviews the Fiscal Theory of the Price level. Extending the barebones version of the central banks' model presented here to the case in which "land" is endowed with liquidity, the chapter shows, among other things, that if land is subject to Liquidity Crunch, increasing the supply of liquidity by pump-priming high-powered money fails to send land's relative price back to pre-liquidity-shock level. This helps to give a rationale for Quantitative Easing in which the central bank purchases "toxic assets" with high-powered money. The chapter includes extensions to account for banks and liquidity as a factor of production, and it ends with a critique of the new crop of financial crisis models, especially those stressing non-linear constraints.

scholarly journals Why is inflation targeting adopted?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
Yutaka Kurihara
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

Since the early 1990s, inflation targeting (IT) has been conducted in many countries and the number of the countries has been increasing rapidly. The outcomes of adopting IT has been discussed, however, the incentives of adopting IT is not fully examined. This study focuses on this issue empirically. The results are clearly divided into two types of countries. In developed countries, budget/GDP ratio, central bank credibility, exchange rate stability, and openness of the economy are deterministic elements of adopting IT, however interestingly, inflation itself does not play any roles of adopting IT. On the other hand, only inflation is the deterministic element of adopting IT in developing countries. Other elements, that are deterministic elements in developed countries, do not any effects on introducing IT. Moreover, countries would not like to limit the scope of policies when the economy’s openness is high.

scholarly journals Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence via Its Internal Characteristics

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroll H. Griffin
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Informal Economy ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Reserve Requirements ◽  
Formal Economy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Macroeconomic Environment

This study examines central bank independence in developing countries of Latin America and Asia as well as selected developed countries. Many countries around the world, both developed and developing, have accepted the idea of central bank independence over the last several decades, so central banks have autonomy. A majority of studies has examined primarily the impact of central bank independence on inflation as promoting the theoretical benefits of a more stable and prosperous macroeconomic environment. However, there is only now sufficient data to empirically determine whether these claims are true. This research attempts to answer why developing economies with an informal sector resort to inflationary measures to finance their activities; how does a government induce an agent to choose the formal economy. In the trade-off between inflation and reserve requirements, the optimal policy is maximum inflation and minimum reserve requirements as increasing the steady-state utility of an optimizing agent. Also agents prefer the informal economy if policy relies on a maximum reserve requirement.  

scholarly journals The external impacts of Central Bank independence

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (54) ◽  
pp. 51-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carroll Howard Griffin
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Standard Procedure ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Macroeconomic Environment

The term "central bank independence" (or abbreviated, CBI) can be broadly defined as the degree of freedom of the central bank to pursue monetary policy without interference from political considerations. The idea of central bank independence has been widely accepted over the last several decades by many countries around the world, both developed and developing. Since being first written about academically in the late 1980s, many countries have come to adopt this policy and many governments have come to recognize this as standard procedure. As such, many countries around the world granted autonomy to their central banks during the 1980s and 1990s. The majority of past studies have examined primarily the impact of central bank independence on inflation. however, the additional theoretical benefits are much more far reaching, the result of a more stable and prosperous macroeconomic environment. Additionally, there is only now sufficient data to empirically determine whether many of these claims are true. This study examines central bank independence in developing countries of Latin America and Asia as well as selected developed countries to determine what actual impact an autonomous central bank has had. It also examines such phenomena as financial crises (including the current global crisis of 2008-2009), inflation targeting, legal systems, country development and fiscal policy to determine the effects of these items on not only inflation, but the broad spectrum of macroeconomic outcomes. Although there is some empirical evidence to support the benefits of central bank independence, it is limited in scope to certain areas.

scholarly journals Financial crisis and central bank independence and governance (CBIG) in the Asia Pacific.

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amirul Ahsan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of financial crisis on central bank independence and governance in 36 Asia Pacific countries. It constructs a unique CBIG index for fifteen years (1991-2005); which has an overall index and six sub-indices covering all the necessary aspects of central banking operations. These indices are ranked first to measure the relative positions of the central banks and then statistically tested their relationship with inflation, economic growth and financial crisis of 1997. It applies a panel data pooled regression model and finds a robust negative relation of CBIG with inflation; moderate positive relation with economic growth; and CBIG in post crisis period is significantly different from the pre-crisis period.

Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes

2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER WAY
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Partisan Politics ◽  
Free Lunch ◽  
Conventional View ◽  
Partisan Theory ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Pooled Time Series

What are the implications of the trend toward granting central bank independence for partisan theories of the macroeconomy? The conventional view is that parties of the Left and Right strive to achieve distinctive macroeconomic outcomes when in government. However, when faced with an independent central bank, parties of the Left may prove unable to produce their preferred partisan outcomes, whereas Right parties may be privileged in their ability to pursue their goals. Moreover, granting the central bank independence can be expected to have differing effects depending on whether Left or Right parties prevail in government. These issues are explored with a pooled time-series model of inflation and unemployment in 16 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries from 1961 through 1991. The results support the claim that the effects of partisan government and central bank organization are mutually contingent. The pattern of results anticipated by partisan theory only arises where central banks are under political control, whereas when central banks are independent, Left governments are disadvantaged and Right governments privileged in their ability to achieve their partisan goals. On the other hand, the effects of central bank independence also depend on the partisanship of government, casting doubt on the claim that an independent central bank always provides a “free lunch” of lower inflation with no attendant costs in terms of increased unemployment.

Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (5) ◽  
pp. 809-830 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abel Mawuko Agoba ◽  
Joshua Yindenaba Abor ◽  
Kofi Osei ◽  
Jarjisu Sa-Aadu ◽  
Benjamin Amoah ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Quality ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fiscal Performance ◽  
Fiscal Balance

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to primarily investigate the ability of independent central banks (central bank independence (CBI)) to improve fiscal performances in Africa, accounting for election years, and also to examine whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced by higher political institutional quality. Design/methodology/approach Using recent CBI data from Garriga (2016) on 48 African countries, 90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries over the period 1970–2012, the authors apply a two stage system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction estimator to examine the impact of CBI and elections on fiscal policy in Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Findings The authors provide evidence that unlike in other developing countries and developed countries, CBI does not significantly improve fiscal performance in Africa. However, the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance in Africa is enhanced by higher levels of institutional quality. Although elections directly worsen fiscal performance in Africa, institutional quality enhances CBI’s effect on improving fiscal performance in election years across Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Practical implications The findings of the study are significant as they provide insight into the benefits of having strong institutions to complement independent central banks in order to control fiscal indiscipline in election years. Originality/value The study is the first among the studies of CBI-fiscal policy nexus, to measure fiscal policy using net central bank claims on government as a percentage of GDP. In addition to the use of fiscal balance, this study also uses cyclically adjusted fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal policy. This is a critical channel through which independent central banks can constrain government spending. It also compares findings in Africa to other developing countries, noting some differences.

Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Russia

2009 ◽  
pp. 9-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kudrin
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Energy Prices ◽  
Russian Government ◽  
The Real

The article examines the causes of origin and manifestation of the current global financial crisis and the policies adopted in developed countries in 2007—2008 to deal with it. It considers the effects of the financial crisis on Russia’s economy and monetary policy of the Central Bank in the current conditions as well as the main guidelines for the fiscal policy under different energy prices. The measures for fighting the crisis that the Russian government and the Central Bank use to support the real economy are described.

scholarly journals Testing for Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Felix S. Nyumuah
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Less Developed Countries ◽  
Reaction Function ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
Asymmetric Preferences ◽  
Policy Reaction Function

The linear specification of the ideal monetary policy reaction function has been questioned in recent times by researchers. They have suggested a nonlinear framework where central banks exhibit asymmetric behaviours. Despite the important policy implications of having asymmetric central bank preferences, studies have been on single-country basis focusing almost entirely on advanced economies. The aim of this study is to check the existence of asymmetric preferences on the part of central banks in the context of a panel of countries and not just a single a country. The study derives and estimates a nonlinear flexible optimal monetary policy rule, which permits zone-like as well as asymmetric behaviours using panel data from a range of countries both developed and less developed. Although the findings indicate the presence of asymmetric preferences on the output gap across less developed countries, generally, the evidence is in favour of a linear policy reaction function and symmetric central bank preferences. These findings mean that monetary policy is characterised by a linear policy rule and symmetric central bank preferences. The results also indicate that interest rate ‘smoothing’ reaction by monetary authorities is more pronounced in less developed countries than in developed ones.

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