scholarly journals Kritik Nalar Kausalitas dan Pengetahuan David Hume

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (02) ◽  
pp. 201-214
Author(s):  
M Suyudi ◽  
Wahyu Hanafi Putra

This research aims at explaining David Hume’s logical critique of causality and knowledge. As library research, the method used is descriptive-qualitative. Data and data sources were obtained from his important works Why Cause is Always A Need and A Treatise of Human Nature and several secondary literatures on causality. The data was carried out through documentation, started by the researcher documenting Hume's thoughts, especially criticism of the law of causality (cause-effect) and knowledge of both of Hume's primary works. The study results explained that Hume criticized the performance of the law of causality, which explained that the existence of a second essence and after it was an impact or certainty of the first essence. The second essential is the consequence and legitimacy of the first one. According to Hume, it cannot serve empirically as the law of causality occurs because the sequential process is stagnant. Hume's skepticism and doubts over dogmatic and metaphysical matters then affect that all knowledge can only be explored with the five senses and is empirical. All irrational and non-empirical characteristics cannot be attributed to a belief and truth. In conclusion, real truths in knowledge are those that can be investigated empirically. Keywords: Causality, Hume, Knowledge, The five senses.   Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan kritik nalar kausalitas dan pengetahuan David Hume. Sebagai penelitian pustaka, metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif-kualitatif. Data dan sumber data didapat dari karya-karya Why Cause is Always Necessary dan A Treatise of Human Nature serta literatur-literatur sekunder yang berkaitan dengan tema kausalitas. Teknik pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan dokumentasi, yaitu peneliti mendokumentasikan pemikiran-pemikiran Hume terutama kritik atas hukum kausalitas (sebab-akibat) dan pengetahuan dari kedua karya primer Hume tersebut. Hasil penelitian menjelaskan bahwa Hume melakukan kritik atas kinerja hukum kausalitas yang menjelaskan bahwa adanya esensi kedua dan setelahnya merupakan dampak atau keniscayaan atas esensi pertama. Esensi kedua merupakan akibat dan legitimasi dari esensi pertama. Hal demikian yang menurut Hume tidak dapat dijelaskan secara empiris. Menurutnya, hukum kausalitas itu terjadi karena proses keterurutan secara stagnan. Sikap skeptis dan ragu-ragu Hume atas perihal yang sifatnya dogmatis dan metafisik membawa dampak bahwa segala pengetahuan hanya bisa digali dengan panca inderawi dan bersifat empiris. Semua perihal yang sifatnya irasional dan tidak empiris tidak dapat dinisbatkan pada suatu keyakinan dan kebenaran. Pada akhirnya, kebenaran sejati dalam pengetahuan adalah yang dapat diselidiki secara empiris. Kata kunci: Hume, Kausalitas, Pengetahuan, Panca Indera

2019 ◽  
pp. 39-76
Author(s):  
Peter S. Fosl

Chapter Two of Hume’s Scepticism charts the development of Academic scepticism from Cicero and Augustine, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and into early modernity. The exposition is organized around sceptical ideas that anticipated or may have influenced David Hume, who describes himself an ‘academical’ sceptic. The chapter also sets out Cicero’s influence upon Hume, scepticism at the college in La Flèche where Hume wrote much of A Treatise of Human Nature, and Hume’s self-conception of Academic scepticism. Accounts of sceptical ideas in Marin Mersenne, Simon Foucher, John Locke, Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle set the stage for Hume’s own Academicism. The chapter closes with a five-point General Framework defining Academic Scepticism.


Author(s):  
David Fate Norton

Francis Hutcheson is best known for his contributions to moral theory, but he also contributed to the development of aesthetics. Although his philosophy owes much to John Locke’s empiricist approach to ideas and knowledge, Hutcheson was sharply critical of Locke’s account of two important normative ideas, those of beauty and virtue. He rejected Locke’s claim that these ideas are mere constructs of the mind that neither copy nor make reference to anything objective. He also complained that Locke’s account of human pleasure and pain was too narrowly focused. There are pleasures and pains other than those that arise in conjunction with ordinary sensations; there are, in fact, more than five senses. Two additional senses, the sense of beauty and the moral sense, give rise to distinctive pleasures and pains that enable us to make aesthetic and moral distinctions and evaluations. Hutcheson’s theory of the moral sense emphasizes two fundamental features of human nature. First, in contrast to Thomas Hobbes and other egoists, Hutcheson argues that human nature includes a disposition to benevolence. This characteristic enables us to be, sometimes, genuinely virtuous. It enables us to act from benevolent motives, whereas Hutcheson identifies virtue with just such motivations. Second, we are said to have a perceptual faculty, a moral sense, that enables us to perceive moral differences. When confronted with cases of benevolently motivated behaviour (virtue), we naturally respond with a feeling of approbation, a special kind of pleasure. Confronted with maliciously motivated behaviour (vice), we naturally respond with a feeling of disapprobation, a special kind of pain. In short, certain distinctive feelings of normal observers serve to distinguish between virtue and vice. Hutcheson was careful, however, not to identify virtue and vice with these feelings. The feelings are perceptions (elements in the mind of observers) that function as signs of virtue and vice (qualities of agents). Virtue is benevolence, and vice malice (or, sometimes, indifference); our moral feelings serve as signs of these characteristics. Hutcheson’s rationalist critics charged him with making morality relative to the features human nature happens at present to have. Suppose, they said, that our nature were different. Suppose we felt approbation where we now feel disapprobation. In that event, what we now call ‘vice’ would be called ‘virtue’, and what we call ‘virtue’ would be called ‘vice’. The moral sense theory must be wrong because virtue and vice are immutable. In response, Hutcheson insisted that, as our Creator is unchanging and intrinsically good, the dispositions and faculties we have can be taken to be permanent and even necessary. Consequently, although it in one sense depends upon human nature, morality is immutable because it is permanently determined by the nature of the Deity. Hutcheson’s views were widely discussed throughout the middle decades of the eighteenth century. He knew and advised David Hume, and, while Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, taught Adam Smith. Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, among other philosophers, also responded to his work, while in colonial America his political theory was widely seen as providing grounds for rebellion against Britain.


2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Linda M. Austin

THE IDEA OF THE SELFin its various constructions–political, economic, psychological–has always been shadowed by an English tradition of skepticism about the persistence of a conscious and stable identity. Voiced most disconcertingly by David Hume in his section, “Of personal identity” fromA Treatise of Human Nature(1739–40; I.iv.vi), this attitude was significantly advanced during the second half of the nineteenth century by a group of physiological psychologists who argued for the corporeal basis of mental functions, including memory. Henry Maudsley and George Henry Lewes, among others, challenged the metaphysical notion of a mind and drew instead from controversial and often suppressed theories of neuroscience to describe the physiological operation of memory. These theories, which located impressions and sensations in the brain or spinal chord, produced a form of identity that could endure alterations of consciousness. They offered, in addition, a new understanding of an adult's physical connection to the personal past.


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Field ◽  
Eric T. Beeson ◽  
Laura K. Jones ◽  
Raissa Miller

This article presents summative findings from a 12-month multiphase mixed-methods pilot study examining counselor and client perceptions of neuroscience-informed cognitive-behavior therapy (nCBT) following clinical application. Results from the first 6 months of the study indicated that the counselor's and client's beliefs about the credibility and effectiveness of nCBT (i.e., expectancy) remained stable from pretreatment to 6 months into treatment. The fourth phase of data collection at the 12-month interval followed an explanatory sequential process whereby the qualitative data were connected to earlier merged quantitative data to better understand initial findings from the first 6 months of the study. Results indicate that counselors' initial comprehension and familiarity with the model, counselor–client trust, counselor delivery and suggestion, and client willingness to practice outside of session were key components to the development of counselor and client belief (expectancy) in the model. Implications for nCBT theory development and application are discussed.


Author(s):  
Pablo Henrique Santos Figueiredo

David Hume, em seus livros Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigação Acerca do Entendimento Humano, propõe a divisão da mente humana em percepções fortes e vivas, as quais recebem o nome de impressões, e suas cópias, que, por sua vez, recebem o nome de ideias. Estas percepções da mente também se dividem em duas: memória e imaginação. A primeira, com maiores graus de força e vivacidade, e a segunda com menores graus de força e vivacidade. As percepções da mente se relacionam a partir das relações filosóficas, que são princípios de associação e dissociação de ideias. A relação da imaginação com as ciências empíricas é o principal aspecto deste trabalho, de modo que, no decorrer do texto, os aspectos que fomentam esta relação serão trabalhados, ilustrando a importância que tem a imaginação no advento das ciências experimentais. Abstract: David Hume, in his books A Treatise Of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, proposes the division of human mind in in strong, lively perceptions, which are called impressions, and their copies, which, in turn, receive the name of ideas. These perceptions of the mind are also divided into two: memory and imagination. The first, with higher degrees of force and vivacity, and the second with lower degrees of force and vivacity.  The perceptions of the mind are related from the philosophical relations, which are the principles of association and dissociation of ideas. The ratio of the imagination with the empirical sciences is the main aspect of this work, so that, throughout the text, aspects that foster this relationship will be worked out, illustrating the importance of the imagination in the advent of experimental sciences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-231
Author(s):  
Saifullah Bin Anshor ◽  
Sartini Lambajo ◽  
Dewi Indriani ◽  
Rizqa Izzati

This study aimed to find out how the law of touching Mushaf of the Qur'an for people who are in hadas according to the Syāfi'ī and Hanbali schools. The type of study was descriptive qualitative research that focuses on retrieving data sources from library research using a normative juridical approach. The results showed that the sects of Syāfi'ī and Hanbali both viewed the prohibition of touching Mushaf of the Qur'an without wudu for the person in hadas. As for the law of touching or carrying a mushaf wrapping sheath (which has a hanger) or a box in which there is a Mushaf of the Qur'an, the sects of Syāfi'ī and Hanbali differ. The Syāfi'ī sect thinks it is haram because it is made for mushaf and converted to it like a mushaf cover skin. The Hanbali sect argues that it is permissible not to touch the mushaf because what is forbidden is touching, while carrying does not mean touching. This difference arises because of differences in views on the basis of qiyas in the source of the law of its sect.


2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER VANDERSCHRAAF

I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic analysis of anarchy, I maintain that typically in anarchy some moderate individuals will most desire mutual cooperation while other dominators will most desire to exploit others' cooperation. I argue that once one allows for different types of individuals in anarchy, any a priori analysis of anarchy requires unrealistic assumptions regarding the agents' common knowledge of their situation. However, this move also suggests a dynamical analysis of anarchy, one that assumes no common knowledge. In the Variable Anticipation threshold model developed here, individuals modify their behavior as they learn from repeated interactions. I present specific instances of this model where the individuals in anarchy converge to different equilibria corresponding to either peace or war, depending on the initial conditions. I show that individuals are liable to converge to Hobbes' war of all against all even if only a small percentage of are dominators. The presence of only a few “nasty” individuals gradually drives all, including those inclined to be “nicer”, to imitate the “nasty” conduct of these few. This dynamic analysis suggests that the Hobbesian war in anarchy is indeed inevitable in most realistic circumstances.You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-79
Author(s):  
Michael B. Gill

AbstractIn the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text.


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