scholarly journals INKONSISTENSI PENERAPAN PRINSIP INDEPENDENSI KEKUASAAN KEHAKIMAN DALAM PELAKSANAAN SELEKSI CALON HAKIM

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-441
Author(s):  
Ikhsan Azhar

The general public in 2017 hotly debated the implemented selection process of Judges. The focus is on the issue of government involvement in the selection process which potentially jeopardize the judiciary’s independence.  In discussing this particular issue, the author uses a juridical normative or dogmatic approach and other data is collected by the use of library research . In addition, the author also compares the existing policy and rules/regulation concerning judge selection from different government’ era (the Old & New Order). A number of conclusions can be drawn from this comparison, i.e. that during the Old dan New Order Government, the judiciary was never considered independent. The government on a regular basis intervene in the selection process, appointment and placement of judges and have a strong say in their professional carrer path.  In contrast, only after the fall of the New Order Government, did the Judiciary enjoy independence which is guaranteed by virtue of Law 35/1999 and the 1945 Constitution (amended version).  Unfortunately though the Supreme Court decide to bring back in the government in the selection process and in doing that jeopardize the judicary’s independence.

BESTUUR ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Suwari Akhmaddhian

<p>The purpose of this study is to determine the regulation of laws and regulations regarding environmental justice in Indonesia and how the concept of building environmental justice in the justice system in Indonesia. This research can be useful both practically and theoretically, practically. The research method used by researchers is the evaluative analysis method, which is a method of gathering and presenting data obtained to analyze the actual situation and then rational analysis is carried out based on juridical references through library research. The results of the research Regulations on the environment are already available namely Law Number 32 of 2009 concerning Environmental Protection and Management and building an environmental justice system starting from improving human resources namely the Supreme Court by consistently educating and training judges with knowledge of aspects of environmental law life that will later handle environmental cases; The Supreme Court makes a special assembly that handles environmental cases; The Supreme Court creates a special chamber that is integrated with the general court that handles environmental cases; The government is amending the 1945 Constitution specifically Article 24 by adding the judicial environment to the environmental court. The conclusion of the legislation is already available and must be used as well as possible and amend the laws and regulations so that bias can be created specifically for environmental justice.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Building; Environmental; Justice System.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This article argues that the Senate’s refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court should be deemed unconstitutional. The Senate’s stonewalling disrespected the institutional needs of the judiciary, violated the constitutional norm of forbearance in the exercise of power, and assumed a Senate role in the appointments process that was never intended. Although no court would ever enjoin a recalcitrant President to make a nomination or an obstructionist Senate to meet with, deliberate over, or vote on a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court or anything else, the President’s and the Senators’ oaths to “support the Constitution” should be understood as entailing a good faith commitment to enabling the government to function.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Diana Majury

In this paper, Diana Majury looks at the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent s.15 decision, R. v. Kapp, in a preliminary exploration of the different understandings of equality she sees operating in three different sites (the Supreme Court, equality advocates, and the general public). She looks at the first two sites simultaneously by offering her equality advocate’s critique of the Kapp decision, outlining where the decision falls short of the substantive equality that equality advocates have been theorizing and promoting. She then looks at media responses to the decision, responses that almost unanimously present a formal equality understanding of equality. Recognizing that media coverage provides only a very limited and partial window on public perceptions, the media coverage of Kapp nonetheless raises the spectre that the general public understands equality only to mean formal equality. This conclusion highlights the importance of Rose Vyovodic’s work in combining equality and public education and the need for that work to be continued and expanded.Dans cet article, Diana Majury examine le récent jugement R. c. Kapp de la Cour Suprême du Canada en rapport avec l’article 15 pour faire une exploration préliminaire des compréhensions diverses de l’égalité qu’elle constate être en jeu dans trois lieux différents (la Cour Suprême, chez les défenseurs de l’égalité et chez le grand public). Elle examine les deux premiers lieux simultanément en présentant sa critique du jugement Kapp en tant que défenseure de l’égalité, exposant en quoi le jugement n’atteint pas l’égalité de fond au sujet de laquelle théorisent et que préconisent les défenseurs de l’égalité. Puis elle examine les réactions médiatiques au jugement, réactions qui présentent presque unanimement une compréhension d’égalité comme égalité formelle. Tout en reconnaissant que la couverture médiatique ne présente qu’une fenêtre très limitée et partielle sur les perceptions du public, la couverture médiatique de Kapp laisse tout de même pressentir que le grand public ne conçoit l’égalité que dans le sens d’égalité formelle. Cette conclusion fait ressortir l’importance de l’oeuvre de Rose Vyovodic qui combinait égalité et éducation du public et le besoin que cette oeuvre se poursuive et grandisse.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 399
Author(s):  
Akmal Adicahya

Access to justice is everyone rights that have to be fulfilled by the government. The regulation number 16 year 2011 of legal aid is an instrument held by the government to guarantee the right. The regulation allowed the participation of non-advocates to provide the legal aid. Through this policy, government emphasizes that:1) Indonesia is a state law which legal aid is an obliged instrument; 2) the prohibition of non-advocate to participate in legal aid is not relevant due to inadequate amount of advocate and citizen seek for justice (justiciabelen), and the advocate is not widely extended throughout Indonesia; 3) Non-Advocates, especially lecturer and law student are widely spread; 4) there are no procedural law which prohibits non-advocate to provide a legal aid. Those conditions are enough argument for government to strengthen the participation of non-advocates in providing legal aid. Especially for The Supreme Court to revise The Book II of Guidance for Implementing Court’s Job and Administration.Keywords: legal aid, non-advocate, justice


2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 854-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy-making role.


Author(s):  
Miren Jasone URKOLA IRIARTE

LABURPENA: Auzitegi Gorenari indultu partzialaren gaian Gobernuak garatutako jardunaren izaera juridikoa zehazteko aukera eman dio bere Hirugarren Salaren Osokoak 2013ko azaroaren 20an adostutako Epaiak. Izaera juridiko hori oinarritzat harturik, administrazio-auzien jurisdikzioak gara dezakeen kontrola aztertuko du ondoren: bereziki, elementu arautuen teknikaren bidez gauza dezakeena [LJren 2(a) art.]. Eremu honetan, Indultu Legeari buruz Auzitegi berak egin izan duen interpretazioa iragazi, eta joera berria ezarriko du, gai berean jarraian argitaratutako epaietan berretsia dirudiena. RESUMEN: La Sentencia del Pleno de la Sala Tercera del Tribunal Supremo de 20 de noviembre de 2013 ofrece al Tribunal Supremo la oportunidad de precisar la naturaleza jurídica de la actuación del Gobierno en materia de indulto, para analizar posteriormente la extensión del control practicable en sede contencioso-administrativa, de modo especial, a través de la técnica de los elementos reglados [art. 2(a) LJ], un ámbito en el que tamiza la lectura de la Ley de Indulto que venía realizando el propio órgano judicial. Marca, así, una nueva tendencia que parece confirmada en sentencias posteriores. ABSTRACT: The judgment by the Third Section plenary of the of the Supreme Court from November 20th of 2013 gives the Supreme Court the chance to establish the legal nature of the Government action regarding the pardon, in order to analyze subsequently the extension of the control to be carried out by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, specially by means of the technic of the regulated elements [art. 2(a) LJ], a field where it weights up the reading of the Act of Pardon that used to do the same judicial body. It marks therefore a new tendency that seems to be confirmed in later judgments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-174
Author(s):  
Paul Nkoane

The jurisdiction of the South African Constitutional Court has been extended for the court to administer ‘matters of general public importance’ in addition to administering constitutional matters. There is no South African court that accepted appeals on the grounds that the matter raised an arguable point of law of general public importance. This novelty in the South African law requires an inspection of other jurisdictions to determine which matters the Constitutional Court should accept for appeals. In this respect, the article inspects the Supreme Court of the United States case docket to determine the kinds of cases the court accepts for appeals.


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