scholarly journals The Constitutional Divide of Postapartheid South Africa in the Jurisdiction of the Traditional Justice System

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-293
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama ◽  
Dazo Ntlama

The exclusive jurisdiction of the traditional justice system – which in effect is based on racial classification – has been the subject of debate in South Africa since the attainment of democracy in 1994. The debate is drawn from the Constitution, which recognises the general system of customary law, and limits its application to the people who observe it. The debate is further fuelled by the non-explicit recognition of the customary court system within the judicial structure of the Republic. These courts are inferred from the concept of ‘any other courts’ in the Constitution. The inference of customary courts from ‘any other courts’, compromises the legitimate status of these courts in the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law – in line with the ideals of the new constitutional dispensation. This considered, this article critically reviews the constitutional status of the customary court system in South Africa. The objective is to examine the effect of its exclusive jurisdiction in the application of the principles of traditional justice. It is also limited to the review of South Africa’s constitutional perspective on the protection of customary law relating to the advancement of the traditional justice system. It is argued, therefore, that the exclusive jurisdiction of the traditional justice system is a direct racial classification under the guise of the foundational values of the new democratic dispensation. Equally, the status given to customary courts – which is inferred from the concepts of ‘any other’ – constitutes a manifestation of the historic divide that compromises the legitimacy of these courts in the application of traditional justice. The extent, to which the exclusive jurisdiction can move towards a system that inclusively reflects the values of the new democratic dispensation, is also reviewed in general.

Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mbuzeni Mathenjwa

The history of local government in South Africa dates back to a time during the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. With regard to the status of local government, the Union of South Africa Act placed local government under the jurisdiction of the provinces. The status of local government was not changed by the formation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961 because local government was placed under the further jurisdiction of the provinces. Local government was enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa arguably for the first time in 1993. Under the interim Constitution local government was rendered autonomous and empowered to regulate its affairs. Local government was further enshrined in the final Constitution of 1996, which commenced on 4 February 1997. The Constitution refers to local government together with the national and provincial governments as spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. This article discusses the autonomy of local government under the 1996 Constitution. This it does by analysing case law on the evolution of the status of local government. The discussion on the powers and functions of local government explains the scheme by which government powers are allocated, where the 1996 Constitution distributes powers to the different spheres of government. Finally, a conclusion is drawn on the legal status of local government within the new constitutional dispensation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 134-160
Author(s):  
Alexander Paterson

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, recognises customary law as an independent and original source of law, subject to the Constitution itself and legislation that specifically deals with customary law. As recognised by the Constitutional Court in Alexkor Ltd vs the Richtersveld Community (2004), customary law, as an independent source of law, may give rise to rights including rights to access and use natural resources. Rights to access and use natural resources are often comprehensively regulated by legislation. Conflicts between customary law and legislation relevant to natural resources may arise, as evidenced in the case of Mr Gongqose, who along with several other community members were caught fishing in the Dwesa-Cwebe Marine Protected Area situated off the Eastern Cape coastline. Notwithstanding their claims to be exercising their customary rights to fish in the area, they were convicted in the Magistrate’s Court for certain offences in terms of the Marine Living Resources Act (1998), under which the marine protected area had been established. Their appeal to the High Court proved unsuccessful and the Supreme Court of Appeal was tasked with considering the relationship between their customary rights to fish and legislation purportedly extinguishing these rights. The SCA’s judgment in Gongqose & Others vs Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries & Others (2018) is the first of its kind in South Africa to consider the extinguishment of customary rights to access and use natural resources through post-constitutional legislation. This note critically considers the guidance the SCA provided on proving the existence of customary rights to access and use natural resources, and the manner in which they may be extinguished through legislation. While the focus is on marine living resources, the lessons emerging from this case are relevant to other natural resource sectors.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-146
Author(s):  
I Ketut Sudantra

Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan urgensi dan strategi pemberdayaan peradilan adat dalam sistem hukum di Indonesia. Secara konseptual, peradilan adat yang dimaksud dalam tulisan ini adalah sistem peradilan yang hidup dan dipraktikkan dalam kesatuan-kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat. Secara konstitusional, eksistensi peradilan adat diakui berdasarkan Pasal 18B ayat (2) Undang-undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, tetapi dalam level peraturan perundang-undnagan di bawah Undang-undang Dasar, eksistensi peradilan adat tidak mendapat pengakuan yang memadai. Kondisi ini menimbulkan dampak melemahnya posisi peradilan adat pada sebagian masyarakat adat ditandai oleh sikap dan perilaku masyarakat yang mulai enggan menyelesaikan perkaranya melalui peradilan adat. Di beberapa tempat, dewasa ini sudah tidak bisa ditemukan lagi adanya peradilan adat. Apabila kondisi ini dibiarkan berlangsung terus maka akan mengancam eksitensi kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat, sebab tanpa adanya pranata peradilan adat yang berfungsi menegakkan norma-norma hukum adat, suatu kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat akan kehilangan eksistensinya sebagai suatu kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat yang hidup. Oleh karena itu, peradilan adat sangat penting dan mendesak direvitalisasi, dalam arti diberdayakan agar dapat berfungsi kembali sebagai alternatif penyelesaian perkara, khususnya di lingkungan kesatuankesatuan masyarakat hukum adat.. Revitalisasi peradilan adat dapat dilakukan melalui strategi pembenahan seluruh komponen sistem hukumnya, baik substansi hukum, struktur hukum, dan buidaya hukumnya. This paper aims to explain the urgency and strategy of empowering customary justice in the legal system in Indonesia. Conceptually, the customary judiciary referred to in this paper is a living justice system that is practiced in customary law communities. Constitutionally, the existence of customary courts is recognized based on Article 18B paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, but at the level of statutory regulations under the Constitution, the existence of adat justice does not receive adequate recognition. This condition has the effect of weakening the position of customary justice in some indigenous communities marked by the attitudes and behavior of people who are reluctant to settle their cases through adat justice. In some places, there is no longer any traditional justice. If this condition is allowed to continue, it will threaten the existence of the customary community, because without customary judicial institutions that function to uphold customary law norms, a customary community community will lose its existence as a living customary community. Therefore, customary justice is very important and urgent to be revitalized, in the sense that it is empowered so that it can function again as an alternative case settlement, especially in the environment of customary law community units. Revitalization of customary justice can be done through a strategy of revamping all components of the legal system, both in substance the law, the legal structure and the legal nature. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (15) ◽  
pp. 1456-1461
Author(s):  
Aaron Mnguni

In terms of the Census 2011 in South Africa, the majority of the South African population use indigenous African languages as mother tongue, compared to the minority that use English, Afrikaans and other languages. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) declared Sepedi (N. Sotho), Sesotho, Setswana, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, Siswati, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu as official languages of the Republic of South Africa. Even though in 1996 eleven languages were declared official by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), English and Afrikaans have maintained their pre-1994 status as de facto languages in the technical and scientific fields. The anomaly of the dominance of English and Afrikaans, particularly in the financial industry, has implication for the development of the majority of the citizens in the country, especially in poverty-alleviation and national development interventions. Without paying a special focus on the dynamics in languages, it could be extremely difficult to understand how issues of power, identity, conflict and resistance are established and maintained within organisations and even governments. The purpose of this paper is to investigate reasons for the persistence of the status quo in the positioning of languages in South Africa in particular regarding financial documents. This paper also looks at some of the challenges the African languages are faced with in making inroads in fields such as the finance, as well as implications for the speakers of the African languages over the two decades after the new dispensation was ushered in. The polysystem theory championed by Even-Zohar assists in putting the role translation can play in the effort of developing African languages and putting African languages into perspective. It is also hoped that this paper will contribute towards the debate on intellectualisation of the African languages in South Africa. Keywords: African languages, financial translation, multilingualism, polysystem, poverty, South Africa.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mybes S. McDougal ◽  
W. Michael Reisman

Locked in south central Africa by Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia comprises a land mass of over 150,000 square miles and a population of about four million blacks and 220,000 whites. From 1889 until 1922 the area was administered by a chartered company formed by Cecil Rhodes. In 1922 the white settlers opted for the status of a self-governing colony, and in 1923 Southern Rhodesia was annexed by Great Britain. In 1953 it joined, with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in a federation, still under the United Kingdom; the venture proved unsuccessful and was terminated in 1963.


Author(s):  
Steven Wheatley

Chapter 5 looks at customary human rights law, explaining how we can think about custom as a self-organizing system, the emergent property of the performative acts of states, who literally ‘speak’ customary human rights into existence; customary law then binds the same countries that brought it into existence, exhibiting the characteristics of a complex system. Complexity serves to remind us of the importance of path dependence, the power of events, and possibilities of change as states respond to new information. The work shows how the measures targeting apartheid South Africa after the Sharpeville Massacre resulted in the first customary human right on the prohibition of racial discrimination, as well as an evolution in the methodology for custom-formation, allowing reference to General Assembly resolutions and law-making treaties. The chapter further demonstrates how the status of persistent objector was denied to apartheid South Africa, confirming the non-negotiable character of fundamental human rights.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Razaana Denson

The following issues are discussed in the article, namely the legal status of Muslim marriages, the legal nature of Muslim marriages, the reasons for non-recognition, in particular the concept of “public policy”, as well as the various approaches adopted by the South African courts when dealing with the issue whether Muslim marriages should be granted legal recognition. The effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on the status and consequences of Muslim marriages as well as the proposal for legal reform in the form of a draft Muslim Marriages Bill which was released on the 22 July 2003 is also dealt with.


Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama

The recent judgment by the Mthatha High Court in Dalisile v Mgoduka ((5056/2018) [2018] ZAECMHC (Dalisile)) has elicited much jubilation over the permeation of customary-law principles into the judicial resolution of disputes that emanate from a customary-law context. The judgment comes at a time when common-law principles appear to have infiltrated the resolution of disputes that originate from customary law. This case paves the way and provides a foundation for the resolution of customary-law disputes within their own context. It reinforces arguments that have long been canvassed to constitutionalise customary law within its own framework. It endorses the envisioned commitment to translate into reality the “healing of the divisions of the past” as envisaged in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Section 211(3) of the Constitution is distinct and prescriptive on the obligations of the courts relating to the application of customary law. Section 211(3) is in the context of pursuing the advancement of a constitutionalised system of customary law that seeks to equate the applicable laws of the Republic.This case has filled a lacuna in the application and interpretation of customary law, which has been clouded by the prism of common law. The gap was acknowledged by the court in Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community (2003 (12) BLCR 1301 (CC). In Alexkor, customary law was affirmed as an independent and legitimate source of law that is empowered to regulate its own affairs within the framework of the Constitution. It does not have to be legitimised and validated by common-law principles in addition to the Constitution.Resolving disputes arising from customary law has been a great cause for concern. The courts have delivered many disappointing judgments in the area of resolving customary-law disputes. These judgments appear to lean towards importing common-law principles into the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law. This case note does not intend to discuss these judgments in any depth as they have been dealt with elsewhere.It is thus not the purpose of this case discussion to delve into the history of customary law. Its intended focus is limited to the significant stride made by the court in Dalisile in uprooting the dominance of the application of common-law principles in the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law. The objective is to generate debate on the contribution that the judgment makes to the incorporation of Africanised principles into the broader constitutional framework of the jurisprudence of our courts. The note argues that it is the Constitution that is the dominant authority over all the legal systems that are applicable in the Republic, including customary law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Aaron Mnguni

Language policies are the cornerstone that establish and maintain communication amongst people. Proper communication, particularly amongst speakers of many languages in a country such as South Africa hinges heavily on perceptions regarding the status of the languages used in that specific country. According to the Republic of South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), South Africa has eleven official languages. Nine of these official languages (the indigenous African languages), are regarded as historically disadvantaged, while the remaining two, viz. English and Afrikaans enjoyed official recognition under the then ‘apartheid’ era that lasted until 1994. The previously disadvantaged African languages still lag in terms of development, when compared to English and to a lesser extent, Afrikaans. To address this challenge and reverse the status quo, several measures have been undertaken by government, including the passing of an Act called, Use of Official Languages Act, 2012. This Act aims at managing the use of the official languages optimally, with special emphasis on the previously marginalised languages. South Africa is known for developing good language policies but often criticised for producing such good policies for one good purpose only - to display them in office shelves. Following this state of affairs, this article therefore examines the implementation challenges regarding this Act and suggest what could be done to successfully implement it in South Africa. Second, the article also seeks to alleviate the perceived apathy in implementing language policies, particularly in South Africa, and with implications for Africa as a whole.


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