scholarly journals Representing Veterans

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122
Author(s):  
Jennifer D. Oliva

Federal law has long deprived American veterans of certain fundamental legal rights enjoyed by non-veterans and attributable to veteran sacrifice. Federal case law, for example, denies veterans the right to bring an action in tort against the federal government to vindicate in-service injuries. And the United States Code deprives veterans of their right to robust judicial oversight of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) service-connected benefit decisions. This pair of due process deprivations is compounded by the federal statute that prohibits veterans from exercising the fundamental right to counsel during the initial stage of the VA claims process. This Article examines the federal statutory scheme and pertinent case law that has long denied veterans the right to counsel throughout the VA veteran claims adjudication process, debunks the rationales underlying that law, and concludes by recommending that the federal government extend to veterans the right to counsel throughout the VA’s benefits adjudication proceedings.

Author(s):  
John B. Nann ◽  
Morris L. Cohen

This chapter examines the creation of a better-organized world of legal research through the development and refinement of several legal research tools. The federal government made its first attempt at codification in 1873. At roughly the same time, West Publishing Company began producing a comprehensive collection of state and federal case reporters, which came to be known as the National Reporter System. West also applied the concept of case law digests to the National Reporter System, thus offering legal researchers a comprehensive collection of cases and tools that provided a consistent topical arrangement of case law. By listing every reported case that cited a given case and indicating how the subsequent treated the earlier, citators became a valuable research tool for attorneys. The era reached its climax of successful federal law codification with the publication in 1925 of the United States Code, using the organization developed for the federal government by West.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the application of federal and state law to conduct that takes place outside the territory of the United States. It begins by discussing the territorial scope of U.S. constitutional rights. Special consideration is given to the extraterritorial application of the right of habeas corpus in light of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, concerning the habeas corpus rights of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba. The chapter then discusses the “presumption against extraterritoriality” that the Supreme Court applies when interpreting federal statutes. For situations in which the presumption is overcome or is inapplicable, the chapter explains how customary international law principles relating to prescriptive jurisdiction can be relevant in U.S. litigation through application of the Charming Betsy canon of construction. In addition, the chapter discusses the role of “universal jurisdiction” in U.S. litigation and criminal prosecution. Possible constitutional limitations on the extraterritorial application of both federal statutes and state laws, based on due process and other considerations, are also considered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-834
Author(s):  
Michael Gorup

Lynch mobs regularly called on the language of popular sovereignty in their efforts to authorize lynchings, arguing that, as representatives of the people, they retained the right to wield public violence against persons they deemed beyond the protections of due process. Despite political theorists’ renewed interest in popular sovereignty, scholars have not accounted for this sordid history in their genealogies of modern democracy and popular constituent power. I remedy this omission, arguing that spectacle lynchings—ones that occurred in front of large crowds, sometimes numbering in the thousands—operated as public rituals of racialized people-making. In the wake of Reconstruction, when the boundaries of the polity were deeply contested, spectacle lynchings played a constitutive role in affirming and circulating the notion that the sovereign people were white, and that African Americans were their social subordinates.


1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles J. McClain

In its October term 1882, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision which aborted federal efforts to deal with anti-black violence in the states of the old Confederacy. At issue in the case of United States v. Harris was the constitutionality of a federal statute, Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States of 1874, which made it a crime for private persons to conspire to deprive other individuals of the equal protection of the laws. A group of white Tennesseeans had been convicted under the statute for assaulting and badly beating a group of black criminal defendants in the custody of local authorities. The court held that there was no foundation in the Constitution for the federal law and voided it, thus overturning the convictions. The 14th Amendment, the purported basis for the statute, was aimed, according to the court, at state action and did not empower Congress to legislate against purely private conduct. It was the same line of reasoning that would lead the court in its following term, in the celebrated Civil Rights Cases, to declare unconstitutional Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which established civil and criminal penalties for racially motivated interference with anyone's full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations and conveyances.


Author(s):  
Anthony Gray

In recent years, we have seen continued erosion of an individual’s right to silence. The most recent attempts in the author’s home country, Australia, include a current proposal to adopt the United Kingdom approach, and allow inferences to be drawn from a failure to answer questions at an early stage of investigation, in circumstances where later the person does provide an explanation. An attempt to protect the right to silence in Australia at constitutional level is challenging, because Australia is one of the few Western nations that has not seen fit to enact an express bill of rights. This article will consider whether arguments might be made that, at least in some contexts, infringement of the right to silence is, nevertheless, contrary to the requirements of the Australian Constitution. Courts in other countries around the world have also recognized the right to silence in some circumstances where legislatures have attempted to limit it, and these will be considered in the Australian context, acknowledging appropriate contextual differences. Many countries are faced with the difficulty of reconciling fundamental due process principles with the need for effective investigatory powers sufficient to deal with evolving criminal threats. It will be instructive to consider how a successful balance has been accommodated in a range of jurisdictions. It is believed that the law of the author’s home country could be greatly enriched by engaging with North American and European case law, as this article will seek to demonstrate. The article is considered to be of interest to those outside of Australia, to understand the difficulties in protecting fundamental human rights when an express bill of rights does not exist in the relevant country, and to consider how other ways may be found to protect such rights. In this way, this article will use Australia as the example of a country without an express bill of rights, and will consider how, in that context, fundamental human rights can practically be protected by the courts. The conclusions are considered relevant to a range of nations. Specific examples include Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent India, as will be explained.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Van Quan ◽  
Nguyen Bich Thao

Currently, civil procedure legal science in the world begins to study the application of fair procedural rights. Meanwhile, Vietnamese civil procedure legal science seems to pay attention to the proceedings instead of the procedural rights. In this context, the paper examines the application of rights of due process around the world and in Vietnam. From there, the author suggests a number of appropriate orientations in this area that Vietnam should apply in the near future in order to match the trend in the world and the reality of Vietnam. Keywords: Civil procedure, due process, rights of due process, human rights. References: [1] Rhonda Wasserman, Procedural Due Process: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.[2] E. Thomas Sullivan and Toni M. Massaro, The Arc of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, 2013.[3] Khoa Luật Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội, Giáo trình Luật tố tụng dân sự Việt Nam, NXB. Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội.[4] European Court of Human Rights (2013), Guide to Article 6: The Right to a Fair Trial (Civil Limb), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf.[5] C.H. Van Rhee & Alan Uzelac (eds.), Truth and Efficiency in Civil Litigation: Fundamental Aspects of Fact-Finding and Evidence-Taking in a Comparative Context, Intersentia, 2012, pp. 5-6.    


Author(s):  
Nicolás Pérez Sola

Se analiza la recepción por el Tribunal Constitucional de la jurisprudencia del TEDH sobre el derecho al proceso con todas las garantías en la segunda instancia penal cuando a través de sentencia condenatoria se revisa sentencia absolutoria en la primera instancia.This essay focuses on the reception by the Constitutional Court of the case law of the ECtHR on the right to trial with guarantees of due process in second criminal instance, in cases where a court convicts an accused who was acquitted by the first instance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Soojin NAM

Abstract With the global proliferation of antitrust law enforcement, multinational businesses, scholars, and practitioners have clamoured for stronger due process protection in competition adjudication. Often, the argument assumes the existence of a due process standard applicable internationally to all competition jurisdictions. The standard comprises certain features typical of adversarial adjudication, including a neutral decision-maker, a live in-person hearing before such decision-maker, and the right to present and cross-examine evidence and witnesses. This paper challenges this alleged due process standard on two different levels by comparing the competition adjudication procedures of the United States Federal Trade Commission, the European Commission, and the Korea Fair Trade Commission. First, the paper shows that such a standard, which advances certain features of Anglo-American adversarial adjudication, is at odds with the local due process laws of the European Union and South Korea. Second, the paper shows that implementing such adversarial features would pose significant practical problems in jurisdictions where existing administrative procedures are largely inquisitorial or ‘continental.’ While the supporters of the due process argument identify a number of procedural problems that should be addressed, framing these problems as a due process issue would only be counterproductive.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis

A hotly debated issue raised in this publication’s October 1986 Agora and, repeatedly, during the drafting of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) has to do with the relationship between customary international law and federal law in the United States. Most of the debate addressed whether a newly emerged custom would supersede an earlier federal statute or self-executing treaty. The reporters of the Restatement took a strong stand at first, placing custom on the same plane as federal statutes and self-executing treaties: in case of conflict, the latest in time should prevail. Criticism rolled in, and the reporters eventually retreated a bit. The final version says only that since custom and international agreements have equal authority in international law, and both are law of the United States, “arguably later customary law should be given effect as law of the United States, even in the face of an earlier law or agreement, just as a later international agreement of the United States is given effect in the face of an earlier law or agreement.”’


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