THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LIFE SENTENCE REGIME: THE PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND UKRAINIAN LEGISLATION

Author(s):  
Maksym Ovdiienko ◽  
◽  
Anastasiia Sorokina ◽  
Mykhailo Romanov ◽  
◽  
...  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Mario Antinucci

Life sentence penalty covers a diverse range of practices, from the most severe form of life imprisonment without parole, in which a person is sentenced to die in prison so long as their sentence stands, to more indeterminate sentences in which at the time of sentencing it is not clear how long the sentenced person will spend in prison. Dealing with the question whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state where is accused of a crime for which a sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed can potentially violate article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.What all these sentences have in common, however, is that at the time the sentence is passed, a person is liable to be detained for the rest of his or her natural life. We all know “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules” and relevant international instruments on the rehabilitation of imprisonment, but at the moment more than 73 States in the world retain life imprisonment as a penalty for offences committed while under the age of 18. General perspective of criminal justice reform in Latin America should take into a right account the meaning of life - imprisonment penalty under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Szydło

The recent judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) in Vinter and Others reflects a very significant change in the Court's attitude to those actions of the states parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘the Convention’ or ‘the ECHR’) that consist in the imposition and further execution of whole life sentences. In this judgment, the Court concluded that Article 3 of the Convention – which prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading punishment – requires the reducibility of all whole life sentences as imposed by national courts, in the sense of a review mechanism which allows domestic authorities to conclude whether in the course of a life sentence the legitimate peno-logical grounds justifying the further incarceration of a life prisoner still exist. Moreover, such a mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence must be provided for by a national law and, consequently, must be known to a life prisoner already at the moment of imposition of the whole life sentence. What is also important, a life prisoner, at the outset of his/her sentence, must know when (i.e. after how many years) and under what conditions a review of his/her sentence will take place or may be sought, and what he/she must do to be considered for release. Otherwise, the very imposition of a life sentence by a national court infringes Article 3 of the Convention.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-233
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bild

The exercise of the Secretary of State's power to release from prison a murderer sentenced to a whole life order would be controversial and politically fraught. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) succinct summary of the offending leading to the whole life order imposed on the applicant in Hutchinson v United Kingdom (57592/08), Judgment of 17 January 2017, demonstrates quite why a Secretary of State would find exercising their compassionate release powers so politically unpalatable: “In October 1983, the applicant broke into a family home, where he stabbed to death a man, his wife and their adult son. He then repeatedly raped their 18-year-old daughter, having first dragged her past her father's body” (at [10]). Yet the power to release life sentence prisoners on compassionate grounds under s. 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 has become the fig leaf covering a more fundamental disagreement between the domestic courts and the ECtHR: whether it is possible to commit offences of such gravity that, for the purposes of retribution and deterrence, a person must forfeit their right to liberty for the duration of their life.


2011 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seema Kandelia

This article reviews the system of whole life orders in England and Wales, looking in particular at whether such sentences constitute inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This issue came before the European Court of Human Rights in 2008 in the case of Kafkaris v Cyprus. The court held that a whole life tariff would not violate Article 3 as long as there was some possibility that a life sentence was de jure or de facto reducible. The possible grounds for the release of a prisoner serving a whole life sentence in England and Wales is, however, extremely limited. This article will assess to what extent the release procedures regarding whole lifers meet the criteria laid down by the European and domestic courts and whether there is any realistic hope of release for prisoners sentenced to whole life orders.


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bild

THERE can be little doubt that there is disagreement between the Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over the whole-life sentence in England and Wales. Despite evolving jurisprudence on the issue of life-long detention emanating from Strasbourg, the Court of Appeal has readily upheld the English whole-life sentence in recent years. It has been doing so by adopting a very wide interpretation of the Secretary of State's power to order the compassionate release of a life sentence prisoner.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-301
Author(s):  
Marko Milanović ◽  
Tatjana Papić

The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) in Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary is remarkable both on account of its facts and the peculiar legal issues it raised. In 2004, an ax-wielding Azerbaijani army officer (R.S.) beheaded one Armenian officer, and attempted to kill another, while attending a NATO-organized English language course in Budapest, Hungary. R.S. was prosecuted in Hungary and given a life sentence. Eight years later, R.S. was transferred to Azerbaijan to serve the remainder of his sentence. However, upon his arrival, R.S. received a hero's welcome. He was released, pardoned, promoted, and awarded salary arrears for the period spent in prison, as well as the use of a state apartment in the capital. Many high-ranking Azerbaijani officials expressed their approval of R.S.'s conduct and pardon. (The long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan of course looms in the background of this story.)


2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-208
Author(s):  
Naomi Hart

THE ECtHR has for the second time in three years engaged with the British Government's handling of whole-life prison terms. In Hutchinson v United Kingdom (Application no. 57592/08), Judgment of 3 February 2015, not yet reported, the Fourth Section accepted the authoritativeness of an English court's decision on the meaning of English law relating to the Home Secretary's discretion to reduce a whole-life sentence. It also yielded to national judges on whether this sentence review mechanism complies with the proscription on inhuman and degrading treatment in Article 3 of the ECHR.


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